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ABSTRACT 
This thesis makes significant contributions to improving the use of Airport Safety 
Areas (ASAs) as aviation accident risk mitigation measures by developing improved 
accident frequency models and risk assessment methodologies. In recent years, the 
adequacy of ASAs such as the Runway End Safety Area and Runway Safety Area has 
come under increasing scrutiny. The current research found flaws in the existing 
ASA regulations and airport risk assessment techniques that lead to the provision of 
inconsistent safety margins at airports and runways. 
The research was based on a comprehensive database of ASA-related accidents, 
which was matched by a representative sample of normal operations data, such that 
the exposure to a range of operational and meteorological risk factors between 
accident and normal flights could be compared. On this basis, the criticality of 
individual risk factors was quantified and accident frequency models were developed 
using logistic regression. These models have considerably better predictive power 
compared to models used by previous airport risk assessments. 
An improved risk assessment technique was developed coupling the accident 
frequency models with accident location data, yielding distributions that describe the 
frequency of accidents that reach specific distances beyond the runway end or 
centreline given the risk exposure profile of the particular runway. The application 
of the proposed methodology was demonstrated in two case studies. Specific 
recommendations on ASA dimensions were made for achieving consistent levels of 
safety on each side of the runway. Advances made in this study have implications on 
the overall assessment and management of risks at airports. 
Key words: Airport risk assessment, aerodrome design, airport land-use planning, 
aircraft accidents, third party risk, risk exposure, accident frequency model, logistic 
regression 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background & Justification 
The airlines are estimated to carry 2.2 billion passengers and almost 40 million tonnes 
of freight in 2006 (IATA 2006). Meanwhile, air travel has preserved its title as the 
safest form of mass transport (Muir & Thomas 2004). The hull loss rate of 2005 is a 
remarkable 0.76 per million sectors flown (IATA 2006). There was less than one 
fatal accident per five million flights between 2002 and 2005 in US commercial 
aviation (GAO 2005a). 
Growth in the aviation sector is expected to continue for the years to come. By 2015, 
commercial aviation in the United States alone is projected to carry one billion 
passengers (FAA 2006a). International passenger traffic is estimated to grow 5.6 
percent annually between 2005 and 2009 (IATA 2005). If the industry is to sustain 
its expansion, one of the challenges that must be met is maintaining its excellent 
safety record. 
The majority of accidents occur at or near airports (Cowell et al. 1997). Hale (2002) 
reports that some 70 percent of crashes take place close to airports while Ashford 
(1998) found 90 percent of aviation accidents occur during phases of flight related to 
take-off and landing. For the worldwide commercial jet fleet, 69 percent of accidents 
and 42 percent of fatalities between 1996 and 2005 occurred during the take-off, 
initial climb, final approach and landing phases of flight (Boeing 2005). The 
European Transport Safety Council also highlighted the concentration of aircraft 
accidents in climb and approach (ETSC 1999a). Appropriate protection and 
mitigation measures for these types of accidents and their consequences would 
translate into a significant improvement in aviation safety as a whole. Chapter 2 
provides more detailed descriptions and statistics on each of the accident types 
concerned. 
1.2 Growing Pressures 
With the industry-wide implementation of Safety Management Systems, there is a 
growing need to improve the management of safety at airports. The following 
developments add to the pressure to examine current risk mitigation policies. 
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1.2.1 Traffic growth vs. safety improvement 
Aviation worldwide expects robust growth in the years to come (IATA 2005). The 
US air transport system is expected to carry one billion passengers by 2015 (FAA 
2006a). If the accident rate does not improve, traffic growth alone will increase the 
absolute number of accidents to an extent unacceptable to the public and regulators 
within the foreseeable future (Roelen et al. 2004, Simmons & Forrest 2005, ICAO 
2006, Lee 2006). Because of the increase in flights, it is projected that there will be 
23 fatal approach and landing accidents worldwide annually by 2010 (CAST 1999). 
The US has a goal of reducing the commercial fatal accident rate to 0.0 10 per 100,000 
departures by 2007. If applied to the forecast traffic of 2025, there would still be ten 
accidents per year (Fiorino 2005). 
Despite the very low accident rate, it is nonetheless the frequency of accident 
occurrence and their absolute number which the public uses as the yardstick for safety 
(Hayes 2003). The average person rarely considers the increase in exposure due to 
the growing number of flights (FAA 1997). In order to maintain public confidence, 
the accident rate must improve in line with traffic growth (CAA 1998, Hayes 2003). 
Unfortunately, there are signs of slowing safety improvement in aviation. The 
reduction of accident occurrences and the decline in accident rate appear to be 
slowing and stabilising (Raghavan & Rhoades 2005). 
1.2.2 Capacity needs 
With rising traffic levels, many airports have plans to increase capacity. Extra 
capacity at the busiest airports in Europe and America is likely to have significant 
impacts on the level and distribution of risk near airports. In the past, demand for 
more capacity has already led to more over-flights of residential areas, increasing 
third party risk (Eurocontrol 2005). New aerodrome designs, such as the End- 
Around Taxiway which runs around runway ends now installed at Atlanta-Hartsfield 
International Airport and Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport in the US, introduce 
new risks to the system. 
1.2.3 Development encroachment 
As airports expand in size, communities are also spreading out towards them. Van 
Nuys Airport, California was in the middle of orange groves in the 1940s and 1950s 
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but urban development now fills the seven mile radius of the airport (Esler 2006). 
With no more room for expansion and thousands of homes and businesses 
surrounding it, airport and community now sit cheek by jowl. Other airports, such as 
Lowell Airport in Michigan, tell of developers overpowering town planners to build 
in close proximity to runways (Avweb 2005). Airports tend to attract corporate real 
estate too. From East Midlands Airport, UK to Hong Kong International Airport, 
business parks are increasingly located near runways. These developments have 
consequences on risks (ETSC 1999b, Ale & Piers 2000a, State of California 2002). 
Third party risk exposure mounts as communities and airports draw closer to one 
another. 
In the Netherlands, the policy of capping third party risk at 1990 levels at Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport has already failed because of the growth in traffic and employees in 
the area (Post et al. 2006). Instead, societal risk - one of the measures of third party 
risk - has almost doubled between 1990 and 2006. It is expected that large airports 
will have increasing difficulty in meeting standards on third party risk (Caves 1996). 
1.3 Research Aims 
The provision of airport safety areas (ASAs), such as the Runway End Safety Area 
(RESA) and Public Safety Zone (PSZ), is a crucial element of risk mitigation against 
near-airport aviation accidents. However, the development of some of these areas 
lacks substantial research and defendable analysis, relying more on historical 
precedent and qualitative expert judgement (Kirkland et al. 2003a). The aim of this 
thesis is to improve the effectiveness of ASAs as a means of managing risks related to 
aircraft accidents near airports. The overall concern of this work, then, centres on 
developing a more risk-based, flexible and effective strategy of risk mitigation by 
airport safety areas. 
The primary objective of this study is to build a predictive model of the occurrence of 
landing and take-off accidents at or near airports. The model would be capable of 
discriminating between airports of different risk levels to the extent that is significant 
for the formulation of ASA policies. This contributes to the development of an 
improved tool for airport risk assessment. The focus of the study has been placed on 
the probability of accident occurrence, rather than the accident location or 
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consequence, because understanding accident frequency is not only essential to risk 
management (GASR undated) but it is also the first and prerequisite step to a full risk 
assessment exercise. 
Another key objective of this study is the development of a comprehensive database 
of all accidents associated with ASAs. For its depth and breadth, it would be the 
definitive resource for current and future ASA risk analyses. 
A representative database of normal operations' risk exposure is also to be generated 
to provide unprecedented insight into non-incident flights' exposure to a multitude of 
meteorological and operational risk factors. 
Combining the strengths of the accident and normal operations databases, this thesis 
aims to quantify the criticality of a range of risk factors as well as the risk of accident 
occurrence at particular airports according to their exposure to specific risks. 
Additionally, this study reviews the current approach to risk management in 
aerodrome design and ASA policies in light of the industry's adoption of risk-based 
safety management. Then, in view of the risk assessment technique developed, it 
suggests policy options that would assist the industry to conform with the prevailing 
philosophy of safety management. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The next chapter provides a more detailed account of the risks related to the take-off 
and landing phases of flight. 
Chapter 3 reviews the existing risk mitigation measures and gives an account of the 
issues surrounding regulatory compliance and the intrinsic deficiencies of the present 
risk mitigation regime. 
Chapter 4 presents the fundamental characteristics of the Safety Management System, 
which is gaining industry acceptance as the standard framework for safety oversight. 
This chapter highlights the role of risk assessment and explains the need for improved 
methodologies of assessing risks. 
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Chapter 5 considers former airport risk assessment studies, including their main 
concerns, analytical approaches and key shortfalls. This provides the context in 
which the current research is carried out. 
Chapter 6 presents the proposed risk assessment methodology, justifies the chosen 
approach and highlights the advances made. The chapter also sets out the structure 
of the subsequent analysis and modelling work. 
Chapter 7 describes the development of a comprehensive database of ASA-related 
accidents while Chapter 8 presents the analysis of this database, highlighting accident 
trends as well as differences between accident types. 
Chapter 9 explains the development of the normal operations database, including the 
data sources, sampling strategy as well as the extensive efforts spent on ensuring that 
it is compatible with the accident database. 
Chapter 10 details the bivariate analysis using accident and normal operations data to 
quantify and characterise the criticality of individual risk factors. The differences in 
risk exposure between accident and normal flights were extensively compared using a 
number of statistical techniques. 
Chapter 11 presents the development of accident frequency models using logistic 
regression. The choice of the statistical procedure, the form and coefficients of the 
four risk models and their respective goodness-of-fit and predictive performance are 
discussed. 
Chapter 12 considers the distribution of accident wreckage locations based on the 
comprehensive database described in Chapter 7. This is an essential step before the 
application of the accident frequency models for risk assessment. 
Based on two case study airports, Chapter 13 demonstrates how the accident 
frequency models could be used for practical airport risk assessment along with the 
accident location distributions. Recommendations on ASA needs for each of the 
runways in the case studies are included. 
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The thesis concludes with Chapter 14, which reviews the major breakthroughs of the 
study including their significance and implications. The limitations of the work and 
avenues of further research are also discussed. 
1.5 EPSRC Project & Responsibilities 
The research of this thesis was carried out within the context of a broader project 
funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). 
While a research team was responsible for completing the EPSRC project, the work 
described in this thesis was undertaken solely by the author, with the exception of the 
development of the accident database, which was a joint-effort as described in 
Chapter 7. The present author had sole responsibility over the literature review, 
collection of normal operations data, all data analysis, subsequent modelling, model 
application and the reporting of the research. 
1.6 Prior Publications and Presentations 
Parts of this thesis have been previously published in preliminary form (Wong et al., 
2006a, 2006b). Presentations have also been made at academic as well as industry 
conferences (Wong et al. 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f). 
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CHAPTER 2 THE RISKS 
2.1 Safety vs. Risk 
Safety is more a construct or concept than a quantifiable entity (Rose 2005). One 
considers relative safety rather than absolute safety (State of California 2002, ICAO 
2006). Research in safety, then, relies on the notion of risk, which could be measured 
(Lowrance 1976). The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defines "safety 
risk" as a measure of probability and impact (Rose 2005). This thesis focuses on the 
probability of occurrence of accidents at airports and their vicinity, which are 
described in more detail in the remainder of this chapter. 
2.2 Accidents at and near airports 
A commercial aircraft spends only about six percent of its flight time in the take-off, 
initial climb, final approach and landing phases of flight. Nonetheless, 
approximately 70 percent of hull loss accidents occur during these stages of operation 
(FAA 1997). 
Approach and landing accidents have come under the industry's scrutiny for some 
years. The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) identified approach and landing accidents 
(ALAs) as the primary cause of fatalities in aviation along with controlled-flight-into- 
terrain (Khatwa et al. 1998). The approach and landing phase of flight begins at 
descent and continues though the landing or missed approach procedure (CAST 
1999). From 1980 to 1996 there were 287 ALAs involving jet and turboprop aircraft 
(MTOW>12500 lbs), resulting in 7185 fatalities (Ashford 1998). It is understood 
that approach and landing is the most unforgiving and stressful phase of flight for 
pilots because of the high information load and the numerous tasks that must be 
handled simultaneously (Fitzgerald 1998, Van Es et al. 2001). 
Take-off accidents deserve much attention too. Although they occur less frequently 
than ALAs, their consequences in terms of fatalities and aircraft damage tend to be 
more serious. Research comparing landing and take-off incidents confirms this 
(David 1990, CAA 1998, Eddowes et al. 2001, Kirkland 2001a). 
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Take-off and landing accidents comprise of several sub-categories of occurrences - 
overruns, veer-offs, undershoots, crashes after take-off and third-party accidents. 
These are now considered in turn. 
2.2.1 Overruns 
According to the FAA, an overrun occurs when an aircraft passes beyond the end of a 
runway during an aborted take-off or while landing (FAA 1989). The United 
Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) similarly considers an aircraft to have 
overrun a runway if its ground run on take-off or landing extends beyond the distance 
that has been declared by the aerodrome as suitable for that purpose (CAA 1998). 
In a FAA study, aircraft that veer-off the side of the runway but come to rest beyond 
the departure end of the runway are also included as overruns (David 1990). 
There are an average of ten aborted take-off or landing overruns at US airports every 
year (Croft 2004). During thirty years of jet transport service up to 1992,46 
accidents and 28 potentially serious incidents have occurred due to overruns during 
rejected take-offs alone, resulting in over 400 fatalities (Boeing 1992). In the UK, 
there were 26 overruns involving civilian, fixed-wing aircraft over 5700kg MTWA 
between 1976 and 1996 (CAA 1998). Even though the overall accident rate of 
aircraft operations have fallen significantly in the past three decades, the rate of 
overruns has not improved over the same period (Kirkland et al. 2003b). 
There are a number of prominent examples of aircraft overruns in 2005 alone. In 
February, a Challenger CL-600 business jet aborted its take-off at Teterboro Airport, 
New Jersey. It overran the end of the runway, crossed a six-lane highway, struck a 
vehicle and smashed into a warehouse, injuring twenty (Parry 2005, Rosero 2005). 
In August, Air France flight 358 overran the runway upon landing with 309 people on 
board at Toronto Pearson International Airport. The Airbus 340 aircraft stopped 
metres from Etobicoke Creek and burst into flames (Simmie et al. 2005). 
2.2.2 Veer-offs 
The FAA defines a veer-off as an aircraft running off the side of the runway during 
take-off or landing roll (David 1990). Veer-off accidents are closely related to 
overruns. In this study, the two are distinguished only by the aircraft's path of 
deviation. Instead of passing beyond the runway end as in an overrun, the veer-off 
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aircraft leaves either side of the paved runway onto the surrounding runway strip. It 
involves greater lateral deviation from the runway centreline before reaching the end 
of the runway. 
The combined frequency with which veer-off incidents occur during commercial 
flight landings and take-offs is estimated at 4.4 x 10'7 per movement (Eddowes et al. 
2001). 
Better known veer-off accidents include the case at Los Angeles International Airport, 
California in February 1991. USAir Flight 1493 was cleared to land on a runway 
which another aircraft occupied. The USAir Boeing 737 collided with the Southwest 
Metroliner and veered off the runway hitting an airport building, killing 22 (NTSB 
1991). 
2.2.3 Undershoots 
An undershoot occurs when a landing aircraft contacts the ground or an obstruction 
prior to reaching the runway (Ashford & Wright 1992). However, there is no 
industry-wide agreement on how near the crash or wreckage site must be from the 
runway threshold to constitute an undershoot. A FAA study uses 2000ft as the cut- 
off point (David 1990). 
The 1978 - 2000 average occurrence rate for commercial carriers is roughly 10"7 
incidents per landing while the combined figure for commercial operations and air 
taxis is 2.5 x 10"7 (Eddowes et al. 2001). The fatality rate of undershoots has been 
found to be about twice as high as overruns (Ashford 1998). 
Notable undershoot accidents include the British Midland Boeing 737, which crashed 
onto a highway embankment approximately 900m short of runway 27 of East 
Midlands Airport UK in 1989 with 46 fatalities (AAIB 1990). 
2.2.4 Crashes after take-off 
Crashes after take-off can be broadly defined as accidents that take place between an 
aircraft achieving lift-off and levelling off. Occuring after the take-off roll and 
during climb, crashes after take-off are usually high energy, high consequence events. 
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A recent example of crash after take-off occurred in August 2006. Comair Flight 
5191 used the wrong runway for take-off at Lexington Blue Grass Airport, Kentucky. 
The CRJ-100 subsequently crashed about a mile from the airport with 49 fatalities 
(BBC 2006a). 
2.2.5 Third paLty accidents 
Third party accidents are those that cause injury or death to persons not involved in 
operating or taking that specific flight. Third parties of aviation accidents have little 
or no control over their exposure to risk (Brady & Hillestad 1995), which originate 
principally from living or working near airports. Since a large proportion of aircraft 
accidents occur near airports, areas in the vicinity of busy runways are subject to 
above average risk (Cowell et al. 1997). While not all accidents near airports result 
in third party injuries or deaths, all occurrences outside the airport boundaries have 
the potential of causing third party casualties. 
European studies have found that, on average, every accident involves one third party 
death (Monk 1981, Caves 1996). In the UK, there was an average of 3.5 cases of 
"Falling Aircraft" per year between 1990 and 1999 (CAA 2000). These include all 
cases where an aircraft struck or ended up on third party property. 
One of the most notorious accidents involving third party deaths is El Al Flight 1862 
of October 1992. The Boeing 747 crashed in the suburban district of Bijlmer, 
Amsterdam, resulting in 43 third party deaths (Smith 1995). Earlier in December 
1985, a Beechcraft Baron crashed into Sun Valley Mall in Concord, California, killing 
84 shoppers (Kimura & Bennett 1993). More recently in December 2005, Southwest 
Flight 1248 overran the runway at Chicago Midway Airport, Illinois. The Boeing 
737 crossed a fence onto a road, impacted a car and killed one of its passengers (BBC 
2006b). 
Awareness of aviation third party risk has increased throughout the 1990s, with 
growing concern in many European countries (Piers et al. 1993, ETSC 1999a). There 
is evidence emerging that the risk to people living near busy runways is comparable to 
the risk of living near chemical plants (ETSC 1999a, Hale 2001) or participating in 
road traffic accidents (Piers 1998a). If airports were governed by laws applied to 
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industrial sites, substantial demolition of homes or other measures to reduce activity 
in airports' vicinity may be necessary (Ale & Piers 2000a). It is expected that this 
issue will continue to grow in importance to airports as well as nearby communities 
(Eurocontrol 2005). 
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CHAPTER 3 CURRENT RISK MITIGATION MEASURES 
Given the prevalence of accidents occurring at and near airports, appropriate 
protection for these incidents and their consequences would translate into a significant 
improvement in aviation safety as a whole. This chapter gives an overview of 
current mitigation measures, issues surrounding regulatory compliance and intrinsic 
deficiencies of the present risk mitigation regime. 
3.1 Risk Mitigation Measures 
Aviation authorities, airlines and airports alike often cite safety as their primary 
concern (ICAO 2006). Indeed, safety features are incorporated at multiple levels 
from the manufacture of an aircraft to its operation, maintenance as well as related 
infrastructure design. Aircraft certification and operational measures, aerodrome 
design and land-use regulations around runways, inter alia, contribute to the 
mitigation of risks resulting from accidents upon landing and take-off. While this 
thesis focuses on land-based physical safety measures, the primary components of this 
safety system are briefly described below. Regulatory details of these measures can 
be found in the relevant official documents and so are not covered here. 
3.1.1 Aircraft certification& operational regulations 
The protection of safety standards plays an important role in the interaction between 
aircraft performance, operational regulations and infrastructure design. Field length 
requirements are published in flight manuals as part of the aircraft certification 
process. Airports are respectively required to publish for each of its runways critical 
distances, namely the take-off run available (TORA), take-off distance available 
(TODA) and landing distance available (LDA) (Ashford & Wright 1992). 
operational regulations, such as the Procedures for Air Navigation Services, 
Operations (PANS-OPS), require sufficient runway length for each take-off and 
landing. The difference between an aircraft's gross runway length requirement and 
the actual length available represent a margin of safety, which increases with the 
amount of excess runway length available. 
Although the above regulations are well established, regulators sometimes issue 
additional rules governing the operation of aircraft with the intention of increasing the 
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safety margin available. For example, the FAA published a Safety Alert for 
Operators (SAFO) in August 2006 in response to the landing overrun at Chicago 
Midway Airport eight months earlier (FAA 2006b). The document recommends jet 
operators to consider landing performance based on conditions at the time of arrival 
further to the assessment at dispatch. Once the runway requirement is determined, an 
extra safety margin of at least 15 percent is to be applied (Thurber 2006). 
3.1.2 Aerodrome desin 
Airports are also designed with safety in mind. There is an internationally agreed 
framework on airport design set out in Annex 14 to the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (ICAO 1999). National aviation authorities, however, may deviate 
from Annex 14 or develop different standards. For instance, the FAA's Advisory 
Circular 150/5300-13 on Airport Design is a parallel framework to Annex 14 (FAA 
2004a), as is the UK's CAP 168. This section summarises the safety areas relevant to 
take-off and landing accidents under ICAO Annex 14 and FAA AC150/5300-13. 
3.1.2.1 ICAO Annex 14 
Dimensional requirements under Annex 14 have been described as necessary to 
provide adequate clearance between aircraft and obstacles or other hazards so as to 
avoid collision and damage (Eddowes et al. 2001). The most relevant ASAs under 
Annex 14 concerning the accident types of interest are the Runway Strip and the 
Runway End Safety Area (RESA). 
The Runway Strip technically refers to the physical paved runway, the runway 
shoulders as well as the area surrounding these, up to 60m beyond runway ends and 
150m from the runway centreline for runways used by large aircraft. Of particular 
interest to this study is the area surrounding the physical runway and shoulders since 
it is designed to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft running off the runway by 
having adequate load bearing strength to support the aircraft and emergency vehicles, 
meeting slope requirements and by being clear of obstacle or ditches (Kirkland 
2001a). The dimensions of the area are intended to contain the large majority of 
incidents where an aircraft fails to remain on the paved runway (Caves 1996). 
- 13 - 
In 1999, the former recommended RESA length of 90m was adopted as the standard 
with a recommendation of 240m for longer runways (Kirkland et al. 2003a). RESA 
width should be no less than twice as wide as the associated runway. Graded, cleared 
of obstacles and meeting slope requirements, the area is expected to contain 50 
percent of all off-runway accidents (Caves 1996). The UK's CAP 168 RESA 
standards are aimed at capturing a statistical majority of overruns and minimising 
their impact (CAA 1998). 
The ICAO Annex 14 RESA requirements have been challenged by the International 
Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) and others for more than two 
decades. The association contends that RESAs at air transport category airports 
should be at least 300m in length (Airports World 2005). Countries with no 
legislative requirements for RESAs, such as Canada and New Zealand (NZAPLA 
2004), also face critics. After the August 2005 Air France overrun in Toronto, 
IFALPA pointed to the paved overrun area of only 60m as a safety defect (Airports 
World 2005). 
ICAO Annex 14 also stipulates three-dimensional obstacle limitation surfaces to be 
provided above and around airports. These are slices of airspace which must be clear 
of obstructions. They are beyond the scope of the current thesis, which focuses on 
ground-based ASAs. 
3.1.2.2 FAA AC150/5300-13 
The concepts of the Runway Strip and the RESA are combined under FAA rules. 
The Runway Safety Area (RSA) surrounds the runway and extends up to 300m 
beyond the runway threshold. The defined area is graded, cleared of obstacles and 
prepared to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft that undershoot, overshoot or veer- 
off from the runway (FAA 1999a, 2004). 
The FAA also specifies a Runway Protection Zone (RPZ), which has no equivalent in 
ICAO Annex 14. The President's Airport Commission recommended the 
establishment of clear zones beyond runway ends in 1952 (IATA, undated). The 
FAA subsequently adopted Clear Zones and eventually RPZs. The trapezoidal area 
beyond the runway end serve to protect people and property on the ground in case of 
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aviation accidents in the area. The airport is required to have sufficient interest in the 
RPZ to prevent incompatible land use or obstructions from being erected within (FAA 
1996). 
3.1.2.3 Engineering solutions 
More recently, airports have also been adopting engineering solutions to mitigate 
relevant risks. In 1984, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked 
the FAA to initiate research on using submerged low-impact resistance structures for 
airports with inadequate RSAs beyond runway ends (NTSB 2001). Today, 
Engineered Material Arresting Systems (EMAS) have been installed at more than 
twenty airports across the US and UK (Airports World 2005,2006). Essentially 
made up of crushable concrete cylinders, an overrunning aircraft would crush the 
material as it traverses the EMAS, slowing down in the process The EMAS bed is 
nonetheless strong enough to support emergency vehicles. The FAA issued its policy 
on EMAS use in 1998 (Heald 2005). An EMAS should be capable of stopping the 
runway's design aircraft leaving the runway end at 70 knots (FAA 2004b). 
In May 1999, American Eagle Flight 4925 overran runway 4R at New York's John F. 
Kennedy Airport. The aircraft stopped after 248ft on the EMAS. The NTSB 
estimated that without the installation, the aircraft would have descended into 
Thurston Basin, which is only 600ft from the runway end (NTSB 2001, Tompkins 
2005). 
Despite a number of examples of aircraft successfully arrested by EMAS, scepticism 
remains with its equivalency to a standard RSA or RESA. While recognising the 
additional safety that EMAS provides, the NTSB does not consider it a substitute or 
safety equivalent to a standard RSA (NTSB 2003). New Zealand's Civil Aviation 
Authority takes a similar stance (Watson 2005). There are also concerns about the 
material's effectiveness and durability in very cold locations, such as Alaska (FAA 
2004b). Finally, the consequences of an aircraft undershooting onto an EMAS bed 
is relatively untested. FAA research suggests that there would be no adverse impact 
on the aircraft, which is expected to 'skip off the material then land normally on the 
runway (Giaquinto 2006). However, the outcome may be different for high velocity 
and downward momentum undershoots. 
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3.1.3 Land-use planning 
In addition to aerodrome design rules, land-use planning regulations and guidelines 
also govern the way land is used around runways. While ICAO Annex 14 provides 
an international framework for safety areas in the immediate vicinity of runways, 
there are relatively few national regulations on land-use near airports, let alone an 
international agreement on the topic (ETSC 1999a). Nonetheless, third party risk is 
gaining attention in land-use planning and it is increasingly used as a tool to mitigate 
third party risk related to aircraft accidents (Caves 1996). The rationale for 
controlling land-use near airports is that the local probability of being affected by an 
aircraft accident is not the same for all locations around an airport. Areas closer to 
the runway are associated with higher risks (Ale ct al. undated, Dfr 1997). To 
prevent people and property from being exposed to unacceptable levels of third party 
risk, it is usually much cheaper to avoid incompatible land use in the area than to 
remove existing development (Dietz & Brody 2003). 
3.1.3.1 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is at the forefront of controlling land use around airports to mitigate 
third party risk, especially since the Amsterdam El Al crash in 1992. The regulations 
employ two measures of third party risk - individual risk (IR) and societal risk (SR). 
IR measures the risk of death per annum to a person at a particular location due to an 
aircraft mishap (DfF 1997, Hale 2002) and is usually expressed by contours around 
the runway or airport. SR is concerned with accidents on a scale that would provoke 
a socio-political response and measures the probability of death of more than N 
persons, usually expressed by a FN curve. SR recognises the importance the public 
places on dramatic disasters with larger losses of life compared to a series of minor 
accidents that may still lead to identical overall fatalities (Brady & Hillestad 1995). 
Unlike IR, SR is not location-specific and only exists when people are present (Hale 
2002). 
In the early 1990s, the Dutch authorities imposed a limit on third party risk related to 
flight operations at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. No more housing was to be built 
within the 10-5 to 10-8 individual risk contours and SR was capped (Ale & Piers 
2000a). An airport could influence the size and shape of its IR contours by changing 
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traffic levels, aircraft types, runway use as well as flight path arrangements (Hale 
2001). 
3.1.3.2 United Kingdom 
In the UK, an area similar in shape to the FAA's Runway Protection Zone was 
introduced in 1958 following the recommendations of the Le Maitre Committee on 
Safeguarding Policy (Smith 2000). The dimensions of the original Public Safety 
Zone (PSZ), extending up to 4500ft from the runway end, were based on the 
subjective choice that 65 percent of landing and take-off crashes should be contained 
within the zone (Ale et al. undated). Unlike the American RPZ, however, the British 
PSZ was never managed under the Civil Aviation Authority. The Department of 
Transport, and subsequently the Department for Transport, administered the zones 
under the Town and Country Planning (Aerodromes) Direction of 1972 (Caves 1996). 
PSZ policy underwent some significant changes in 1999. One of the key revisions is 
the use of individual risk modelling to set the size and shape of PSZs (DfF 1997, Kent 
& Mason 2001). As a result, PSZs today no longer resemble the FAA's RPZs, but 
are elongated isosceles triangles that taper away from the runway end, similar to the 
Dutch IR risk contours. The PSZ roughly follows the 10-5 IR contour based on traffic 
forecasts of fifteen years from the time of study (Dff 2002). New development as 
well as redevelopment projects are usually prohibited within the zone. The Secretary 
of State also expects all housing and workplaces within the 10-4 IR contour to be 
purchased and moved away (Eurocontrol 2005). There were 42 PSZs at twenty 
airports across the UK in 1999 (Kent & Mason 2001). 
3.1.3.3 United States 
Whereas the Netherlands and the UK have national regulations on land-use planning 
around airports, this responsibility is undertaken at the State level in the US, where 
California, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin have published airport land-use 
planning handbooks (Dietz & Brody 2003). California is considered to have the most 
sophisticated rules so the following description concentrates on the Californian case. 
Since 1970, the State of California has required every county with a public airport to 
form an Airport Land Use Commission (ALUC) (SDCRAA 2004). The Commission 
is made up of county and city representatives, aviation experts as well as the general 
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public. It is charged to prepare and adopt airport land-use compatibility plans and to 
review land-use and airport actions for consistency with the plan. The compatibility 
plan provides for the orderly growth of the airport and the surrounding area, 
safeguarding the general welfare of inhabitants within as well as the public in general 
(SDCRAA undated). The safety of aircraft occupants and third parties in the event of 
an aircraft accident is a key concern of the ALUC as well as noise, overflight and 
airspace protection (State of California 2002). 
Unlike the Dutch and British airport land-use planning rules, the Californian 
regulations are not explicitly related to individual risk or societal risk. The 
Californian Airport Land Use Planning Handbook suggests a number of standard 
zones to be applied to areas near runway ends to restrict development within. Their 
dimensions depend on the runway length, its intended traffic type as well as its 
approach visibility minimums (State of California 2002). 
3.2 Compliance & Costs 
From aerodrome design to land-use planning around airports, a complex web of 
international and local regulations make up the total risk mitigation regime for 
accidents occurring upon landing and take-off. Simply considering the rules, though, 
may be misleading. There is a significant gap between the regulations and their 
compliance. This section examines the state of regulatory compliance, related costs 
and consequences of non-compliance. 
3.2.1 State of compliance 
3.2.1.1 ICAO Annex 14 
It is not only Canada and New Zealand that have not incorporated certain ICAO 
Annex 14 rules on airport safety areas into their national legislations. Austria, 
Finland, Greece, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, as well as the UK and US 
have filed differences with the ICAO regarding RESA standards (ICAO 2002a). 
Japan, for example, only provides 40m RESAs even though the ICAO Annex 14 
minimum is 90in and the recommended length is 240in (ICAO 2000). 
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3.2.1.2 FAA AC150/5300-13 
The largest national aviation system, that of the US, has its own aerodrome design 
regulations but fares no better in terms of compliance. The situation with Runway 
Safety Areas (RSA), the quasi-equivalent of ICAO's RESA, is telling. The FAA 
standard on RSA was adopted some 20 years ago but did not require retrospective 
compliance (Airports World 2005, Tompkins 2005). Until recently, airports built 
before the standard came into force did not have to provide standard RSAs unless 
runway improvement projects, e. g. runway extensions, were carried out. Today, 
many of these older airports find themselves surrounded by urban development, 
bodies of water or terrain without adequate space for full RSA compliance (Tompkins 
2005). Out of the 22 runway ends under the administration of the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey, only eight meet RSA standards (ACI-NA 2005). 
Chicago Midway Airport's two runways lack RSAs at both ends (Szczesniak 2006) 
and a similar situation applies to Oakland International Airport in California (ACI-NA 
2005). Burbank Bob Hope Airport, California, cites financial, political and legal 
impediments to providing a full length RSA (NTSB 2003). 
In 1990, only 35 percent of runways used by air carriers met full RSA standards. The 
figure is 55 percent a decade later (FAA 2001). The FAA initiated the RSA 
improvement programme in 2000 to bring RSAs at runways used by commercial 
service aircraft into compliance where practicable (ICAO 2005). The programme 
incorporated the use of EMAS in 2002 (Marchi 2006). By 2005,38 percent of the 
nation's 500 largest airports remain non-compliant (McCartney 2005). In the light of 
accidents at RSA-deficient airports like Chicago Midway and Teterboro, politicians 
like Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey have pushed for greater compliance 
with FAA standards. In November 2005, president G. W. Bush signed the 2006 
Transportation Appropriation Act, including the 'Lautenberg measure', which 
requires major commercial airports to be RSA-compliant by 2015 (Lautenberg 2005). 
The situation of non-compliance is not restricted to that of RSAs. Building permits 
have been issued to homes and businesses for land within the RPZ for more than a 
decade at Brookings Airport, South Dakota. The city authorities only recently 
"discovered" the 1989 FAA order and is now considering options such as shifting and 
shortening the relevant runway (Aberdeen News 2005,2006, Studer 2005). 
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Not only is there a large gap between regulations and official compliance, figures on 
the latter must be taken with a degree of doubt as well. At Martin County Airport, 
Witham, Florida, the airport submitted a map to the FAA related to a runway 
extension project that "failed to show the five streets and cluster of homes... that fell 
in a RPZ" (Ash 2005, Harris 2005, Palm Beach Post 2005a, 2005b, Samples 2005, 
Swartz 2005). Even after the project was completed, the FAA was unaware of the 
housing in the RPZ. The county now has plans to purchase the homes within the 
RPZ. 
3.2.1.3 Land-use planning 
The previous chapter has already cited the failure of the Dutch policy in capping third 
party risk at Amsterdam Schiphol at 1990 levels partly due to increased risk exposure 
of employees in the area (Post et al. 2006). Although there are few national statistics 
on land-use compliance in the US, especially given the local nature of the issue, it is 
evident that at least a number of airports are surrounded by incompatible 
development, e. g. Chicago Midway in Illinois, Burbank, Van Nuys and Santa Monica 
in California and Teterboro in New Jersey. 
3.2.2 Cost of compliance 
As non-compliant airports face increasing pressures to bring their safety areas up to 
standard, they often discover that far more than simple construction is involved. As 
the following cases from the US illustrate, installing standard RSAs and RPZs could 
entail complex and costly issues. 
3.2.2.1 Changes to airport layout & operations 
When ASAs cannot be simply added to runway ends, alternative measures must be 
considered. This may involve modifying the airports existing layout and associated 
operations. Implementing a full RSA at Cherry Capital Airport, Michigan, has meant 
shifting its runway to the north and adjusting the threshold, at the expense of US$1.5 
million (McGillivary 2005). 
3.2.2.2 Displacement of existing developments 
Since airports and communities have grown nearer to each other over time, the area 
where ASAs should be is now frequently occupied by other developments. A project 
is being undertaken at Moore County Airport in North Carolina to purchase property 
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and relocate two roads in order to bring its RSA and RPZ into compliance. The 
project will cost more than US$6 million (Gilkeson 2005). Peachtree City Airport in 
Georgia has a similar project for its RSA (Munford 2005) and so does Indiana County 
Jimmy Stewart Airport, Indiana, for its RPZ (Como 2005). 
3.2.2.3 Environmental costs 
ASAs are installed at an envirorunental cost too. The authorities at Tampa- 
Hillsborough County, Florida, gave permission to Tampa International Airport to 
clear vegetation and fill in eight acres of wetlands in order to keep wildlife out of its 
RPZ and to allow access for emergency vehicles (Salinero 2005). While the airport 
plans to recreate wetlands 28 miles away, there are concerns about the impact of the 
move on flooding, pollution and wildlife habitat. Similarly, Juneau International 
Airport, Alaska, plans to acquire 18.5 acres of Mendenhall Wetland State Game 
Refuge to expand its RSA and related works (Juneau Empire 2005). When a runway 
extension and RSA project at Pittsfield Municipal Airport in Massachusetts threatened 
colonies of spikerush, an endangered plant, the FAA allowed the width of the graded 
RSA to be reduced (Carey 2004a, 2004b). Trade-offs between safety benefits and 
environmental protection are not uncommon. 
3.2.2.4 Development opportunity 
From a development perspective, ASAs could be regarded as lost opportunities for 
airport expansion and local development. In the hand of airport operators, vacant 
land at the end of runways could be used for runway extension projects to increase 
capacity. Local authorities may also sell land around airports to developers to 
generate handsome revenues. Instead, precious real estate sit idle around airports in 
the form of ASAs. 
This is not only true of existing safety areas. Local authorities may also want to 
safeguard land for future airport expansion. A five-star hotel development was 
proposed in Dania Beach, Florida near Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International 
Airport. Even though the project would not infringe on any existing ASAs, the 
county commissioners were reluctant to grant approval because it potentially falls into 
the RPZ of an extended runway. The developers were accused of speculation, hoping 
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that the county would be forced to buy the land if the development ultimately falls 
into a RPZ (Sherman 2005, Miami Herald 2006). 
3.2.3 Cost of non-compliance 
Having considered the costs and issues related to bringing an airport's ASAs into 
compliance, the price of having substandard ASAs must also be examined. Of 
primary concern is the higher risk levels. This has seldom been quantified but since 
1982, there have been 23 fatalities and 300 injuries at FAA certificated airports due to 
overrun accidents alone, with the most serious cases occurring at airports without 
standard RSAs (Croft 2004). Financially, non-compliant federally obligated airports 
in the US may also lose their federal funding, although this is apparently rare. 
Failure to prevent incompatible developments in ASAs may also damage an airport's 
growth. Proposals to build condominiums in the RPZ of Tri-Cities Regional Airport 
in Tennessee is threatening future runway extension and the airport's master growth 
plan (McGee 2005, Wig 2005). 
Finally, inadequate ASAs are also matters of litigation. Upon approving a theme 
park to be built in the RPZ of Republic Airport, New York, the local authorities have 
been sued by the aviation community as well as the State Department of 
Transportation (McShane 2005). Little Rock National Airport in Arkansas has also 
been found negligent for having an inadequate safety area. US$2.1 million was 
awarded to a widow whose husband died piloting American Airlines Flight 1420 to 
land on a RSA deficient runway at Little Rock during a thunderstorm in June 1999 
(Hammer 2005, KATV 2005). A precedent has thus been set for victims of air 
crashes to suc airports with substandard ASAs for large compensations. 
3.3 Deflciencies of Current Measures 
Substandard ASAs are often brought into compliance at significant costs. However, 
the current risk mitigation measures have intrinsic flaws and compliance to the stated 
rules may give a false sense of security. These deficiencies ought to be considered 
rather than blindly pursuing regulatory compliance. 
The current rules' greatest shortcoming is the mismatch between actual risks and the 
protection afforded by the regulations. The margin of safety provided is far from 
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uniform across airports and operations. This is especially true of the aerodrome 
design rules and, to a lesser extent, the European third party risk mitigation measures. 
The major issues are detailed below. 
3.3.1 Risk factor consideration 
The ICAO Annex 14 and the FAA Aerodrome Design Advisory Circular are anchored 
around a set of aerodrome or airport reference codes (ARC). ASA requirements are 
defined according to a number of criteria, which make up the ARC. In ICAO's case, 
the ARC is made up of two elements. The first relates to the critical aircraft's 
reference field length, classified under four groups. The second refers to the 
aircraft's wingspan or outer main gear wheel span, under six categories. Regulations 
may also differ depending if precision approach is available (Eddowes et al. 2001, 
GASR 2003). Similarly, FAA's codes operate with two factors - the aircraft 
approach speed and wingspan. The runway's approach visibility minimums also 
influence ASA requirements. According to these handful of criteria, then, the 
applicability and size of ASAs are set for all airports. 
The risk of landing and take-off accidents varies according to a large number of 
factors. Investigation into the causes of previous accidents shows that aircraft and 
engine type, airport and runway characteristics, availability of navigational aids, 
meteorological and environmental conditions as well as human factors all contribute 
to the overall risk of accident occurrence. Nevertheless, the current regulation only 
considers an extremely small number of factors through the ARC system. Every 
airfield has features that make it especially vulnerable to certain types of accidents 
compared to the 'average airport' (Cowell et al. 2000). The level of risk and nature 
of hazard also vary from runway end to runway end (CAA 1998). The small number 
of factors taken into account through the ARCs suggests that safety margin 
requirements do not reflect the genuine risk exposure of specific locations (Kirkland 
2001a). 
The lack of consideration for local airport conditions is perhaps most apparent in the 
absence of meteorological factors in the ICAO and FAA rules. Despite the well 
known fact that poor weather is associated with heightened accident propensity 
(Khatwa & Helmreich 1998), ASA regulations do not distinguish between airports 
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that are regularly exposed to bad weather and those that are not. The NTSB 
recognises that flights in Alaska face unique challenges in their operating 
environment and travel requirements (NTSB 2006a) yet FAA's aerodrome design 
rules make no distinction between airports in Alaska and, for example, those in 
Arizona, which enjoy far more aviation-friendly weather. 
The specific ASA rules fail to take into account a vast number of risk factors, leaving 
a significant gap between the provision of safety margins and individual airports' 
holistic risk profile. When the regulations do attempt to adjust ASA requirements to 
different risk needs, they are not always supported by defendable analyses. Overall, 
there is considerable mismatch between the provision of safety margins through 
ASAs and airports' actual risk exposure. 
3.3.2 Riaid & prescrintive rules 
The ARC codes provide an easy system of setting ASA standards and for their 
oversight. While this ease of administration is acknowledged, the system's simplicity 
conceals vast differences in risk exposure too, perhaps beyond today's levels of public 
acceptance. 
Research has shown that there is sometimes little relation between the ARC elements 
or their groupings and what actually influences risk levels at airports. Eddowes et al. 
(2001) found insignificant difference between code I and 2 runways and runways of 
code 3 or 4 in undershoot risk that would warrant the distinction in RESA size as 
required by ICAO. No justification is found for less stringent ASA requirements for 
non-instrument runways either. 
The case of London City Airport may also be used to illustrate the system's rigidity 
and how it could be manipulated. The airport's runway used to be one metre short of 
1200m and thus the recommended strip width was only 75m rather than 150m if it 
was one metre longer. Safety margins are mandated in large, rigid steps through the 
ARC system, but risk does not behave likewise. 
Eddowes et al. (2001) concluded that Annex 14 does not provide consistent margins 
of safety. It provides levels of safety that in certain cases exceed a hypothetical 
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Target Level of Safety and fall short of it in others. Whereas risk varies dynamically 
from location to location, ASA regulations offer average levels of protection with 
relatively little discrimination. 
3.3.3 Comnliance mentalit 
Due to the traditional emphasis on regulatory compliance, there is a culture of 
focusing on meeting regulatory demands and assuming that as long as the rules are 
met, adequate safety margins have been provided. The current regulations give the 
impression that airports' safety obligations end at providing the full set of standard 
ASAs. 
A significant number of airports have runways and safety areas that abut steep slopes 
and embankments that are sources of significant risk in the event of an accident. In 
close vicinity of ASAs are also ditches, rivers, transport infrastructure and other 
obstructions (Ashford & Wright 1992). The steep drop-offs at both ends of Luton 
Airport in the UK, and the major road and railway at the bottom of one of these have 
already been pointed out as sources of risk (Airports World 2005). The UK CAA 
responded by only highlighting the airport's compliance with ASA rules and 
dismissed the issue (Airports World 2006). One of the showcase deployments of 
EMAS technology is Greater Binghamton Airport, New York. Surrounding the 
EMAS fitted runway end are steep slopes on all sides. Pilot behaviour in accidents 
repeatedly demonstrate that areas beyond the standard ASAs matter to safety. In 
1988, a pilot in an overrunning aircraft in Wheeling, Illinois intentionally veered his 
aircraft off the runway because of a drop-off at the runway end (NTSB 1988). 
While risk is geogaphically continuous and extends beyond the limits of ASAs, 
airports as well as regulators may find undue assurance in simply complying with the 
regulations. 
3.3.4 Compartmentalised approach 
The requirements for ASAs are compartmentalised in Annex 14 and AC150/5300-13. 
Unlike the Dutch or British third party risk land-use planning risk contours, ICAO and 
FAA specify multiple safety areas. Although together these areas aim to reduce the 
risk of landing and take-off accidents, their interrelationships and inter-functionalities 
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are not made explicit. This has implications for making appropriate decisions on 
what safety measures to provide at physically constraint airports. 
At Greenwood Lake Airport, New Jersey, a take-off overrun occurred soon after the 
declared runway length was shortened to reduce its RPZ requirement so a nursing 
home would not fall inside the zone (Carroll 2005). Local officials then questioned if 
the reduced runway length contributed to the cause of the accident. The emphasis 
has been placed on complying with RPZ rules, at the expense of possibly more 
significant safety margins in terms of take-off distance available. 
When airports like Greenwood Lake have to make trade-offs between safety features, 
the regulations do not allow for a holistic assessment of risk levels related to 
providing varying degrees of safety measures. Rigid, fragmented and 
compartmentalised, the relevant regulations leave no room for compensations 
between measures to reflect risk as a dynamic entity. This further adds to the current 
rules' rigidity and compliance mentality to increase the gap between mandated safety 
margins and actual risk levels. 
3.3.5 Fragmented oversight 
It has already been recognised that the responsibility and accountability for safety in 
aviation is diffused across a multitude of organisations - the airport operator, the 
airlines, the regulator etc. (ETSC 1999a). This fragmented institutional framework is 
mirrored in the administration of ASAs. There is generally a clear separation in the 
government of 'on-airport' and 'off-airport' ASAs (CAA 1998). Even though 
accident risk is continuous, civil aviation authorities tend to have oversight on the 
ASAs in the immediate vicinity of runways while local land-use authorities oversee 
safety areas related to third party risk. 
In the early 1980s, the UK's PSZ was administered by the CAA on behalf of the DOT 
(Dfr 2002). Today, under the rationale that PSZ is purely designed to control third 
party risk and is not concerned with aircraft safety (Dfr 1997), the aviation authority 
is no longer involved in this function. Likewise, the US FAA is restricted to 
aeronautical concerns and a review of its aerodrome design rules would suggest that 
accident risk is not an issue beyond the RPZ (State of California 2002, Dietz & Brody 
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2003). Regarding development encroachment and incompatible land use around 
airports, the FAA points out that zoning is not its business but the locality's (Esler 
2006) 
This disjointed approach has created gaps in regulations where conflicts in interests 
may arise. Developers are believed to exert undue influence over local authorities 
and zoning boards (Avweb 2005), who may give priority to development 
opportunities over aviation accident risk mitigation. The aforementioned nursing 
home near Greenwood Lake Airport, New Jersey, was approved by West Milford 
township despite objections from the DOT as well as the state Attorney General 
(Carroll 2005). The federal government has little authority over local land use issues 
either (State of California 2002). The organisational and regulatory division in 
responsibility is a barrier to the effective use of ASAs to mitigate against aviation 
accident risk, which disregards boundaries ofjurisdiction. 
3.3.6 Opacity & lack of review mechanism 
The formulation and objectives of ASA policies are not always quantitatively explicit. 
The Dutch and British third party risk land-use regulations are supported by a 
substantial amount of research that are in the public domain. They also state clear 
quantitative goals that their policies are intended to achieve. The equivalent for 
ICAO and FAA aerodrome design rules are much more vague. It is relatively 
difficult to trace the detailed methodologies, analyses and rationale used to develop 
the rules. Considerable expert judgement is believed to be involved (Caves 1996) 
and the drawbacks of depending on judgemental decisions are clear (Brooker 2006). 
Without explicit objectives, it is impossible to appropriately evaluate the effectiveness 
of ASAs as risk mitigation measures. It is thus difficult to ensure that the rules are 
kept up-to-date with evolving risk levels. In fact, there appears to be no periodical 
review mechanism for the effectiveness of ICAO and FAA ASAs. 
3.3.7 Piecemeal & reactive aiDproach 
A plethora of usually prescriptive and reactive policies make up the total risk 
mitigation regime (Kirkland 2001a, Spriggs 2002). The FAA's RSA dimensional 
requirements have been increased over time to cope with changing traffic 
characteristics (ICAO 2005). In 1999, ICAO amended Annex 14 and a RESA of 
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90m became the standard rather than a recommendation, which is now 240m 
(NZCAA 2000). These occasional leaps in requirements are not conducive to the 
provision of relatively homogenous safety margins across airports. Regulatory step 
changes do not provide a predictable and farsighted approach to managing risk in the 
long-term. 
The function and role of certain ASAs are also altered at times in response to new 
needs. For instance, the RPZ originates from the approach protection zone, aimed at 
preventing the creation of airport hazards. It then became the clear zone, used to 
preclude obstructions and control construction near runway ends. RPZ only took up 
its current name and role in controlling third party risk in 1989 (FAA 1999b, State of 
California 2002). FAA's latest SAFO on landing distance assessment is a stated 
reaction to the Chicago Midway overrun of 2005. While it is beneficial that the 
system is revised as risks are identified, there are doubts that continuing to add more 
piecemeal, and at times judgemental, decisions to an already fragmented system that 
lacks explicit targets will ensure adequate safety margins. 
3.3.8 Regulatory rationale 
Annex 14 specifications are set from the perspective of sizing an airport according to 
traffic needs. Not considered is the fact that aerodrome design rules could limit what 
aircraft an existing airport could serve because altering airport layout and size is not 
always feasible. Most airports' physical infrastructure simply cannot expand in pace 
with traffic growth and developments such as the New Large Aircraft from a green- 
field basis. As a result, safety margins are being stretched and Annex 14's original 
intent of providing safety margins from a purely airport sizing standpoint is not being 
realised. The rationale of current ASA regulations fail to reflect today's relationship 
between airports' operational needs and their physical, environmental and financial 
constraints. 
3.4 Summary of Findings 
Current risk mitigation measures for aircraft landing and take-off accidents have been 
reviewed. These include aircraft certification and operational rules as well as 
international and local aerodrome design standards and land-use planning regulations. 
Their compliance situation was examined and the associated costs reported. The 
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research revealed a number of deficiencies related to their formulation and 
effectiveness as risk mitigation measures. Rules regarding ASAs only consider a 
very limited number of risk factors. Intuitively important factors such as exposure to 
poor meteorological conditions are not taken into account. Moreover, the regulations 
often come in the form of rigid and prescriptive rules. Coupled with the simple 
compliance mentality of airport operators, they result in average levels of safety being 
provided across vastly different airports, leading to significant discrepancies in terms 
of the margin of safety available. The overall risk mitigation strategy suffers from a 
compartmentalised and fragmented approach. The regulatory regime was also found 
to be reactive and opaque. These key deficiencies are targeted throughout the 
remainder of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 SAFETY MANAGEMENT & RISK ASSESSMENT 
Some shortfalls of current ASA regulations are closely related to the traditional 
approach to safety oversight in the aviation industry. More recently, this 
conventional approach has been shifting towards the adoption of Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) industry-wide. This chapter explores this new approach to safety 
management and highlights the need for better airport risk assessment, which the 
thesis contributes to. 
4.1 A Paradigm Shift in Safety Oversight 
The traditional approach to safety management centred on regulatory compliance 
regardless of risk levels and reacting to accident investigations (Morier 2005, DOT 
2006). It is now a consensus that further safety improvements are hard to achieve 
with traditional safety management, which is no longer adequate given the dynamics 
of the industry (Roelen et al. 2000, GAIN 2004). A comprehensive reform of safety 
oversight and management is hence taking place. Through the introduction of SMS 
in aviation organisations, management by oversight is being replaced by management 
by insight and prescriptive safety control by objective-based safety regulations 
(GASR 1998, Leveson 2004). The UK CAA has switched from setting and enforcing 
rigid rules to auditing licensees, who must demonstrate that safety risks have been 
identified, assessed and mitigated (Kirkland 2001b). 
A number of policy and regulatory changes are also driving the adoption of SMS. 
Mandatory airport licensing is advocated by the European Transport Safety Council, 
which would require integrated safety management programmes to be established and 
maintained (ETSC 1999). The burden of proof, then, lies with the aerodrome 
licensee to prove to the national aviation safety authorities that it can successfully 
implement a SMS to keep risks within an acceptable level (GASR 1999). 
As the privatisation and commercialisation of airports gather pace, governments find 
themselves increasingly removed from the direct management of airport safety. 
Legislative and regulatory measures are therefore put in place to require the 
implementation of adequate safety policies and procedures by operators (GAASR 
1997, ICAO 2006). 
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An equally important driver in the implementation of SMS is the general desire to 
improve the operational and financial efficiency of policies regarding aviation safety. 
There is increasing demand for safety to be measured and monitored similar to other 
aspects of aircraft operations (Rose 2005). The industry's growth, the pressure to 
lower accident rates as well as budgetary constraints call for more effective ways of 
directing financial and human resources to safety measures that would yield tangible 
benefits (FAA 2005, Fiorino 2005, Button & Drexler 2006). 
In the broader aviation industry, airlines are also being required to run safety 
management systems (GAIN 2004). The Hampton Review was published in 2005 to 
promote more efficient regulatory inspection and enforcement in the area of aircraft 
maintenance in the UK (Glaskin 2006). The US Air Transportation Oversight 
System has also been launched in 1998 as a risk-based approach to carrier safety 
oversight (GAO 2005b, DOT 2006). 
4.2 Core Features of SMS 
The ICAO defines an airport SMS as "a system for the management of safety at 
aerodromes including the organisational structure, responsibilities, processes and 
provisions for the implementation of aerodrome safety policies by an aerodrome 
operator, which provides for the control of safety at, and the safe use of, the 
aerodrome" (ICAO 2002b). Under a SMS, the airport operator takes up a much more 
active role in assessing risks and managing safety than under the traditional approach 
to safety oversight. Managing safety becomes an explicit element of corporate 
management responsibility and a key business function (CAA 2003, ICAO 2006). 
SMS has a clear structure and a number of core features. These are detailed below. 
4.2.1 Data-driven 
One of the fundamental principles of SMS is the collection and analysis of relevant 
data for identifying risks and developing mitigation measures (GAIN 2004). The 
evidence-based system discourages the use of expert judgement which has little 
empirical support. Data collection and analysis fuel, validate and calibrate the entire 
safety management process. 
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4.2.2 Risk-based 
SMS is data intensive because quantitative risk assessment is used to identify priority 
areas on which to focus risk mitigation efforts (DOT 2006, GAIN 2006). Instead of 
following rigid and prescriptive rules that often mismatch risk levels and safety 
margins, airport operators need to attune their risk mitigation strategies to local, 
demonstrated needs. This evidence-based approach represents a more targeted and 
effective way of using safety management resources. 
4.2.3 Proactive 
Another hallmark of SMS is the emphasis on proactive risk control (ICAO 2002b). 
Instead of reacting to new sources of risk as made evident by actual accidents and 
incidents, SMS seeks to identify new risks before adverse events occur. SMS makes 
use of hazard and incident reports as well as flight operational data to reveal latent 
unsafe conditions, spot system vulnerabilities and to develop mitigation measures 
accordingly (ICAO 2006). 
4.2.4 Obiective-based 
Clear safety objectives are set against which a SMS is evaluated and improved upon 
(ICAO 2002b). There may be an overall safety target which the aerodrome operator 
should achieve (GASR 1998) or more specific goals for particular risk mitigation 
measures. SMS allows an airport's safety performance to be measured (ICAO 2006). 
4.2.5 Transparent 
The explicit nature of SMS is not restricted only to its objectives. A key 
characteristic of SMS is its transparency. From data collection and risk assessment to 
the development of risk mitigation measures and their evaluation, all safety-related 
activities are documented and visible (ICAO 2006). The UK CAA requires a Safety 
Case to be developed and maintained. It includes all necessary documentation and 
references to demonstrate that a system meets its safety requirements (CAA 2006). 
4.2.6 Systematic 
Safety activities under SMS follow a stated path that is predetermined. The steps of 
safety management are followed consistently throughout an organisation. (ICAO 
2006). There is hence a high level of uniformity between the formulation and 
assessment of different risk mitigation measures. 
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4.2.7 Continuous 
SMS is a continuous process with a feedback-loop (ICAO 2002b). As illustrated in 
Figure 4.1, safety management is a cycle of data collection for risk assessment, 
formulating and implementing mitigation measures and evaluating their effectiveness 
(Roclen et al. 2004). Safety policies are constantly monitored and updated to reflect 
changes in risk. 
Figure 4.1 The SMS safety cycle 
Identify hazard 
Monitor progress 
Take action 
Assess risks 
Control options 
Risk 
Communication 
Source: ICAO 2006 
4.3 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a crucial step and intrinsic element of the Safety Management 
System. Also systematic and structured, it is a process for identifying hazards and 
evaluating their risk in terms of probability and severity of consequences (CAA 
2006). The output of risk assessment feeds into the rest of SMS to help prioritise 
decisions on risk control and to evaluate the effectiveness of safety measures (Smith 
2000, Spriggs 2002). SMS' data-driven nature stresses the importance of quantitative 
risk assessment. This involves expressing the likelihood of hazard realisation and 
related consequences in relatively precise numeric terms, indicative of at least the 
order of magnitude. 
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The four essential steps of risk assessment consist of the identification of potential 
safety hazards, the estimation of their probability of occurrence, the estimation of 
their consequences and the comparison of the results to the acceptability criteria 
(Andrews & Moss 1993). This thesis is concerned with the specific risk of landing 
and take-off accidents on or near airports. The research undertaken contributes to the 
second step of the typical risk assessment process, i. e. estimating the probability of 
occurrence. In particular, it quantifies the likelihood of accident occurrence taking 
into consideration specific airports' exposure to risk. This adds precision and 
relevance to the risk assessment exercise, strengthening the entire SMS. 
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CHAPTER 5 FORMER AIRPORT RISK ASSESSMENT STUDIES 
The preceding chapter has underlined the importance of risk assessment as a crucial 
step in safety management. The role of risk assessment will only grow with the 
increasing emphasis on SMS and quantitative analysis. This chapter reviews former 
airport risk assessment studies, their main concerns, analytical approaches and key 
shortfalls. This provides the context in which the current research is carried out. 
From designing aircraft systems to stipulating operational standards and air traffic 
control rules, risk assessment is used in many aspects of aviation. However, the 
exercise of assessing the risk of accidents occurring near and at airports is relatively 
overlooked. Previous relevant studies can be broadly categorised into four families 
according to their prime objective and approach taken. 
5.1 Categories of Former Airport Risk Assessment Studies 
5.1.1 Airport design studies 
The first family of studies aims to assess risk from an airport design standpoint. For 
example, the UK CAA's Safety Regulation Group conducted a study on aircraft 
overrun risk, which guides airports on overrun risk assessment and provides advice on 
how to reduce it (CAA 1998). Another study under this category is AEA 
Technology's risk assessment of aerodrome design rules (Eddowes et al. 2001). It 
reviewed design standards such as runway length and reference codes, the RESA, 
separation distances between runways and taxiways and obstacle limitation surfaces. 
It made concrete recommendations as to how to amend ICAO Annex 14 safety areas 
in order to achieve a specific target level of safety. In the US, studies have also been 
carried out to set forth criteria for the design of airport safety areas, especially in 
California. Garbell (1988) pioneered the accident-potential concept and led to the 
adoption of safety areas at a number of airports. 
5.1.2 Third-party risk studies 
Another family of airport risk assessment focuses exclusively on third party risk. 
There are only a limited number of general methodologies and models for assessing 
an airport's third party risk (Piers 1996). They are derived principally from studies 
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commissioned by the Dutch and British governments and their results are broadly 
similar (Ale & Piers 2000b). 
The Netherlands is a leader in using and enforcing quantitative risk targets (Hale 
2002). Since 1990, a series of reports have been published on measuring and 
managing third party risk at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport (Smith & Spouge 1990, 
Smith 1991a, 1991b, Technica, 1991, Piers et al. 1993, Piers 1996, Ale & Piers 1999, 
2000a, Piers & Ale 2000, Pikaar et al. 2000, Roelen et al. 2000, Hale 2001,2002). 
These studies have a strong land-use planning focus and contributed to models and 
risk calculations from which regulatory bodies have set planning rules. 
The British third party risk studies are similar in nature to their Dutch counterparts. 
Models were developed by National Air Traffic Services Ltd. (NATS) to calculate 
individual risk around airports (Evans et al. 1997, Cowell et al. 1997,2000, Kent & 
Mason 2001). This set of research provided the basis for modifying the traditional 
size and shape of UK PSZs. 
These techniques have since been applied to a number of airports in Europe and 
elsewhere (University of Sydney 1990, Irvine 1992, Eddowes, 1994a, 1994b, Purdy 
1994, Aho 1995, Gouweleeuw 1995, Loog, 1995, Kent 1998, Kent & Mason 1999a, 
1999b, 1999c). 
5.1.3 Facility risk studies 
A third family of studies seek to assess the risk that aircraft operations pose to specific 
developments near airports. Concerned with the safety of nuclear power plants, the 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission developed a standard methodology by which it 
could determine if a site was far enough from airports and airways (Eisenhut 1973, 
NRC 1981). The Department of Energy also has a methodology for assessing the 
risk of an aircraft crash into its nuclear weapons and material storage facilities, 
notably the Pantex nuclear weapon production facility near Amarillo International 
Airport, Texas (Kimura & Bennett 1993, Alexander et al. 1996, DOE 1996). A study 
on Salt Lake City International Airport investigated the crash probability at a hospital, 
a school and a shopping mall nearby (Kimura et al. 1995). Other similar studies 
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include Hornyik & Grund (1974), Solomon & Kenneth (1975), Smith (1983), Phillips 
(1987), Roberts (1987), Jowett & Cowell (1991) and Slater (1993). 
5.1.4 Operational risk studies 
The final group of risk assessment studies concentrate on flight operational safety and 
are therefore not strictly airport risk assessments. However, certain elements of these 
studies are very relevant to airport risk analysis. For example, the Enders ct al. 
(1996) study on navigational aids established risk ratios for mostly airport factors that 
influence the risk of approach and landing accidents. A related piece of research by 
the Flight Safety Foundation measured accident risk based on, inter alia, airport 
conditions (Khatwa & Helmreich 1998). The ICAO's Collision Risk Model 
calculates the collision probability of an operation with obstacles of known location 
and size during an ILS approach. The model is used as a decision-making tool for 
developing safe approach procedures and for airport planning (ICAO 1980). 
5.2 Shortfalls of Previous Airport Risk Assessment Studies 
All four families of previous airport risk assessment studies have certain fundamental 
shortfalls, some of which are reflected in the deflciencies of existing ASA policies as 
described in Chapter 3. These are discussed in turn. 
5.2.1 Sinaular-view approach 
The four types of airport risk assessment all approach the subject of airport risk from 
a single standpoint, i. e. the airport's, the third party's, the facility's and the 
operation's. This in fact reflects the fragmented oversight of risk mitigation 
measures. Studies on third party risk have little regard for aerodrome deign (Ale et 
al. undated, Couwenberg 1994, Davies et al. 1994, Smith 1995, Dff 1997, Piers 1994, 
1996,1998a, 1998b, Ale & Piers 1999,2000a, 2000b, Pikaar et al. 2000, Spriggs 
2002, Bienz 2004) while airport design studies fail to look beyond the airport 
boundary when analysing risk (CAA 1998, Eddowes et al. 2001, Davies & Quinn 
2004a, 2004b). Similarly, operational studies narrowly focus on the safety of aircraft 
take-offs and landings (Enders et al. 1996, Khatwa et al. 1996, Khatwa & Helmreich 
1998, CAST 1999) whereas facility-specific risk assessments only attend to the risk 
exposure of the identified structures or sites (Alexander et al. 1996, Kimura 1997, 
Prassinos & Kimura 1998, Ghosh & Sagar 2002, Kimura et al. 1995,2004, Weidl & 
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Klein 2004). Such divisions in the investigation of the complex issue of airport risk 
does not offer the comprehensive understanding that would support an integrated 
approach to risk management and control, which is clearly desirable when both the 
problems of individual studies and their solutions are in fact intricately related. 
5.2.2 Limited risk factor consideration 
Other than failing to include related risks in a coherent study, former risk assessments 
also have a traditional neglect for assessing risk factors relevant to the occurrence of 
accidents. With the exception of operational risk studies, most of the analytical and 
modelling effort is devoted to assessing the location and consequences of accidents, 
rather than the causes or the circumstances related to the accidents' occurrence. The 
great majority of third-party risk assessments, facility risk studies as well as airport 
design studies calculate the frequency of accident occurrence using simple historical 
crash rates based on aircraft or engine types. For example, the study on the third 
party risk of Manchester Airport's second runway calculated crash frequency based 
on the historical crash rates of commercial jet landings and take-offs, and a combined 
crash rate for general aviation (Davies et al 1994). The NLR Schiphol studies' crash 
rates only distinguished between a handful of aircraft generations (Ale et al undated, 
Couwenberg 1994, Piers 1994,1996,1998a, 1998b, Ale & Piers 1999,2000a, 2000b, 
Pikaar et al. 2000). In addition to aircraft type and generation, the studies on the UK 
Public Safety Zones also considered whether the aircraft was Western-built or 
Eastern-built, the engine type as well as the operation type (passenger vs. cargo) (Dff 
1997, Spriggs 2002). Facility risk studies such as Kimura et al. (1995) and 
Alexander et al. (1996) distinguish risk rates purely on operation type (air carrier, air 
taxi, military, general aviation and aerial application). This crude approach to 
calculating crash frequencies fails to take into account a wide spectrum of factors that 
have been identified by accident investigation authorities as relevant to accident risk, 
e. g. exposure to poor meteorological conditions. It therefore contributes towards the 
lack of sensitivity of risk control measures as well as the mismatch between actual 
risks and the provision of safety margins. 
One of the principal reasons for this oversimplification of accident frequency 
modelling is the lack of data on flight exposure to various risk factors in normal 
operations. Without this normal operations data, the crash rates related to the 
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presence of risk factors cannot be established. Closing this gap in research is a 
major achievement of this thesis. The subject is further elaborated in the next chapter 
when the approach of the current study is described. 
5.2.3 Data & applicability limitations 
The data used by former risk studies often place constraints on the applicability of 
their results. Some studies are based on only a very small sample of accidents. For 
instance, the Joint Safety Analysis Team's analysis of approach and landing accidents 
only considered a total of twelve accidents (CAST 1999). Drawing general 
conclusions from such analyses and applying them must therefore be done with 
caution. 
Apart from sample size, the sampling strategy of former risk assessments also limit 
their future use. From analysing the risk of flight manoeuvres to justifying land-use 
regulations, former risk studies were conducted for a variety of purposes. As such, 
they are usually based on accident data that has been specifically tailored to the needs 
of the particular study. For example, airport-specific studies may disregard some 
accident cases because it does not correspond to certain features of the airport 
concerned (Dff 1997). Third-party risk studies of both Amsterdam Schiphol airport 
and Manchester airport exclude accidents that involve mountainous terrain (Davies et 
al. 1994, Piers 1994,1996). The results of these studies are hence specific to their 
target airports only and the models cannot be simply applied to other sites. 
5.2.4 Limited modelling capability 
The modelling capability of former risk assessments is often limited. Indeed, most 
operational studies only offer an analysis of a set of accidents and are not models as 
such. Other more advanced studies such as the NLR and NATS models were 
developed to justify zoning policies and not designed for deriving risk reduction 
initiatives (Hale et al. 1999, Hale 2002). So other than the data applicability issues 
mentioned above, these methodologies offer limited scope for considering the impact 
of changes in risk parameters to the overall risk and the need for ASAs. Scenarios of 
risk exposure and other "what ifs" cannot be assessed easily. 
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Previous efforts to build more generic models of ASA-related risks also have 
deficiencies in terms of modelling capacity. Eddowed et al. (2001) and Kirkland et 
al. (2003a) presented a series of generally applicable one-dimensional models. The 
latter pioneered the modelling of accident risk using weight and runway criticality 
while the former examined accident risk related to factors such as excess runway 
available and approach type. However, flights do not experience individual risk 
factors in isolation from other risk factors. It is well known under Reason's 'Swiss 
cheese' model that accidents occur often because of exposure to a series of risks 
(Reason 1990,1997, Rose 2004). The inability of these models to consider the 
combined effects of multiple risk factors on accident occurrence is a major handicap 
in aircraft accident risk assessment. 
5.3 Summary of Findings 
This chapter reviewed former airport risk assessment studies relevant to ASAs and 
grouped them into four families according to their principal concerns. Four 
fundamental shortfalls of these studies were then exposed, including their scope, risk 
factor consideration in addition to data and modelling limitations. The current 
research aims to make advances in these areas, as described in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter has laid out the principal shortfalls of existing airport risk 
assessment studies and models. This chapter presents the proposed risk assessment 
methodology, justifies the chosen approach and highlights the advances made. The 
chapter ends by setting out the structure of the analysis and modelling, which 
corresponds to the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
6.1 The Three-part Model 
The ma ority of previous risk models in the field break down the risk assessment 
exercise into three key components - accident frequency, location and consequence 
(Caves 1996, Piers 1998a, Eurocontrol 2005). The frequency model considers the 
probability of an accident occurrence, while the location model assesses the likely 
wreckage site in relation to the runway or a specific facility, and the consequence 
model deals with the resulting fatalities, injuries and sometimes the financial impact. 
This three-part approach is well established and supported by extensive peer review 
(Hale 2002). The Dutch NLR as well as British NATS studies follow this three-step 
analysis (Piers 1996, DfT 1997). The current research follows the same rationale of 
risk analysis and concentrates on advancing the state-of-the-art of accident frequency 
modelling. 
6.2 Advances in Methodology 
This thesis offers a new approach to accident frequency modelling addressing some 
key deficiencies of current risk mitigation measures and risk assessment 
methodologies as described in previous chapters. Explained below, these advances 
were made possible by expanding the traditional scope of airport risk assessment 
studies, building comprehensive and compatible accident and normal operations 
databases and developing multi-dimensional quantitative models that explicitly take 
into account previously neglected risk factors. 
6.2.1 Intguated approach 
This research takes an integrated approach to airport risk assessment rather than 
focusing on a single stakeholder or element of the aviation system. The study crosses 
existing regulatory boundaries and considers aircraft crash risk on both sides of the 
-41- 
airport fence, reflecting the geographically continuous nature of accident risk. This 
facilitates complementary policies in aerodrome design, land-use planning and 
operational parameters to be developed in lieu of the cuffent fragmented and 
compartmentalised risk control measures. It has never been done before and avoids 
the difficulties of drawing from studies with different objectives and assumptions. 
The need for such an approach is evidenced in the responses to the New Zealand Civil 
Aviation Authority's consultation on its RESA policy where respondents suggested 
that more aerodrome physical requirements be assessed along with the RESA in a 
single coherent study (Watson 2005). 
6.2.2 Single comprehensive database 
Another advance made by this study is the comprehensive accident database 
developed. Unlike previous studies that focused on a specific type of accident, such 
as approach-and-landing accidents (Enders et al. 1996, Khatwa & Helmreich 1998), 
third-party accidents (Piers 1996, DfT 1997) or overruns (CAA 1998), all accident 
types that are implicated by ASAs are included in this study - take-off and landing 
overruns, undershoots, veer-offs as well as crashes after take-off. This facilitates 
the assessment of all accident types in a coherent manner, rather than based on 
multiple databases with different inclusion criteria. All accident types are sampled 
from the same period and for the same parameters using a set of standardised rules. 
More definitive conclusions on ASA policies could therefore be drawn. For 
example, Kirkland's work (Kirkland et al. 2003a) considered overruns but not 
undershoots or crashes after take-off. Having included the latter two types of 
accidents for modelling, the current study provides the complete analysis of RESA 
and PSZ needs. 
The building of such a comprehensive accident database per se is a breakthrough and 
provides a strong basis for future studies. The California Department of 
Transportation (2002) has in the past signalled the importance of such a database. 
6.2.3 Normal overation risk exposure 
Another major methodological advance of this study is the use of normal operations 
(i. e. non-accident flight) data for risk modelling. Various studies have already 
identified the lack of normal operations data (NOD) as a major obstacle to the 
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development of quantitative risk models (DOT 1979, Piers et al. 1993, Khatwa et al. 
1996, Khatwa & Helmreich 1998, Eddowes et al. 2001, Li et al. 2001). For example, 
a NLR study on the impact of crosswind on aircraft operations noted that "the 
significance of [risk] factors can only be established when the number of non-accident 
flights, under identical circumstances is known" (Van Es et al. 2001). Enders et al. 
(1996) stated that the unavailability of NOD hampered the calculation of accident 
occurrence rates and the ICAO concurs that the absence of NOD "compromises the 
utility of safety analysis" (ICAO 2006). Indeed, in the absence of information on risk 
exposure, even though the occurrence of a factor, e. g. contaminated runway, could be 
identified as a contributor to many accidents, it is impossible to know how critical the 
factor is since many other flights may have also experienced the factor without 
incident. With NOD, the number of operations that experience the factor singly and 
in combination with other factors could be calculated, so risk ratios could be 
generated and the importance of risk factors quantified. This would allow the 
allocation of resources for safety improvement to be prioritised (Enders et al. 1996). 
This thesis represents an important step forward in the field of airport risk assessment 
in collecting a large and representative sample of disaggregate NOD covering a range 
of risk factors, allowing their criticality to be quantified. Incorporating this risk 
exposure information into the accident frequency model enhances its predictive power 
and provides the basis for formulating more risk-sensitive and responsive ASA 
policies. Accident frequency models need no longer rely on simple crash rates based 
on just aircraft, engine or operation type. As discussed below, factors previously 
ignored by airport risk assessments and ASA regulations are accounted for using the 
models developed in this study. Moreover, this normal operations database is not 
only valuable for the current project but can also be used for future studies. The 
detailed source and sampling strategy of this database is described in Chapter 9. 
6.2.4 Factors considered 
Only in human factor and crew resource management analysis is the use of NOD 
relatively established. Khatwa and Helmreich (1998) used Line Operations Safety 
Audits (LOSA) to analyse crew errors during non-accident flights. Work at the 
University of Texas at Austin (Helmreich et al. 1999, Klinect et al. 1999) also used 
LOSAs to build conceptual models that represent the operating environment. 
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Beyond human error analysis, the use of NOD in risk assessment is limited, especially 
for airport-related risks. Enders et al. (1996) and Roelen et al. (2000) used aggregate 
NOD to establish risk ratios for various risk factors such as the availability of 
Terminal Area Radar and other airport navigational aids. Many attempts to 
incorporate NOD in risk assessment failed because the available risk exposure data 
does not allow subdivision in movements based on the risk factors of interest (Piers 
1994,1998a). Kirkland et al (2003a) broke new ground in the use of disaggregate 
NOD for assessing aircraft overrun risk. Using a limited sample of NOD, three 
overrun risk models were built. Two of them assessed overrun risk based on aircraft 
weight as a percentage of the maximum take-off and landing weight respectively and 
the third model considered landing overrun risk based on the distance of excess 
runway available. Although some insightful conclusions were drawn, the number of 
risk factors that could be modelled remained small. 
One notable gap in research is the quantification and modelling of the criticality of 
meteorological risk factors to accident occurrence. The lack of data on flights' 
exposure to meteorological conditions meant traditional risk assessment had to rely on 
qualitative judgements (Eddowes et al. 2001) or simply ignore meteorological 
conditions as risk factors, as do most ASA policies. Although Enders et al. (1996) 
acknowledged that adverse weather conditions is one of the most regularly cited 
factors in accident reports, they were unable to include the terms in their analysis. 
Kirkland also cited the lack of meteorological NOD as a major shortcoming of his 
work (Kirkland 2001a). The current study was able to collect exposure data on a 
range of meteorological parameters and include them in accident frequency modelling 
- ceiling height, visibility, crosswind, temperature, fog, precipitation, electric storm, 
snow, frozen precipitation and icing conditions. Other factors not commonly 
modelled were also taken into account, e. g. airport hub size, terrain surrounding the 
airport, dawn and dusk conditions as well as foreign or domestic operation. This is in 
addition to the more traditional parameters of aircraft, engine and operation type. 
The current research is thus able to provide a far more comprehensive analysis of risk 
factors relevant to airport risk assessment and develop state-of-the-art frequency 
models of accident occurrence covering an unprecedented spectrum of risk factors. 
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6.2.5 Enhanced modelling capabilit 
Using disaggregate, multidimensional NOD, the accident frequency modelling 
capability of the current study is much better vis-A-vis former works in the field. The 
depth and breadth of the risk exposure data collected meant that multiple risk factors 
could be modelled in a single analysis, as opposed to a series of one-dimensional 
analyses, as in Kirkland et al. (2003a) and Enders et al. (1996). The 
multidimensional model developed adjusts for the joint influences between risk 
factors and provides a single risk formulae for the combined effects of multiple risk 
factors. It is able to offer risk estimates for individual flights as well as assess the 
risk profile of an airport with specific traffic and environmental characteristics. The 
increased modelling capability and flexibility add much value to the models as risk 
assessment tools. The use of multidimensional NOD and multivariate modelling is 
hence another important breakthrough in airport risk assessment methodology. 
6.3 Causal Association 
6.3.1 Caveats of causal modelling 
In principle, aircraft accident frequency could be calculated by considering all 
possible cause-effect relationships that lead to aircraft mishaps (Piers et al. 1993, DfT 
1997). Regulators such as the Dutch government have long desired to develop such a 
fully causal model. The advantages of such a causal model are clear. It would 
capture the precise cause of accident occurrences and allow a definite assessment of 
the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures (Hale et al. 1999, Hale 2002). A series 
of studies have therefore been carried out to develop a causal model of air transport 
safety (Roelen et al. 2000,2002 2004, Ale et al. 2005). Whereas a modelling 
framework involving Bayesian belief nets has been presented, the effort has not to 
date produced a full working model. 
A number of fundamental issues hinder the development of a fully causal accident 
frequency model. Causal modelling emphasises the identification, quantification and 
prediction of accident causal factors. However, causes of accidents are theoretically 
infinite in number. Accidents rarely have a single cause but are usually multi-layered 
events involving simultaneous failure of multiple systems and the compounding and 
interaction of technical, human and cultural causal factors (DOT 1979, Piers et al. 
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1993, Khatwa et al. 1996, Khatwa & Roelen 1997, Maurino 1997, Roelen et al. 2002, 
Rose 2004, Hale et al. 2006). The large number of accident causation and occurrence 
scenarios would lead to a combinatorial explosion in quantitative techniques such as 
fault-tree analysis and Bayesian belief nets, resulting in an extremely complex and 
inefficient model (Roelen et al. 2002, Brooker 2006). Simplifications and the use of 
numerous assumptions are thus necessary. 
The lack of relevant data is another key difficulty in developing causal models. Even 
if all accident causes could be exhaustively identified, some of them would certainly 
be hard to quantify, e. g. cultural and organisational factors, let alone accounting for 
their complex interrelationships (Dfr 1997). It is inherently difficult to predict the 
occurrence of infrequent events and the use of too many assumptions may lead to 
unrealistic risk estimates (Brooker 2006). The general lack of data led an earlier 
NLR study as well as other researchers to conclude that even relatively rudimentary 
quantitative causal models are not feasible (Piers et al. 1993, Piers 1998a). Beyond a 
certain level of detail, the modelling of causal risk factors must rely on human 
estimates (Hale et al. 1999), which contradicts the purpose of developing statistical 
models to lessen the role of expert judgements on decision-making. 
The complexity and huge data burden of causal models not only contribute to their 
difficulty in development but also mean they are strenuous to use and apply. If a 
model is only accessible to a small number of specialists removed from the decision- 
making process, it would vastly reduce its value as a risk assessment tool. 
6.3.2 The empirical approach 
The accident frequency model developed in this study is essentially an empirical one. 
Rather than depending on the exhaustive identification and modelling of accident 
scenarios, it relies on historical records of actual accidents as a basis of risk 
assessment. Studying the experience of previous accident occurrences has been 
identified as a crucial element of and the most appropriate approach to risk 
assessment (Smith 1995, Goossens & Hale 1997). The use of historical data is often 
preferred to theoretical estimates because the former represents real world 
observations (Roelen et al. 2004). While two accidents are never identical, much can 
be leamt from the similarities and differences of previous incidents as accidents are 
-46- 
not just random combinations of events (Roelen et al. 2002, Muir & Thomas 2004). 
In a multi-causal system as that of aircraft accident occurrence, it would be reasonable 
to assume that the frequency of accidents at a particular location is comparable to that 
of another site with a similar risk exposure profile, without specific consideration of 
causal inferences (Piers et al. 1993). As in former works in the area, such as Enders 
et al. (1996) and Li et al. (2001), the current study identifies and quantifies risk factors 
that demonstrate a positive association with accident occurrence without implying 
causality. Past empirical models have been found to be broadly compatible with each 
other (DfT 1997). With the comprehensive accident database developed as part of 
this research, the analysis could be conducted with even greater confidence and 
statistical validity. Unlike the causal models that set out to explicitly identify and 
model causal relationships, the approach adopted is less complex, have more realistic 
data requirements and is easier to implement for aviation stakeholders. The approach 
used is also similar in structure and rationale to existing methodologies used by the 
international aviation regulatory community and would therefore be more readily 
accepted and implemented. 
6.3.3 Limitations of the selected methodology 
There are two key criticisms of the selected approach to risk assessment based on 
demonstrated associations between risk factors and accident occurrence using 
historical accident data. The first concerns the inability to imply causality, which is 
seen as a failure to explicitly explain the root causes of accidents and formulate 
strategies accordingly (Piers et al. 1993). However, the core concern of the present 
thesis is in developing a predictive model of accident occurrence, rather than drawing 
conclusions on accident causation. While the value of being able to make inferences 
on causality is acknowledged, the predictive ability of the risk models is of prime 
interest to ASA policy makers (Hale et al. 1999). As a matter of fact, the Dutch and 
British studies on land-use planning and PSZs only computed accident frequency 
based on aircraft and operation type without any consideration for causality. By 
taking into account a range of additional risk factors, the current study has already 
implicitly expanded the model's causal dimension compared to existing 
methodologies, while avoiding the practical difficulties of full causal modelling as 
described in section 6.3.1. 
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The second criticism centres on the use of historical accident data. With the general 
long-term decline in accident rates and the continued safety improvements advanced 
by organisations, such as the FAA, NTSB and European Aviation Safety Agency, 
accident rates based on historical data would overestimate current risks (Dfr 1997). 
At least in principle, accident investigations lead to changes in the system such that 
similar accidents would not occur again (Brady & Hillestad 1995, FAA 1997). 
Historical models, then, cannot account for future accident scenarios (Hale 2002). 
The problem is especially acute for causal models because the analysis is based on 
explicitly identifying and modelling specific chains of events that lead to accident 
occurrence. Not only is the current research approach free from explicit causal 
inferences, the inclusion of a multitude of risk factors also lessens the impact of the 
improvement of any individual aspect of the safety system which is multi-layered. 
As to the overall trend of safety improvement, previous improvements in equipment 
and procedures have only resulted in relatively stable developments in safety levels 
(Piers et al. 1993). While acknowledging that the use of historical data may 
overestimate current accident rates, Eddowes et al. (2001) concluded that it is still 
within the general bounds of uncertainty of risk assessment. 
6.4 Structure of Analysis 
The current risk analysis and modelling were carried out in three major parts - 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses. Previous studies of aviation risk, such 
as Li et al. (2001), have a similar structure. The univariate analysis considers the 
nature and characteristics of accidents alone. Bivariate analysis then draws on the 
NOD and uses normal flights' exposure to risk as the basis for characterising and 
quantifying the criticality of a series of individual risk factors. The multivariate 
analysis then builds accident frequency models that are capable of taking into account 
the combined effects of multiple risk factors. These and the development of the 
accident database are the contents of the subsequent chapters of the thesis. The 
detailed methodology of each part of the analysis is presented in the relevant sections. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE ACCIDENT DATABASE 
As with other safety issues, conclusions on the need of ASAs cannot be based on 
isolated events or anecdotal information (ICAO 2006). However, the low accident 
rate of aviation means that no particular airport has sufficient accident occurrences in 
the recent past to support a model with reasonable statistical confidence (Piers et al. 
1993, Piers 1994, Hale 2001). Therefore, a robust risk assessment must draw from a 
large database of relevant accident cases. The development of such a comprehensive 
database that brings together all accident types that matter to ASA dimensions is a 
major contribution of the current research to the field of airport risk assessment. This 
chapter describes its development. This phase of the project took over two years and 
was undertaken with other members of the EPSRC research team. 
7.1 Accident Types Included 
ASAs are safety measures aimed at aircraft take-off and landing accidents. Accident 
types commonly associated with the safety areas include overruns, veer-offs, 
undershoots, crashes after take-off and third party accidents. However, these 
accident classifications are based more on consequence than cause. For example, 
third party accidents may simply be undershoots or crashes after take-off if no third 
parties were present. Similarly, an aircraft overrunning the runway end and another 
veering off the side of the runway are often just different manifestations of the same 
root problem, differing only in crash kinematics and airfield conditions. The current 
database classes all take-off and landing related accidents under four categories - 
landing overruns (LDOR), landing undershoots (LDUS), take-off overruns (TOOR) 
and crashes after take-off (TOC). This classification essentially separates landing 
and take-off accidents then ground-based and airborne accidents. This facilitates 
their analysis by cause rather than consequence, which is especially appropriate for 
developing the accident frequency model. Incorporating third party accidents within 
these four accident types instead of considering them in isolation reflects the 
geographically continuous nature of accident risk. Keeping the number of accident 
categories to a small number also helps to increase the statistical significance of 
subsequent analyses and models. 
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Appendix A presents the detailed classification scheme of all accident types. Only 
cases in which at least one ASA was directly challenged were included in the 
database. This means that the aircraft has exited from the 'normal' areas of operation 
on the airfield, e. g. veering off the runway or hitting obstacles on landing or take-off. 
Some accidents are very complex and may not fit intuitively into one of the four types 
of accidents to be studied. The United Airlines Flight 232 accident in Sioux City of 
July 1989 is a good case in point. The flight has already encountered severe 
controllability problems during approach but with exceptional piloting skills it 
touched down on the runway then veered-off onto a field (NTSB 1990). Accidents 
involving complex accident sequences are classed according to the first instance 
where an ASA was challenged, which in this case was a landing overrun. Although it 
is acknowledged that the accident could have easily resulted in an undershoot instead, 
it is impossible to accurately predict alternative crash sequences, let alone assign 
probabilities to each scenario. The adopted approach is in line with the essence of 
empirical research, which relies on historical data to provide realistic and credible 
data, avoiding the inherent modelling uncertainties of the deterministic approach. 
7.2 Data Source & Fields 
The database was intended to include all relevant accidents in the major English- 
speaking countries of the developed world. Priority was given to collecting data 
from the US for a number of reasons. The US represents the largest national aviation 
system in the world in terms of air traffic, aircraft and airfields. The US NTSB is 
also the largest aviation accident investigator with an established database of 
accidents that have been investigated in a relatively systematic and consistent manner. 
The preference for studying US aviation safety data has been echoed by other studies 
such as Button & Drexler (2006). 
A list of relevant accident parameters was drawn up based on previous risk 
assessment studies and discussion within the research group. These data fields 
covered a multitude of parameters including aircraft, flight and airport characteristics, 
weather conditions, wreckage location and injury levels. Appendix B provides the 
full list of data fields of the accident database. The NTSB online accident database 
alone is not sufficient for the purpose of the current research. Therefore, as with 
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Kirkland (Kirkland 2001 a), it was necessary to obtain individual accident reports and 
docket files from the NTSB. Accident reports are only published for relatively 
serious accidents but a docket file is available for all incidents investigated by the 
NTSB, even though the amount of information contained in each docket varies 
greatly. From these sources all available relevant information was extracted. 
Certain variables required additional calculation based on available data. For 
instance, crosswind strength was computed from data on wind direction, wind 
velocity and true runway orientation. The definitions of individual data fields and 
rules regarding how the database was completed are detailed in Appendix C. The 
database took two full-time researchers approximately two years to complete. This 
involved collecting the relevant documents from the NTSB and its subcontractor 
General Microfilm Inc., reading them in the form of electronic files, hard copies or 
microfiche, extracting the relevant data, checking for consistency and applying 
judgement where necessary then inputting the information into a database 
systematically. 
7.3 Accident Inclusion Criteria 
Other than directly challenging at least one ASA or impacting ground or obstacles 
within lOkm of the landing or take-off runway threshold, a number of other criteria 
were used to filter the NTSB accident database to identify the accidents of interest. 
These filters and their justification are given in Appendix D. In essence, they 
eliminate cases that involve airports outside the US, irrelevant aircraft types and 
operations as well as accidents with minimal consequences. These filters were 
developed considering data availability and quality, compatibility with the normal 
operations data, the need for statistical significance, relevance to large and small 
airports as well as the criteria used by previous airport risk assessment studies. The 
l0kin cut-off was considered appropriate and slightly conservative since airfield 
effects on crash risk is judged to be relevant up to 8km from the airport boundary 
(Phillips 1987). 
The final database contains all relevant accidents between 1982 and 2002 inclusive, 
totalling 440 cases, of which 199 are landing overruns, 122 are landing undershoots, 
52 are take-off overruns and 67 are crashes after take-off. The breakdown of these 
cases by accident type and aircraft FAR part is shown in Table 7.1. 
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Tnhlt-7-1 Rreakdown ofaccident datqhiqe hv nrcident tvne knircraft PAR inqrt 
FAR part LDOR % LDOR LDUS %LDUS TOOR %TOOR TOC %TOC 
091 90 45.2% 42 34.4% 19 36.5% 29 43.3% 
121 42 21.1% 15 12.3% 12 23.1% 16 23.9% 
129 1 0.5% 2 1.6% 2 3.8% 1 1.5% 
1135 1 63 1 31.7% 1 60 1 49.2% 1 19 1 36.5% 21 1 31.30/( 
PublicUse 3 1.5% 3 2.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0711 
7.4 Data limitations 
Quantitative as well as qualitative limitations of accident data invariably constrain the 
depth, breadth and quality of airport risk assessments (Piers et al. 1993, Dff 1997, 
Roelen et al. 2000). This study is no exception. The scope and detail of analysis is 
restricted by the availability and quality of the data extracted from NTSB docket files. 
The major data limitations are outlined below. 
7.4.1 Missing data 
The NTSB accident investigation records principally consist of a number of standard 
forms and reports. Even within these standard areas of interest, it is extremely rare 
that every field is filled in. The docket files of minor accidents frequently contain 
less than a dozen pages of forms accompanied by a brief synopsis of the occurrence. 
The accident wreckage site is often only given by a very crude description without 
supporting maps or diagrams. Just a small proportion of data fields are 
systematically recorded for every accident. The amount of missing fields in the 
database is therefore high, restricting the number of parameters that could be 
analysed. 
The docket files contain mostly information which the accident investigators deemed 
relevant to an accident's occurrence. Outside of this judgement, few potential risk 
factors are included. This is a major handicap in building a database that consistently 
and systematically records a set of risk exposure parameters. The data available for 
analysis and model-building ultimately depended on the NTSB's accident 
investigation mentality and policies. Besides, there is no alternative source of data. 
The problem is especially acute concerning unconventional or latent risk factors 
beyond the well established sources of risk such as airframe and engine failure. 
Parameters such as weight and runway criticality that require additional calculation 
arc often impossible to compute because of missing data. 
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However, it should be noted that the above data limitations are not unique to the 
current research but are inherent to risk assessment studies that use historical accident 
infonnation (Piers 1994, ETSC 1999a). 
7.4.2 Poor data quality 
Former studies using data from accident reports and docket files have already reported 
on the poor data quality (Hagy & Marthinsen 1987). Erroneous or conflicting 
information within the same docket is not uncommon. One example is that the 
wreckage location diagram provided does not match the text description given. 
Confusing and inconsistent use of terms and nomenclature adds to the challenges of 
extracting precise data points. When faced with conflicting data, the research team 
applied judgement to obtain a final figure according to the best information available. 
7.4.3 Inherent measurement difficulties 
The measurement of certain parameters suffers from inherent ambiguity in the 
aviation industry. A prime example is runway condition. There simply has not been 
an agreed industry standard on reporting runway conditions and determining its 
relationship with runway friction and aircraft braking performance (DeGroh 2006, 
FAA 2006b). The current industry approach is to rely mostly on pilots' subjective 
reporting. However, runway surface conditions may change rapidly according to 
precipitation, temperature, usage and runway treatment so actual conditions may 
differ significantly from that which was reported (FAA 2006b). Icing conditions too 
are known to be difficult to determine despite their important impact on aircraft 
performance (Winn 2006). 
The reporting of meteorological conditions in general is not as straightforward as it 
seems. The weather measured from ground stations may vary significantly from that 
experienced by the accident flight (Jerris et al. 1963), especially if the weather station 
is located far from the accident location, although the latter is only common among 
very remote airports. Another difficulty lies with the dynamic nature of 
meteorological conditions. Wind strength and direction may constantly change 
during the course of an approach. It may not always be clear as to which reading is 
most relevant. Judgement must therefore be applied to enter the most appropriate 
reading into the database. 
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7.4.4 Unregistered accidents 
When considering aircraft overruns, the issue of unregistered, or "dark-side", 
occurrences must be considered. These are flights that used more than the nominal 
runway distance required (take-off or landing) to complete the operation but without 
directly challenging ASAs due to excess runway available. As shown in Appendix 
A, these cases are normally considered as "normal operations" and would not feature 
in accident records. The same applies to operations that take up more runway width 
than normally required. Of equal concern are otherwise registered, or "semi-dark- 
side" cases, which exceeded the nominal runway distance requirement but are only 
reported as accidents for reasons other than challenging ASAs. 
Although these dark-side cases may provide additional data to the database, it is not 
feasible to systematically identify them within the timeframe of the project. They are 
expected to be so rare that the amount of normal flight data needed to yield a 
meaningful number of dark-side cases is so great that it is beyond the means of the 
current study. Moreover, normal operations data on actual runway distance used 
proved difficult to obtain despite extensive efforts. Finally, the presence of excess 
runway may alter pilot behaviour such that more runway distance is used than 
otherwise. 
7.4.5 Limited geographical scope 
Due to subsequent time constraint, the project was unable to collect data from sources 
other than the NTSB. While more data would allow additional statistical confidence 
in the model building, the gathered NTSB data provided nonetheless a solid basis 
from which statistical models could be developed. Besides, focusing on a specific 
aviation system gives a more homogenous set of data for analysis, eliminating the 
issue of comparability between national safety records and practises (Dff 1997). 
7.5 Incidents 
Given the limited time and resources available, the thesis concentrated on occurrences 
with the greatest potential for safety improvement, i. e. accidents with at least minor 
damage or injury. It is acknowledged that by excluding incident data the project is 
not taking into account potentially serious occurrences. However, with the accident 
data, the models developed focus on factors that have, in reality, turned what could 
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have otherwise been innocuous incidents into serious accidents. As such, risk 
assessment based on these models would also identify the more important risk factors. 
Including innocuous incidents in the database would affect the goodness of fit of the 
intended models. Furthermore, a practical difficulty of incorporating incident data is 
the lack of it. The quantity and quality of incident data is in even greater doubt than 
for accidents. 
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CHAPTER 8 UNIVARIATE, ANALYSIS - ACCIDENT DATABASE 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the univariate analysis of the accident database before NOD was 
incorporated in later analyses. The analysis aims to give a basic description of the 
accidents in the database, provide a better understanding of their nature and 
background conditions and to allow comparisons to be made between the four 
accident types. As such, it builds a foundation for the subsequent bivariate analysis 
and multivariate modelling. Many previous studies have identified the causes and 
contributory factors of take-off and landing accidents. Examples include CAA 
(1998), CAST (1999), FSF (2000) and Thurber (2006). This thesis does not repeat 
that exercise but examines the prevalence of a number of key risk factors that are 
relevant to the core objectives of the research, i. e. quantifying the criticality of risk 
factors and building predictive accident frequency models. Numerous references 
report that poor weather conditions such as adverse wind conditions and low visibility 
are associated with take-off and landing accidents (FSF 1999, NTSB 2005,2006b, 
Veilette 2006). Special emphasis was therefore placed on providing a comprehensive 
study of the pervasiveness of poor weather conditions in ASA-related aircraft 
mishaps. 
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8.1 Database Overview 
The breakdown of the database by accident type is given in Figure 8.1. Tile database 
is clearly dominated by landing accidents. Tlie ratio of landing accidents to take-off 
ones is 1: 2.7. Landing overruns and undershoots together account for over 70 
percent of occurrences over the period. Kirkland's overrun database had a similar 
split of landing and take-off cases (Kirkland 2001 a). 
Fifzure 8.1 Accident database breakdown by accident type 
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8.2 Accidents by Year 
Figure 8.2 shows the evolution of the number of cases under each accident type as 
well as the total number of ASA-rclated accidents since 1982. Considerable 
fluctuation in the number of total cases per year can be observed. While there 
appeared to be a period of decline in the total number of accidents between 1991 and 
1996, the situation has since peaked in 1997 with 27 occurrences and fallen to only 12 
in 2002. The large fluctuations suggest that fitting a trend line to the data would not 
be rricaningftil. 
The number of cases under each accident type varies significantly year-to-year as 
well. None of the accident types clearly display a clear trend of Increase or decrease. 
Since 1996, landing overruns consistently represent the largest group of accidents. In 
the last five years of the database, crashes after take-off are the smallest group. 
Figure 8.2 Accidents by yea 
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8.3 Accidents by Month 
The accidents were also grouped by month of occurrciicc. It was observed that a 
significant portion of accidents occurred during the winter months. Considering 
December, January and February as the winter season, the latter accounts for 34 
percent of all cases of the database. With the exception of take-off overruns, more 
accidents occur in winter than any other season. Figure 8.3 shows tile breakdown of 
accidents by season of occurrence. Winter-related incidents feature especially 
prominently for the two landing accident types. 37 percent of landing overruns and 
35 percent of landing undershoots occurred in winter. Sirmlar findings were reported 
by Kirkland (2001a) who found a higher proportion of overruns between November 
and February than in the rest of the year. This suggests that winter conditions is a 
potentially significant risk factor that warrant ftirther analysis. 
Figure 8.3 Accidents by season 
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8.4 Equipment Class 
Small and mediurn aircraft dominate each accident type in terms of eqUIpnICnt class 
(Figure 8.4). These are aircraft with a maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of 
41,000lbs or under. Medium size aircraft typically include business. lets such as tile 
Learjet 35 while small aircraft are under 12,500lbs, e. g. the Beech 90. Large jets 
include those above 41,000lbs up to 255,000lbs, such as the B737 and A320. Large 
commuters are in the same weight bracket but are generally smaller than large jets, 
e. g. regional jets. Heavy equipment refers to aircraft of MTOW more than 
255,000lbs. Together, medium and small aircraft make up more than 70 percent of 
all accidents. The figure is even higher for landing undershoots at 84 percent. 
Although the public's attention usually focuses oil large aircraft mishaps, the accident 
database consists of many more cases involving smaller aircraft, which may differ 
significantly in nature from the high-profile accidents. It could also be observed that 
a larger share of take-off accidents involve heavy equipment than landing accidents. 
F4,, ure 8.4 Accidents by equipment class 
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8.5 Equipment Type 
The split between turboprops and jet aircraft is fairly similar across all accident types, 
varying frorn 42 percent turboprops for take-off overruns to 60 percent for landing 
undershoots (Figure 8.5). Overall, overrun accidents involve a higher share of jets 
(average 56 percent) than airborne accidents (average 46 percent). 
Figure 8.5 Accidents by equipment type 
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8.6 User Class 
The accident database was also broken down by user class, i. e. operation type (Figure 
8.6). Commercial operations account for no more than roughly a third of tile cases 
under each accident category. Air taxis are especially prominent for landing 
undershoots, representing 31 percent of the accident type whereas the average is only 
24 percent. Crashes after take-off have a higher share of freight operations than all 
other accident types. By contrast, landing overruns have the highest proportion of 
general aviation incidents. The differences between the accident types highlight the 
importance of conducting this analysis and the subsequent modelling in a disaggregate 
manner 
Figure 8.6 Accidents by user class 
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8.7 Foreign Origin or Destination 
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Only a very small proportion of accidents involve flights with a foreign origin or 
destination. These flights account for an average of 4.9 percent of all accidents but 
this varies from 1.0 percent for landing overruns to 11.5 percent for take-off overruns. 
8.8 Hub Type 
The accidents were grouped by the size of the airports at which they took place. The 
2001 FAA airport statistics were used to class airfields as hubs or non-hubs. The 
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former include small, medium as well as large hubs according to conventional FAA 
definitions while non-hubs include all other airports, including non-hubs, non-primary 
and non-commercial service airfields. Without exception, more than half of the cases 
involve non-hub airports. They make up roughly 70 percent of all accident types 
except crashes after take-off, the figure for which is 52.2 percent. 
8.9 Approach Type 
The database was also analysed for the approach type that was used in landing 
accidents. As shown in Figure 8.7, just over 50 percent of landing overruns involved 
visual approaches. The figure is slightly lower for undershoots but the approach type 
used was unknown for approximately 10 percent of undershoots. Nevertheless, 
visual approach is the most common approach type for both classes of accidents. 
Among instrument approach accidents, 76.7 percent of landing overruns and 59.3 
percent of undershoots involved precision instrument approaches. 
When compared to previous studies of approach and landing accidents such as Enders 
et al. (1996), the current database contains a higher proportion of visual approaches. 
This may be attributed to the different accident filtering criteria used. Whereas 
Enders' database only considered commercial operators, the present database covers a 
wider range of operations that are likely to use visual approaches, e. g. general aviation 
flights. 
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Figure 8.7 Accidents by approach type 
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8.10 Go-around 
Due to the poor quality of the accident data, it was not possible to gauge the 
prevalence of go-around operations aniong landing accidents with confidence. For 
38 percent of both landing overruns and undershoots, it was impossible to ascertain 
whether the accidents involved a go-around manoeuvre. For the remaining cases, 
28.0 percent of landing undershoots followed a go-around and 16.9 percent of 
overruns did. This is intuitively correct as uncertain landing conditions are 
understood to be related to undershoots more than overruns. 
8.11 Aborted Take-offs 
For take-off accidents, the proportion of cases that involved aborted take-offs was 
considered. As expected, the share of accidents that entailed an aborted take-off is 
much higher for overruns than crashes after take-off. Aborted take-off was 
implicated in 67.3 percent of overruns but only 10.4 percent of crashes after take-off. 
The majority of the latter type of occurrence would involve a late aborted take-off that 
failed to prevent the aircraft from becoming airborne. 
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8.12 Visual and Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
The accident database was analysed against a number of meteorological factors. The 
first of these is whether the accident took place under visual meteorological 
conditions (VMC) or instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Considering the 
individual accident classes, landing undershoots were found to have the highest share 
of incidents involving IMC at 46.7 percent. This is followed by landing overruns 
with 36.7 percent, crashes after take-off with 25.4 percent and finally take-off 
overruns with 19.2 percent. On average, 40.5 percent of landing accidents and 22.7 
percent of take-off accidents took place in IMC. The disparity is reasonable since 
flights on approach and landing have less choice as to whether to continue the 
operation while take-offs could be delayed in severe weather conditions. These 
results are in general agreement with (Benedetto 2002) but the present study did not 
involve a causal analysis. 
8.13 Ceiling Height 
The ceiling height in which the accidents took place was then examined. It was 
observed that, similar to VMC and IMC, the mean ceiling height for landing accidents 
was clearly lower than their take-off counterparts. Whereas the average ceiling 
heights were 1,963ft and 1,821ft for landing overruns and undershoots respectively, 
take-off overruns averaged 2,416ft and crashes after take-off 2,142ft. Figure 8.8 
displays the percentage of cases of each accident type that occurred under different 
ceiling heights. It is evident that a greater share of landing accidents took place in the 
lower ceiling height categories (e. g. under I 000ft) than take-off incidents. 
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Figure 8.8 Accidcnts by ceiling height 
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The proportion of cases involving fog also shows an imbalance between landing and 
take-off accidents, as Figure 8.9 displays. More than a third of landing undershoots 
took place in fog but only 17.3 percent of take-off overruns did. This finding is 
consistent with the concept that flights on approach have reduced ability to avoid poor 
weather conditions compared to take-off operations. 
Figure 8.9-Accidents involving fog 
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8.15 Visibility 
When the proportion of cases of each accident type that took place in different 
visibility conditions was assessed, a similar situation to that of cciling licight was 
obtained (Figure 8.10). There is again a greater share of landing incidents that 
occurred in low visibility compared to take-off accidents. 37.7 percent of landing 
overruns and 45.1 percent of undershoots occurred in visibility under four statute 
i-nllcs whereas the figures are considerably lower for take-off incidents, at 15.4 
percent and 29.9 percent for take-off overruns and crashes after take-off respectively. 
Figure 8.10 Accidents by visilLility 
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8.16 Rain 
The accident database was then analysed against a number of types of precipitation. 
First, the share of each accident type involving rain was assessed (Figure 8.11). Most 
accidents did not occur in rain, although just over 30 percent of landing overruns did. 
Where rain was involved, the majority of cases was related to light rain. Heavy rain 
accounted for no more than five percent of each accident type and moderate rain 
under eight percent. The prevalence of landing accidents over take-off accidents is 
not so clear in terms of rain-related incidents but could nonetheless be observed. 
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Figure 8.11 Accidents bv level of rain 
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8.17 Electric Storm 
Despite the common connotations, very few accidents actually involved all electric 
storin. In fact, none of the accident types have more than 5 percent of cases related to 
electric storms. Not a single take-off overrun encountered an electric storm and only 
one crash after take-off did, making up 1.5 percent of the accident type. The figures 
are slightly more substantial for landing accidents, with nine (4.5 percent) landing 
overruns and six (4.9 percent) undershoots implicated. 
8.18 Frozen Precipitation 
Similar to electric storm, the number of accidents that involved frozen precipitation, 
e. g. freezing rain and hail, is very small. Overall, only 3.4 percent of cases of the 
accident database encountered frozen precipitation. Considering the individual 
classes of accidents, crashes after take-off have a markedly higher share of frozen 
precipitation-related cases. 7.5 percent (five cases) of crashes after take-off involved 
frozen precipitation while only 3.1 percent, 2.5 percent and 1.9 percent of incidents 
were involved for undershoots, landing and take-off overruns respectively. 
8.19 Temperature 
on average, landing accidents took place in lower temperatures than take-off 
accidents. The average temperature in which landing overruns and undershoots took 
-68- 
LDOR LDUS TOOR 
place is 10.8'C and 9.9'C respectively. Both are lower than the averages for take-off 
overruns (I 2.0'C) and crashes after take-off (I 1.4"C). Figure 8.12 shows the share of 
cases belonging to each accident type that took place in conditions under 5"C. 
Landing undershoot has a particularly high share of such incidents (42.7 percent) and 
landing overrun too has a higher share of low temperature occurrences than take-off 
accidents. 
Figure 8.12 Accidents under 5 degrees Celsius 
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8.20 Icing Conditions 
As expected, the results for icing conditions mirrored that of low temperature 
conditions, but to a smaller degree. Landing undershoot has the highest proportion of 
cases that took place in icing conditions (10.7 percent). It is also interesting to note 
that a substantially higher share of airborne accidents involved icing conditions than 
overruns. The former averaged 10.1 percent while the latter averaged only 5.6 
percent. 
8.21 Crosswind 
From the information available, the crosswind experienced by the accidents was 
calculated and compared. 87.8 percent of all accidents occurred with crosswind of 
under I Oknts. Considering the high crosswind cases of above 10knts, Figure 8.13 
reveals the difference between overruns and airborne occurrences. High crosswind 
was experienced by a distinctly high proportion of landing and take-off overruns 
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compared to undershoots and crashes after take-off. Even takinill into account all 
cases in each accident group, the mean crosswind of both overrun types are higher 
than the respective means of either airborne accident types. 
Figure 8.13 Accidents above I Oknts crosswind 
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8.22 Snow 
The proportion of cases that involved snow averaged 14.3 percent overall. Landing 
accidents have a slightly higher share of snow-related occurrences compared to take- 
off accidents. The contrast is greatest between landing undershoots (17.2 percent) and 
crashes after take-off (11.9 percent). The statistic is similar between both landing 
and take-off overruns, at approximately 13.5 percent. 
8.23 Runway Condition 
Transport Canada reported that the majority of landing accidents involve wet or icy 
runways (FSF 2003). The current database found 47.0 percent of landing overruns 
and 30.0 percent of take-off overruns took place on non-dry runways. Figure 8.14 
shows the breakdown of these cases. Overall, 62 out of the 107 overruns that 
occurred on non-dry runways involved wet runways. However, a remarkably higher 
share of landing overruns took place on wet runways compared to take-off overruns. 
Snow is the second most frequent non-dry runway condition, followed by ice. Only 
two landing overruns involved slush-covered runways and none of the take-off 
overruns. For every category of non-dry runway state, the share of landing overruns 
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involved is higher than the take-off equivalent. This follows the pattern where a 
greater proportion of landing occurrences are related to adverse weather conditions 
than take-off accidents. 
Fig, ure 8.14 Accidents involving- non-dry runways 
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8.24 Light Condition 
Figure 8.15 shows that roughly half of all accidents occurred in daylight conditions. 
The proportion of cases that took place at night ranged from 30.8 percent of take-off 
overruns to 38.5 percent of landing undershoots. The breakdown of cases by light 
condition is broadly similar for all accident types. Crash after take-off, however, has 
the highest share of cases that occurred in non-daylight conditions (50.8 percent) as 
well as the highest share of cases that took place in dawn or dusk (13.4 percent). 
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Figure 8.15 Accidents by light condition 
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8.25 Weight Criticality 
8.25.1 Maximum certified weight criticality 
Kirkland (2001a) pioneered the investigation of weight criticality as a factor of 
overrun risk. The corresponding inforrriation was also examined for the current 
database, adding landing undershoots as well as crashes after take-off to tile analysis 
on top of overruns. The analysis depended on cases for which tile actual weight of 
the aircraft at the time of accident occurrence was reported. This ranged from 53.7 
percent of crashes after take-off to only 29.6 percent of landing overruns. As such, 
the following analysis must be interpreted with care, especially as the NTSB tends not 
to report information that its investigators consider as irrelevant'. 
Figure 8.16 shows the aircraft weight at accident occurrence as a percentage of the 
relevant aircrafts' maximum certified weight in a cumulative format. Take-off 
accidents were found to be generally more weight critical than landing ones. 
1 Kirkland (2001 a) may have provided a more complete study of weight criticality by using sources 
other than the accident docket files to determine the weight of the aircraft at accident occurrence. This 
was not carried out in the current study because of the lack of NOD on weight criticality, which implies 
that the factor could not be included in the subsequent accident frequency models. 
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Figure 8.16 Accident weight criticality M maximum certified weight) 
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Table 8.1 compares the findings with Kirkland's results. The weight criticality of the 
current study's take-off overruns are similar to those found by Kirkland. Tile mean 
weight criticality of take-off overruns of the two studies are almost identical. As 
expected, both take-off overruns as well as crashes after take-off were found to be 
generally more weight critical than the sample of NOD Kirkland obtained from a 
large European airline. This is noticeable at the mean, 80 percent and 90 percent 
levels, and is particularly evident in the proportion of accident flights that were 
heavier than the maximurn certified weight. 
Týklo QI TA-t--nff nnomitinnq weitylit rritionlitv t-nrnn, -iri,, nn 
Weight Criticality Mean >80% >90% >100% 
Current study TOOR 92.5 94.1 70.6 11.8 
Current study TOC 87.3 77.8 47.2 8.3 
Kirkland study TOOR 92.0 85 65 11 
Kirkland study NOD 81.0 60 30 0.06 
However, the current study's weight criticality findings diverge significantly from 
Kirkland's in terms of landing overruns. Table 8.2 highlights some results for 
landing operations. Kirkland's landing NOD seems to be even more weight critical 
than landing accidents of the current database, except for cases which exceed the 
maximum certified weight. This may be related to the small number of cases in the 
present database that report the aircraft weight at the time of accident occurrence, i. e. 
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29.6 percent of landing of overruns and 34.4 percent of undershoots. The fact that 
the NOD belongs to a large commercial operator whereas the current database include 
many smaller operations may also contribute to the unusual results. 
Tnlkili- RIT nintlincr nni-. rnfinn-, we. icrlht nritirnlitv i-. nmnnri-znn 
Weight Criticality Mean >80% 1 >90% >100% 
Current study LDOR 79.87 57.6 15.3 3.4 
Current study LDUS 81.15 61.9 21.4 0.0 
Kirkland study LDOR 91.4 95 65 6 
Kirkland study NOD 87.5 95 35 0.0015 
8.25.2 Maximum allowable weight criticality 
Kirkland also conducted an analysis of weight criticality as measured by the aircraft 
weight at accident occurrence as a percentage of the relevant operation's maximum 
allowable weight, although a comparison with NOD was not feasible. Figure 8.17 
shows the results of the same analysis for the latest database. Overrun cases were 
found to be generally more weight critical than airborne accidents but these results are 
even more severely limited by the small number of cases available for analysis. Only 
7.0 percent of landing overruns report this information, rising to 28.4 percent of 
crashes after take-off. 
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Figure 8.17 Accident weight criticality (% maximum allowable weight) 
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Table 8.3 shows the weight criticality of the four classes of accidents as measured by 
percentage of maximum allowable weight. In line with expectations, the accidents 
are even more weight critical when measured against maximurn allowable weight 
compared to maximum certified weight. For all accident types, this is true 
concerning the mean weight criticality as well as the proportion of incidents at 80 
percent, 90 percent and 100 percent criticality. The results confirm Kirkland's 
finding that many accident flights were weight restricted, most likely because of 
weather conditions or runway length (Kirkland 200 1 a). 
Table 8.3 Accident weight criticality measured as % maximum allowable weight 
Weight Criticality Mean >80% >90% >100% 
Current study LDOR 87.3 78.6 71.4 21.4 
Current study LDUS 90.0 86.4 54.5 9.1 
Current study TOOR 95.2 100.0 90.0 20.0 
Current study TOC 91.0 94.7 47.4 10.5 
8.26 Runway Criticality 
Another breakthrough of the preceding study by Kirkland (2001 a) is the assessment of 
runway criticality as an overrun risk factor. A similar analysis was conducted using 
the current database. Figure 8.18 shows the runway criticality of take-off and landing 
overruns as measured by the amount of excess runway available. The latter is 
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measured by the difference between the available and required rUnWay distances as a 
percentage of the latter. 
Figure 8.18 Overrun runway criticality 
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The results suggest that take-off overruns tend to be more runway critical, i. e. have 
less excess runway available, than their landing counterparts. This is in agreement 
with Kirkland's findings. However, the analysis must again be interpreted with care 
due to the small number of cases that report inforniation on runway distance 
2 required . Only 16.6 percent of 
landing overruns (33 cases) and 19.2 percent ( 10 
cases) of take-off overruns could be used for this analysis. Even fewer cases of 
landing undershoot and crash after take-off contain the relevant data so these classes 
of accidents were not analysed. Nonetheless, some intuitively correct results were 
obtained. A sirmlar proportion of landing overruns in Kirkland's database and the 
present one involved negative excess runway distance, i. e. insufficient runway length. 
The former reported 10 percent and the latter registered 12.1 percent. As expected, 
these figures are significantly higher than the NOD Kirkland obtained from a major 
European airline. Regarding take-off overruns, cases with less runway distance 
available than required represent 20 percent of the current database but only 4 percent 
of Kirkland's. The discrepancy may be due to the reporting bias of NTSB 
investigations. Since NTSB tends to only report what is considered as relevant, it is 
2 Similar to weight criticality, Kirkland relied on sources other than the accident docket files to 
compute runway distance required. This was not done in the current study because of tile lack of 
representative NOD for model building. More fundamental concerns about using runway criticality as 
a predictive factor of accident occurrence are discussed in the next chapter. 
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not surprising that using the available data alone would yield more extreme results 
compared to an analysis of all cases. 
8.27 Violation of Minimums & Restrictions 
Understanding the extent to which accidents violated approach minimums and weight 
restrictions was also made possible by the current database. Out of the 61.7 percent 
of landing occurrences for which data was available, 5.5 percent of overruns and 17.2 
percent of undershoots involved the violation of approach minimums. This 
encompassed incidents such as landing without sufficient runway visual range for the 
approach category used. 
Studies have found that even a small amount of weight in excess of maximum gross 
weight could dramatically impact aircraft performance (Turner 2006). It was known 
for 66.4 percent of take-off accidents in the database whether the maximum take-off 
weight was violated. Of these known cases, 1.9 percent of take-off overruns and 6.0 
percent of crashes after take-off exceeded the maximum take-off weight. This is 
intuitively correct as one would expect more crashes after take-off to be weight 
related compared to overruns. 
8.28 Summary of Findings 
This chapter has presented the first stage in analysing the accident database, which 
involved identifying overall trends and assessing the prevalence of certain risk factors 
among the different accident types. More than 25 variables were examined although 
the database covered even more accident parameters. Since the ultimate objective of 
the research is to develop predictive risk models, this part of the study concentrated on 
factors that are relevant to the subsequent modelling work. Certain results confirmed 
the findings of previous studies such as (Kirkland 200 1 a). 
Numerous variables that were not tested previously were examined. Rather than 
simply grouping rain, snow and hail under precipitation as in Kirkland et al. (2003a), 
these factors were independently identified and analysed. In all, over ten 
meteorological factors were examined. Some significant trends were revealed. For 
instance, it was found that the majority of adverse meteorological conditions featured 
more prevalently among landing accidents than take-off occurrences. 
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The inclusion of landing undershoots and crashes after take-off in the dataset 
complemented the overrun incidents to provide a complete analysis of the types of 
accidents that occur during the take-off and landing phases of flight. The univariate 
analysis characterised each of the accident types on a series of variables and the 
nature of each accident type was compared. Crashes after take-off, for example, were 
found to differ from the other accident types for a number of variables. These ranged 
from a particularly high proportion of freight operations to a higher share of cases 
involving frozen precipitation and non-daylight conditions. 
The findings of this stage of the analysis have potential implications on the 
development of predictive models and were further investigated in the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. 
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CHAPTER 9 THE NORMAL OPERATIONS DATABASE 
The collection and incorporation of NOD in the risk modelling are major 
contributions of this thesis to the field of airport risk assessment. It is therefore 
crucial that appropriate NOD is collected. This chapter describes the development of 
the normal operation database, including the data sources, sampling strategy as well 
as the extensive efforts spent on ensuring that it is compatible with the accident 
database. 
9.1 Sources of NOD 
The challenges of obtaining appropriate NOD for risk assessment are well 
documented (Piers 1994, Dfr 1997, Roelen et al. 2002). Unavailability, 
incompleteness and difficult access are only some of the hurdles that must be 
overcome. A number of sources of NOD were considered for use in the current 
study. 
9.1.1 Flfizht data recorder data 
The prime source of NOD would come from the aircraft operators. Flight data 
recorders measure a range of potentially pertinent operating parameters for 
understanding normal flights' exposure to risks. In the US, such data is collected 
under the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programme. Numerous US 
and UK airlines were contacted directly and through umbrella organisation such as the 
Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) requesting access to a sample of 
FOQA data. However, all cited safety sensitivities and pilot union concerns as 
preventing the provision of relevant data, even in aggregated or de-identified format. 
one carrier did provide a sample of FOQA data on aircraft weight but the data only 
covered one type of regional jet and its variant, which is insufficient to build a 
representative sample for analysis. 
Requests were also made to third party organisations that possess various forms of 
FOQA data, including the FAA, aircraft manufacturers, aviation safety software 
companies and NASA's Aviation Performance Measuring System. Unfortunately, 
none of these were able to provide an adequate sample of NOD and suggested 
contacting the airlines. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has a 
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Safety Trend Evaluation Analysis & Data Exchange System (STEADES), which is a 
database of de-identified incident reports. However, the system is not capable of 
delivering the desired parameters of this thesis either. 
Kirkland sourced a sample of NOD from a major European airline, with which 
individual models were built assessing the criticality of individual risk factors 
(Kirkland 2001a). This data source was not used for the current thesis because of its 
mismatch with the accident database. Whereas the latter concerns US events, an 
extremely high proportion of the NOD from this airline would involve operations to 
or from the carrier's hub airport in Europe. Moreover, the accident database covers a 
very broad spectrum of aircraft types and operators while Kirkland's NOD source 
only includes several large aircraft models operating on commercial flights. In fact, 
using NOD from a particular airline inevitably leads to the issue of incompatibility 
with the accident database in terms of aircraft, operation and airport characteristics. 
Given the difficulty in gaining access to the airlines' data, it would be hard to collate a 
representative NOD sample from multiple airlines. 
The possibility of using airline load sheets to calculate nonnal flights' weight 
criticality was also considered. Unfortunately, access to such operational data was 
equally difficult and the problem of unrepresentative sampling would not be remedied 
unless the data is collected from a multitude of different aircraft operators. 
9.1.2 Airport sources 
An alternative source of NOD was therefore sought through airport operators, 
especially in terms of aircraft landing weights. At least two airports were supportive 
of providing the relevant information. However, even though these airports do 
charge landing fees according to maximum landing weight, the actual weight of the 
aircraft at landing is seldom recorded. As such, airport data on landing weights is not 
precise enough for risk assessment purposes. 
9.1.3 FAA sources 
A satisfactory solution was found in the data provided by the FAA's Aviation Policy 
and Plans Office (APO). The APO hosts a number of online databases that record 
flight activity and associated information. Two of these stand out as especially useful 
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sources of NOD. The first is the Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) 
which provides take-off and landing counts at specific airports in fifteen-minute or 
hourly segments, including information on aircraft and operation type, runway 
orientation as well as certain meteorological parameters such as ceiling height and 
visibility. However, the database only covers fifty-five large and medium hub 
airports. This would misrepresent actual traffic characteristics of normal flights and 
fail to match the accident database. 
The related Enhance Traffic Management System Counts (ETMSC) was therefore 
used instead. ETMSC provides hourly traffic counts for over 450 airports as well as 
the relevant traffic characteristics for individual flights, including aircraft, engine and 
operation type. One of the key advantages of the ETMSC database is that, unlike 
specific airport or airline FOQA data, it encompasses a wide variety of airport sizes 
and includes commercial, air taxi, freight as well as general aviation flights. It is 
therefore not necessary to collate multiple sources with potential compatibility issues 
to ensure that the flight population concerned is correctly represented3. However, 
ETMSC does not provide the associated weather and runway orientation information 
as does ASPM. Supplementary sources must therefore be used to cover these data 
gaps, as described later in this chapter. 
9.2 Sampling Strategy 
While the accident database contains all relevant occurrences within the period of 
study, a sampling strategy must be developed for collecting the appropriate sample of 
NOD. The prime concern is to gather a sample that is representative of the risk 
exposure of the overall normal flight population of interest. 
The process of extracting a representative sample of NOD from the ETMSC database 
and adding supplementary risk exposure information from other sources could be 
broken down into seven key steps. These are set out in Figure 9.1 and explained in 
detail below. 
3 It should be noted that ETMSC only records flights that filed a flight plan. Given that the filtering 
criteria of the accident database has already eliminated smaller aircraft types such as single and piston 
engine aircraft, this caveat is unlikely to significantly affect ETMSCIs capacity to represent risk 
exposure of the flight population of interest. 
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Fiaure 9.1 
Full ETMSC database 
Step 1 
Eligible airports for 
sampling in ETMSC 
Step 2 
Eligible airports split 
into 22 strata 
Step 3 
Select airports 
within each strata 
Step 4 
Sample flights from 
each selected airport 
Step 5 
Remove irrelevant 
flights from sample 
Step 6 
Apply weights to 
sampling strata 
Step 7 
Add supplementary 
NOD 
Final weighted 
NOD sample 
9.2.1 Safeguarding for crosswind calculation (Step 1) 
Before the sampling was carried out on the ETMSC database, a preliminary airport 
selection exercise was conducted. Crosswind is one of the risk factors that the 
current study aims to quantity and include in the risk modelling. Because ETMSC 
does not provide meteorological information, supplementary sources of NOD must be 
used, as with visibility, ceiling height etc. However, unlike the latter factors, 
crosswind strength is dependent on the orientation of the flight path and must be 
calculated using runway orientation information. ETMSC does not indicate the 
runway configuration in use at specific flight times. A solution was found by using 
airports with single or parallel runways and those with multiple non-parallel runways 
that only operate them in parallel or single configurations. The latter was confirmed 
by checking against the ASPM database, which provides the operational frequency of 
airport runway configurations. Multiple non-parallel runway airports not covered by 
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ASPM were automatically eliminated. This reduced the number of eligible airports 
for sampling to 125. 
9.2.2 Stratified sampling 
Random sampling of the ETMSC database would not be appropriate as it may bias 
against airports of certain risk profiles and misrepresent the genuine risk exposure of 
normal flights. A stratified sampling strategy was hence developed to select airports 
from which normal flights were then sampled. 
9.2.2.1 Stratification factors (Step 2) 
The eligible ETMSC airports were stratified by three factors. The first is airport size 
(hub and non-hub). Hub airports include all large, medium and small hub airports as 
classified by the FAA in 2001, as listed in Appendix E. Non-hub airports cover all 
remaining airfields. This accounts for the difference in risk exposure of flights 
related to large and small airports including aircraft size, operation type, navigational 
aid availability, airport infrastructure etc (Piers 1994). 
The second stratification factor is FAA region. The nine FAA administrative regions 
as shown in Figure 9.2 represent a reasonable division of the key geographical regions 
of the US4 . As such, it is a useful stratification factor to account for differences in 
regional weather patterns and hence normal flights' exposure to various 
meteorological conditions. Although weather patterns obviously vary within 
individual regions as well, using FAA regions is nonetheless an effective way to 
account for the broad differences in weather exposure. Due to the limited number of 
airports available for sampling as well as the effect of other stratification factors, it 
would be impractical to stratify the sample into even smaller meteorological regions. 
Hawaii is part of the Western Pacific Region 
-83- 
Figure 9.2 FAA regions 
FAA REGIONS 
too" 
Il 
Source: FAA 
The third stratification factor is the presence of significant terrain near the airport as 
the latter is expected to influence accident risk, especially for landing undershoots. 
The NOD sample ought to reflect the proportion of flights that are exposed to more 
challenging topographic environments. An airport is considered to be situated near 
significant terrain if the terrain within the Instrument Approach Procedure plariview 
exceeds 4,000 feet above the airport elevation, or if the terrain within a 6.0 nautical 
mile radius of the Airport Reference Point rises to at least 2,000 feet above the airport 
elevation. Detailed terrain is depicted in the Instrument Approach Procedures of 
these airports according to this definition in the FAA US Terminal Procedures 
Publication (FAA 2007). 257 airports met this criteria as of April 2006, as listed in 
Appendix F (FAA 2006c). The ETMSC airports were thus further stratified 
according to whether it is situated near significant terrain. 
9.2.2.2 Extraneous & empty strata 
The two airport classes, nine FAA regions and two terrain categories theoretically 
lead to 36 strata from which the NOD sample should be drawn. However, seven of 
these never featured among the airports of any FAA Terminal Area Forecasts (TAF) 
from 2000 to 2005, which comprehensively includes FAA towered airports, federally 
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contracted towered airports, non-federal towered airports as well as non-towered 
airports. It is therefore reasonable to assume that no airport exists under these strata. 
An example would be a large hub in the central region in significant terrain. 
Eliminating these non-existent hypothetical strata resulted in 29 strata with actual 
airport traffic. 
The 125 ETMSC airports suitable for NOD sampling were therefore split according to 
the 29 strata. However, no airport fell under seven of them. The limiting factor for 
five of them is significant terrain. For instance, none of the eligible ETMSC airports 
is an Alaskan non-hub airfield in significant terrain. Earlier elimination due to 
runway number or layout was responsible for the remaining two strata without 
sampling candidates. For example, all hubs in New England in norinal terrain have 
multiple runways in non-parallel layouts. Appendix G identifies all twenty-nine 
strata and indicates the empty ones. 
The impact of the empty strata was considered before the described sampling strategy 
was accepted. From TAFs, it was calculated that all airports nationwide belonging to 
the seven empty strata which cannot be sampled collectively account for 4.2 percent 
of the total relevant traffic from 2000 to 20055. This figure is considered sufficiently 
small as to not affect the overall representation of risk exposure of the great majority 
of relevant normal operations. 
9.2.2.3 Intra-stratum sampling (Step 3& 4) 
There remained, then, 22 strata with airports to sample from. If there were five or 
fewer airports in a particular stratum, all of them were sampled. For strata with more 
than five candidate airports, five were sampled from each. The five were selected 
such that airports of different traffic levels are represented. For example, if there 
were ten airports in the stratum, every other airport would be sampled in the order of 
descending traffic level. This ensures that the sampled airports correctly reflect the 
traffic characteristics of the overall normal flight population. This resulted in a total 
of 78 selected airports, as detailed in Appendix H. These sampled airports account 
for 48,924,040 operations from 2000 to 2005 inclusive, i. e. 25.5 percent of all relevant 
traffic during that period. 
5 See Appendix I for the calculation of relevant TAF traffic 
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Clearly, it is impractical and unnecessary to use all operations from these sampled 
airports for analysis. Therefore only flights on the first day of February, May, 
August and November of 2002,2003 and 2004 were sampled to constitute the final 
NOD sample for risk assessment. The selection of the four months allows seasonal 
variations in weather exposure to be captured. 
9.2.2.4 Removing irrelevant NOD (Step 5) 
The next stage involved ensuring that the sampled NOD traffic does not contain 
traffic types outside the scope of the accident database. This exercise followed the 
accident database filtering criteria as detailed in Appendix D. Where certain ETMSC 
data was missing, alternative sources were used to the extent possible to identify the 
relevant information, e. g. equipment class. Flights under equipment type 
'Helicopter', 'Piston' and 'Other'; equipment class 'Other'; user class 'Military' and 
'Other'; and general aviation flights of aircraft under 12,500lbs were removed. A 
small number of flights with incomplete data to verify its relevance was also removed. 
Having eliminated the irrelevant traffic, the final NOD sample consisted of 242,420 
flights. 
9.2.2.5 Accounting for sampling fractions (Step 6) 
Before the sampled NOD could be considered as representative of the overall 
population of normal operations of interest, the differences in sampling fraction 
between the 22 strata must be resolved. Sampling every stratum as described above 
led to certain strata being over-sampled and others under-samPled when compared to 
the actual composition of the overall normal flight population, since the proportion of 
available airports for sampling varies stratum to stratum. 
Proportionate allocation was therefore applied via the use of weights. A specific 
stratum's weight was derived by dividing the stratum's fraction of traffic in the 
overall population by the stratum's fraction of traffic in the sampled population. This 
is similar to inversing the sampling fraction of each stratum but avoids inflating the 
total number of sampled flights. Appendix G shows the traffic fractions and weights 
for each stratum. It could be seen that before the application of weights, non-hubs in 
the southern region in non-significant terrain were hugely under-sampled and non- 
hubs in significant terrain of the same region were over-sampled. These imbalances 
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were addressed by applying the weights, which calibrated the final NOD sample to 
reflect the overall nonnal flight population. 
9.3 Supplementary NOD (Step 7) 
The ETMSC database provides landing and take-off counts of hourly segments at 
specific airports broken down by aircraft, engine and operation type. For other risk 
exposure parameters, additional sources of NOD were found to supplement ETMSC's 
traffic data. 
9.3.1 NOAA TD3505 database 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Integrated Surface Hourly 
(TD3505) database was selected to measure the sampled ETMSC flights' exposure to 
a range of metrological factors. TD3505 was selected for its wide coverage of 
airports and weather parameters. Its quality control, completeness and depth are also 
superior to other hourly weather databases such as the Local Climatological Data 
Publication (NOAA 2004). 
TD3505 data for the sampled airports and times was therefore acquired and collated 
with the ETMSC traffic data. This involved converting GMT times (used by 
TD3505) into local times (used by ETMSC), paying attention to time zones and 
daylight saving hours of different US regions, which proved to be time-consuming 
and labour-intensive. The was accentuated by the fact that TD3505 often provides 
more than one reading per hour so a systematic reading selection method had to be 
devised to extract the most relevant weather readings. 
Weather observations were missing from the TD3505 database for a small proportion 
of time periods. The great majority of these concerned hours of closure for eight 
small airports when no flights took-off or landed overnight and were therefore 
inconsequential. Only a small number of hourly segments with ETMSC flight 
operations lacked the corresponding TD3505 data. These were removed from the 
normal operations database. There was no reason to suggest that these missing 
weather observations biased against any particular meteorological condition. Upon 
removing these time periods and associated flights from the NOD sample, the weights 
applied to each sampling strata were recalculated to ensure that the NOD sample 
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remained representative of the overall flight population. This is especially important 
as a disproportionate number of these removed time periods belonged to non-hub 
airports. The weights presented in Appendix G are the updated and final weights 
applied. 
9.3.2 Weather parameters 
9.3.2.1 TD3505 parameters 
Having collated the appropriate TD3505 data to the relevant ETMSC time segments, 
it was possible to quantify the normal flights' exposure to a large number of weather 
parameters. These include visibility, ceiling height, temperature, precipitation, snow, 
fog, icing condition, electric stonn and a host of other weather measures. 
9.3.2.2 Crosswind 
Whereas most meteorological conditions were readily identified in TD3505, others 
required further calculation. TD3505 data on wind direction and velocity was 
coupled with the true runway orientation of flight operations to compute the 
crosswind factor. This was relatively straightforward for airports with single or 
parallel runways. For airports with multiple runway operational orientations, the 
ASPM database was used to ascertain the runway configuration in use for all sampled 
flights. This was another lengthy exercise. 
9.3.2.3 Light condition 
Another parameter that required further computation was light condition. The 
accident database recorded whether each incident occurred in daylight, night, dawn or 
dusk. For normal operations, dawn was defined as the hour before official sunset 
time and dusk the hour after official sunset. 2002 civil twilight times were used to 
determine sunrise and sunset hours at locations across the US. If sunrise occurred 
after 30 minutes past the hour, that hour was considered dawn. Otherwise, the 
previous hour was marked as dawn. If sunset occurred before 30mins past the hour, 
that hour was considered dusk. Otherwise, the next hour was marked as dusk. It 
was found that, for all states other than Alaska, dawn and dusk fell on the hours 
indicated in Table 9.1. 
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Tnl-ilp. 01 T)nwn k. iiilqlc hniirq (nll. qtqtf-. q t-ýYnimt Aln-. 1-n) 
Hour of Dawn Hour of Dusk 
February 06 17 
May 05 20 
August 05 20 
November 06 
1 
17 
The calculations took into account daylight saving hours as well as the latitude of 
airport locations. It was checked that the above hours applied to Nantucket Memorial 
Airport, Massachusetts, one of the most northerly sampled airports, as well as Los 
Angeles International Airport, California, one of the most southerly. The figures for 
Alaska were calculated based on a centrally located Alaskan airport in the sample, 
Fairbanks International Airport, and are shown in Table 9.2. 
TAIP Q-? Dawn & dusk hours (Alaska) 
Hour of Dawn Hour of Dusk 
February 09 17 
May 04 22 
August 04 23 
November 08 16 
According to these designated hours, then, sampled flights that took-off or landed in 
dawn and dusk were identified. Hours after dusk were identified as night-time and 
the rest daylight. 
It is acknowledged that the definitions and methodology used to identify light 
conditions are somewhat crude and may have overstated the duration of dawn and 
dusk hours. However, given the hourly time segments of ETMSC, more precise 
definitions were not possible. 
9.4 Compatibility with Accident Database 
Once the NOD sample was collected and collated with the relevant supplementary 
data, it must be made compatible with the accident database. Unless the two were in 
a compatible state, bivariatc and multivariatc analyses could not be carried out. For 
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most variables, the process involved collapsing discrete variables into fewer 
categories. For example, TD3505 distinguishes between many forms of fog and 
snow. These were consolidated into generic groups so as to match the accident 
database. Commercial and air taxi operations were also merged into one category 
because ETMSC air taxi operations involve heavier aircraft than those in the accident 
database and it proved difficult to split the ETMSC air taxi operations into more 
groups without using aircraft size as a criterion, which would lead to multicollinearity 
later in the analysis. For periods when TD3505 only reported measures of 
precipitation in millimetres, they were converted into light, moderate or heavy rain as 
in the accident database 6. Units of continuous variables were also standardised. 
9.5 Advances Achieved 
The achievements reported in this chapter are considerable. From finding the best 
source of NOD to devising an appropriate sampling strategy, significant time and 
effort were required. The care and precision needed to collate the supplementary 
NOD to the matching time segments and to ensure accuracy were also substantial. 
To the author's knowledge, such a comprehensive database on normal operations' risk 
exposure has never been developed. The breadth of the database - covering a large 
range of big and small airports, from locations across the US - as well as its depth - 
taking into account such a wide spectrum of operational and meteorological risk 
factors - are groundbreaking. Kirkland, who pioneered the use of NOD for airport 
risk assessment, used a very limited sample of NOD from a single European airline, 
covering only several risk factors (Kirkland 2001a). The current database is far more 
representative of the overall population of flights of interest and covers more than a 
dozen risk factors. Furthermore, the current database is multidimensional. Indeed, 
exposure to all risk factors studied were measured for the entire sample of normal 
flights, producing a single, integrated database. This is significant as Kirkland has 
previously highlighted the lack of multidimensional NOD as a major handicap to risk 
analysis. With the current multidimensional normal operations database, multivariate 
risk models could be developed instead of a series of diSjoined bivariate models. 
' Trace amounts to 2mm of precipitation was considered light; 2-6mm moderate and above 6mm 
heavy. These were calculated from hours when TD3505 recorded continuous as well as discrete 
measures of precipitation. 
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CHAPTER 10 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS - QUANTIFICATION OF RISK 
FACTOR CRITICALITY 
With the comprehensive accident and normal operations databases, the difference in 
accident and normal flights' exposure to risk could be compared. Essentially, the 
analysis is of a case-control setup. Rather than simply focusing on the common 
characteristics of accident flights, case-control analyses reveal the factors that set 
accidents apart from normal operations and contribute to their occurrence (NTSB 
2005). After explaining which factors were analysed, this chapter presents the case- 
control analysis that identified and quantified the criticality of a series of risk factors. 
10.1 Factors AnalYsed 
10.1.1 Prereguisites 
Data on normal flights' exposure to the particular risk factor must be available if its 
criticality were to be quantified. Where NOD is available, extensive efforts were 
made to ensure that it is also compatible with the accident database. Both accident 
data and NOD may constrain the breadth and depth of the analysis. In the current 
study, for example, the TD3505 database provides much more in-depth data on 
weather factors than accident reports. On the other hand, ETMSC only provides 
limited information on traffic characteristics compared to accident reports. Despite 
these constraints, the great majority of risk factors studied in the univariate analysis 
were included in the bivariate and multivariate analyses. 
10.1.2 Factors not analyse 
This section explains the reasons behind not conducting the bivariate and multivariate 
analyses on certain potentially pertinent risk factors. 
10.1.2.1 Runway& weight criticality 
Any operation that used more runway distance than that required is in theory an 
overrun. The frequency and extent by which normal flights exceed their required 
runway distances should therefore be compared with that of accident Rights, as 
suggested in Chapter 8. However, runway criticality was not carried forward in the 
current analysis due to practical difficulties in measuring the true amount of runway 
used by normal operations. In day to day operations, there is no onus on pilots to 
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conduct the operation within the minimum runway distance required when excess 
runway is available. The location of runway exits and the braking force applied also 
influence runway distance used. Since pilot behaviour could vary from operation to 
operation, NOD on runway distance used is not an accurate measure of true runway 
criticality. In fact, runway criticality is not always easy to obtain for accidents either. 
Only a small proportion of accident reports include data on runway distance 
requirement and numerous assumptions on aircraft settings would be necessary to 
calculate the distance required from aircraft manuals. 
The possibility of using weight criticality as a proxy of runway criticality was 
considered. However, difficulties in obtaining data on normal take-offs and landings' 
actual weights from sources such as FOQA and airline load sheets impeded such an 
analysis. Besides, the same data for accidents is not always available in accident 
docket files either. 
10.1.2.2 Runway state 
Runway condition is understood to be one of the most pertinent overrun risk factors. 
Unfortunately, fundamental issues related to the description and assessment of runway 
state have precluded it from the current study. The aviation industry lacks a 
standardised and accurate method in measuring and reporting runway conditions. 
Current techniques have been deemed either subjective (e. g. PIREPs) or inaccurate 
(e. g. runway friction values) (DeGroh 2006). These nomenclatural and 
technological deficiencies mean that accurate data on runway state is difficult to 
obtain for accidents as well as normal flights. Although the factor could not be 
directly analysed, some of its effects were captured through other meteorological 
factors such as icing conditions and snow. 
10.1.2.3 Human factors 
Numerous sources point to the importance of human error and other crew-related 
factors in contributing to take-off and landing accidents (Ashford 1998, FSF 1999, 
2003, Li et al. 2001, NTSB 2006b). However, simply identifying human error as the 
cause of an accident (not uncommon in NTSB accident investigations) is not always 
constructive to safety management. Many underlying factors may be concealed 
under the term "human erroe' (Statler et al. 2003, ICAO 2006). 
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Indeed, the likelihood of human error has been found to be a function of endogenous 
and exogenous factors (Li et al. 2001). Rather than a purely intrinsic phenomenon of 
human behaviour, extrinsic attributes contribute to human error too. For instance, air 
crew error has been found to correlate strongly with weather and visibility conditions 
(Jerris et al. 1963). Adverse weather is consistently associated with higher risk of 
human error. Among factors associated with pilot, aircraft and crash circumstances, 
a number of studies identified IMC as most predictive of crew error. This could be 
explained by the stress model. Factors such as poor visibility are environmental 
stressors that add to pilot workload and performance demand, heightening the 
likelihood of pilot error and accident risk (Li et al. 2001). 
While human error may be the proximate cause of aviation mishaps, it is crucial in 
terms of safety management to identify and understand its exogenous factors. The 
British CAA, for example, encourages airport operators to consider aerodrome-related 
factors that may increase the risk of human error when examining overrun risk (CAA 
1998). Similarly, the current research indirectly considered the effect of human error 
through explicitly analysing and modelling some of its key established precursors -a 
range of weather parameters. Apart from these modelled factors, it was assumed that 
human error follows similar random distributions within accident and normal flights. 
This is not to dismiss the importance of understanding 'active [human] errors' as 
highlighted by Young et al. (2004). However, the lack of relevant data (accident & 
NOD) and concerns of collinearity prohibited a more explicit and direct examination 
of human error in the present study. 
10.2 Data Preparation 
Before the analysis was carried out, certain continuous variables required further 
preparation. When there is no cloud ceiling, the ceiling height entry in TD3505 is 
blank. Since blank fields would be omitted from the analysis, the blank ceiling fields 
were replaced with 3000ft as this is considered to be a generally safe ceiling height 
that would not contribute to accident occurrence. As very high ceiling heights are 
reported with less accuracy, any ceiling height reported as over 3000ft in TD3505 
were also entered as 3000ft. For consistency, accidents with no cloud ceiling or one 
above 3000ft were entered as 3000ft too. 
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Likewise, large visibility values are also more likely to be less accurate. Therefore, 
all visibility values greater than ten statute miles in the accident as well as NOD 
databases were entered as ten statute miles. 
Temperature is recorded in degree Celsius in the NTSB database. However, certain 
entries are so large that they are suspected to be in degree Fahrenheit. Those that are 
above 50 were assumed to be such cases and were converted into degree Celsius. 
The small number of cases with missing data were removed from the analysis of the 
respective factors concemed. 
10.3 Structure of Analysis 
The analysis involved several statistical procedures. Each was used to explore a 
different aspect of risk factor criticality. Firstly, Pearson's chi-square test of 
independence and the independent t-test were applied to compare the mean values of 
risk exposure between accident and normal flights. Secondly, RAIRs were utilised to 
measure flight accident propensity under different conditions and various levels of 
risk exposure. Finally, bivariate logistic regression was employed to assess the risk 
factors' statistical significance in predicting accident occurrence and to quantify the 
magnitude and direction of the relationship between risk exposure and accident 
likelihood. 
10.4 Comparison of Mean Exposure 
As an initial investigation of the difference in risk exposure between normal and 
accident flights, chi-square analysis and independent t-test were performed on the two 
sets of data to detect significant differences in mean exposure and the related effect 
sizes. Pearson's chi-square test of independence was used to determine whether the 
two datasets differ significantly in the proportional distributions of exposure to 
categorical risk variables (Hutcheson & Sofroniou 1999). It is therefore also a test on 
whether accident occurrence is associated with the various risk factors. The NTSB 
used this statistical procedure as well to assess the extent to which general aviation 
accidents are associated with meteorological risk factors (NTSB 2005). The same 
was achieved for continuous risk variables using the independent t-test. 
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The analysis was conducted on each accident type independently. Take-off accidents 
were compared to normal take-off operations and landing accidents to normal landing 
operations. 
10.4.1 Chi-square analysis results 
The chi-square analysis results are shown in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1 Chi-sciuare analysis results 
LDOR LDUS TOC TOOR 
Equipment Class 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
510.4 
(<. 0001) 
747.0 134.1 
< 
174.8 
<. 1 
Cramer's V 0.067 0.081 0.033 0.038 
Equipment Type 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
100.3 
(<. 0001) 
145.1 
(<. 0001) 
15.2 
(<0001) 
30.6 
<0001 
Cramer's V 0.030 0.036 0.011 0.016 
User Class 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
123.8 
(<. 0001) 
65.9 
(<. 0001)* 
18.6 
<0 01 
124.6 
1 
Cramer's V 0.033 0.024 0.012 0.032 
Foreign Ori. /Dest. 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
6.4 
(0.011) 
1.5 
(0.216) 
4.6 
(0.033)* 
0.0 
Cramer's V 0.007 0.004 0.006 -0.001 
Hub 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
123.8 
(<. 0001) 
67.5 
(<0001) 
21.2 7.1 
(0.008) 
Cramer's V 0.033 0.024 0.013 0.008 
Terrain 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
0.1 
(0.754) 
4.9 
(0.027) 
0.1 
(0.792) 
2.8 
(0.096) 
Cramer's V 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.005 
Dawn/Dusk 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
9.9 
(0.002) 
0.2 
(0.695) 
0.9 
0.34 
5.6 
(0.018)* 
Cramer's V 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.007 
Fog 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
444.0 
(<0001) 
291.8 
(<. 0001)* 
21.5 
(<0001)* 
62.6 
(<. 0001)* 
Cramer's V 0.062 0.050 0.013 0.023 
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Icing Conditions 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
494.5 
(<0001)* 
821.6 
(<0001)* 
12.3 
(<0001)* 
373.7 
<0001 
Cramer's V 0.066 0.085 0.010 0.055 
Dectric Storm 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
36.3 
(<. 0001)* 
27.3 
(<. 0001)* 
0.4 
(0.504)* 
0.3 
(0.569)* 
Cramer's V 0.018 0.015 0.002 0.002 
Frozen Precipitation 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
138.0 
(<. 0001)* 
56.5 
(<0001)* 
21.3 
KNOW 
428.5 
KNOW 
Cramer's V 0.035 0.022 0.013 0.059 
Snow 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
430.5 
(<0001)* 
438.2 
(<. 0001)- 
126.5 
(<. 0001)* 
126.3 
(<0001)* 
Cramer's V 0.061 0.062 . 008 0.032 
Rain 
Chi-square 
(Sig. ) 
83.4 
(<. 0001) 
41.7 
(<0001) 
7.2 
(0.007) 
13.2 
(<. 0001) 
Cramer's V 0.027 0.019 0.032 0.010 
Risk factors associated with accident occurrence significant at the 0.05 level are 
highlighted in bold. The categories distinguished within all variables studied are 
identical to those discussed in the univariate analysis of Chapter 8. The only 
exception is user class, which due to data compatibility issues, commercial and air 
taxi operations were merged into one class. 
Nine factors were found to be significantly associated with the occurrence of all 
accident types. These are equipment class, equipment type, user class, hub size, fog, 
icing conditions, frozen precipitation, snow and rain. Other factors were found to be 
significantly associated with certain accident types only. Foreign origin/destination 
was associated with landing and take-off oven-uns and dawn/dusk with landing 
overruns and crashes after take-off. A significant relationship was also observed 
between the occurrence of landing undershoots and significant terrain, which is 
intuitively correct. Finally, electric storm was associated with both types of landing 
accidents, which echoes the trend observed in the univariate analysis where adverse 
meteorological conditions featured more prevalently among landing than take-off 
occurrences. 
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When interpreting the results of chi-square analysis, however, the number of expected 
frequencies for each category must be considered. The usual assumption is that in 2 
x2 tables, the expected number of cases ought to be at least five for each category. 
Risk factors that did not meet this criterion were marked with an asterisk in Table 
10.1 after the significance value. Equipment type, hub, terrain and rain meet this 
condition for all accident types. Icing, electric storm, frozen precipitation and snow 
failed across all accident classes due to the rarity of expected accident occurrences 
despite the large accident database. Results that involve expected frequencies under 
five should be interpreted with caution. 
The Cramer's V statistic was calculated to measure the strength of association. 
Cramer's V varies from zero to one, the latter designating maximurn effect size 
(Hutcheson & Sofroniou 1999). Figure 10.1 compares the Cramer's V ineasures of 
risk factors that meet the minimum frequency criterion across all accident types and 
for which significant associations were found. 
Fig, ure 10.1 Chi-square effect size comparison 
Chi-square Effect Size Comparison 
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It should first of all be noted that the effect size of all three risk factors are small for 
all accident types. Within this context, variations exist between factors and types of 
accident. All three factors generally show stronger strengths of association with 
landing accidents. It is perhaps surprising that even operational factors such as 
equipment type (i. e. jet or turboprop) and hub size (hub or non-hub) follow this 
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pattern too. This will be further investigated in the bivariate logistic regression 
analysis. 
10.4.2 T-test results 
Independent West was conducted on risk factors measured as continuous variables 
(Hutcheson & Sofroniou 1999). Dependent West was not used because the accident 
data and the NOD were drawn from independent samples. Levene's test was carried 
out on each risk factor to determine if the assumption of equal variances held true. 
The Mest results were then obtained accordingly, as shown in Table 10.2. 
Tshle 10.2 T-test results 
LDOR LDUS TOC TOOR 
Ceiling Height 
Accident mean (I 00ft) 19.626 18.208 24.159 21.422 
NOD mean (I 00ft) 27.499 27.499 27.296 27.296 
t (Sig. ) 9.1 (<. 0001) 8.1 K0001) 2.2(0.036) 4.1 (<. 0001) 
r 0.558 0.616 0313 0.479 
Visibility 
Accident mean (SM) 6.044 5.541 7.879 6.897 
NOD mean (SM) 8.971 8.971 8.881 8.881 
t (Sig. ) 10.2 (<. 0001) 9.3 (<. 0001) 2.1(0.044) 4.2 (<0001) 
r 0.589 0.644 0.278 0.456 
Temperature 
Accident mean (I OQ 1.082 0.988 1.195 1.141 
NOD mean 0 OOC) 1.652 1.652 1.657 1.657 
t (Sig. ) 6.3 (<0001) 6.0 (<0001) 2.6(0.013) 3.3(0.002) 
r 0.423 0.487 0.342 _0.380 
Crosswind 
Accident mean (knts) 5.164 4.134 5.232 4.616 
NOD mean (knts) 4.044 4.044 3.975 3.975 
t (Sig. ) -3.1 (0.002) -0.3 (0.778) -1.6 (0.111) -1.1 (0.284) 
r 0.219 0.001 0.222 0.135 
Significant results at the 0.05 level are highlighted in bold. The results show 
significant differences in the mean exposure of accidents and normal flights to ceiling 
height, visibility and temperature across all accident types, suggesting that the two 
groups of flights were exposed to generally different meteorological conditions. For 
example, on average, landing overruns took place in lower ceiling height (1963ft) and 
in poorer visibility (6.04SM) than normal landings (2,750ft and 8.97SM respectively). 
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Accidents also tended to occur in lower temperatures. The difference is starkest for 
landing undershoots, which on average took place in 9.9'C' whereas the average for 
normal landings is 16.5'C. Since these findings were statistically significant, it is 
unlikely that the difference in exposure to risk factors came about simply by chance. 
The results for crosswind are only significant for landing overnins, which on average, 
experienced crosswind of 5.16 knots compared to only 4.04 knots for normal 
landings. Similar findings were obtained for the other accident types but they were 
not statistically significant. 
The effect sizes of these risk factors were evaluated by calCLIlatillg their r values. 
Figure 10.2 shows the r values for the statistically significant findings. 
,,, ure 
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Correlation values of 0.3 to 0.5 generally indicate a medium effect and values above 
0.5 signal a strong effect. Most of the r values in Figure 10.2 show medium to strong 
effects. However, the effect sizes are not uniform across parameters and accident 
types. It is interesting to note that the results differ considerably between landing and 
take-off accidents. For landing accidents, visibility has the strongest effect on 
accident occurrence, followed by ceiling height then temperature. However, effect 
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sizes are smaller across the board for take-off accidents. The order of impact of the 
three risk factors are also different, especially for take-off overruns. For the latter, 
ceiling height, visibility as well as temperature have medium effect sizes of similar 
strengths. For crashes after take-off, ceiling height shows the largest effect, followed 
by visibility and temperature. The dissimilarities in effect magnitude between risk 
factors and accident types indicate the four classes of accidents arc affected to 
different degrees by the various risk factors and highlight the importance of 
disaggregating the analysis as performed. In order to further examine the relationship 
between these factors and accident occurrence, their respective Relative Accident 
Involvement Ratios (RAIR) were analysed. 
10.5 Relative Accident Involvement Ratio (RAIR) 
Chi-square analyses and Mests compared accident and normal flights in terms of their 
mean values of risk exposure. To add further insight on the criticality of risk factors, 
the disparity in exposure to different levels or strengths of risk factors was also 
assessed. Enders et al. (1996) used the "Risk Ratio" to estimate the risk of an 
approach and landing accident in the presence of a particular factor. It is calculated 
as: 
Risk Ratio = (a/A)/(f/N) 
where; a is number of occurrences of a factor in accidents, A is number of accidents, f 
is number of occurrences of the factor in normal flights, and N is number of normal 
flights. 
The same measure, but called the Relative Accident Involvement Ratio (RAIR), is 
well established in road transport safety research as a measure of accident propensity 
among driver groups. Ratios over unity indicate that the subgroup of drivers 
concerned is more likely to cause a crash under the circumstances considered 
(Stamatiadis and Deacon 1995,1997, Hing et al. 2003, Yan et al. 2005). Here the 
measure was used to evaluate accident propensity of flights under different levels or 
strengths of specific risk factors. 
For each parameter, its range of values was split into quintiles and the RAIR for each 
quintile calculated. This provided a simple description of the flight accident 
-100- 
propensity associated with the different strengths of the parameter concerned. In 
cases where accident propensity is highly concentrated in a particular range, the latter 
was split into finer groups and the RAIRs recalculated. RAIR analysis was 
conducted on all continuous variables and discrete ones with multiple categories. 
10.5.1 Ceiliniz height 
Figure 10.3 shows the results for ceiling height. It reveals a clear trend in the 
parameter's relationship with accident propensity. Low ceiling conditions are 
associated with high accident propensity, which decreases with higher ceiling heights. 
This confirms and quantifies the idea of heightened accident risk in low ceiling 
conditions. This relationship is apparent for all accident types except take-off 
overruns, which saw higher accident propensity in 1200-1800ft ceiling height 
compared to 600-1200ft. Under ceiling height of 1200ft, it is clear that landings have 
higher accident propensity than take-offs and that landing undershoots have the 
highest RAIR figures. This suggests that ceiling height is somewhat more pertinent to 
landings as an accident risk factor than for take-offs at the low-end of ceiling height 
conditions. Within the same ceiling range, the RAIR of crashes after take-off is also 
larger than take-off overruns. This seems reasonable since take-off overruns stay 
closer to the ground than crashes after take-off. The RAIRs for all accident types 
drop below unity when ceiling height increases to beyond 2400ft, implying that 
accidents are relatively unlikely when ceiling height is above this level. 
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Figure 10.3 Ceiling height RAIRs 
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10.5.2 Visibility 
As with ceiling height, a clear trend was observed between visibility and accident 
propensity. As visibility decreases, the likelihood of accident occurrence increases. 
Figure 10.4 shows that RAIRs tend to be above unity when visibility is under four 
statute miles. In this high risk visibility range, landing undershoots have the highest 
RAIRs, followed by landing overruns, crashes after take-off and finally take-off 
overruns. These results echo those of ceiling height and again suggest greater 
sensitivity of landing and airborne operations towards adverse weather conditions. 
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Figure 10.4 Visibility RAIRs 
RAIR Visibility 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
0-2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8-10 
Visbility (SM) 
LDOR 
LDUS 
TOO R 
o TOC 
Figure 10.5 is a more detailed breakdown of the results for visibility under five statute 
miles. 
Figure 10.5 Visibility RAIRs detailed 
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The general tendency of rising accident propensity with lower visibility remains but 
the detailed results also show the exponential increase in accident propensity when 
visibility decreases to under one statute mile. For example, RAIRs for landing 
undershoots are fairly stable at around 4.5 between visibilities of one to four statute 
miles. Once under one statute mile, however, its R-AIR reaches over 20. This 
implies that landing undershoots are especially likely to occur in very low visibility 
conditions. This risk decreases dramatically when visibility improves to over one 
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statute mile and RAIR falls below unity beyond five statute miles. The analysis 
revealed that accident propensity does not necessarily have a continuous or linear 
relationship with changes in visibility and helps to identify conditions of significant 
concern. Lastly, the disparity between landing and take-off accident propensity at 
very low visibility conditions could be explained by the choice available to pilots oil 
the ground regarding whether to initiate a take-off. 
10.5.3 Temperature 
Figure 10.6 displays the RAIRs of different temperature ranges. Extremely low 
temperatures are associated with very high accident propensities, especially for 
landing accidents. Outside the -300C to -15"C range, the difference in accident 
propensity between accident types is relative small. As temperature rises above 
freezing point, RAIRs cross the unity threshold. 
Fiý,, urc 10.6 Temperature RAIRs 
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Figure 10.7 shows a more detailed investigation of RAIRs in the -150C to 150C 
temperature range. Within this range, the relatively small RAIR numbers suggest 
that accident propensity is somewhat less sensitive to temperature than to the range of 
visibility or ceiling height considered. This confin-ris the findings of the t-tests where 
temperature showed smaller effect sizes compared to the other two parameters. 
Overall, high accident propensity is generally associated with lower ternperatures but 
the trend is not as uniform between accident types as with ceiling height and visibility. 
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Between -I 5'C and 15'C, accident propensity clearly peaks around the freezing point 
for landing accidents. This is not apparent for take-off accidcrits, the propensity of 
which continues to rise below freezing point. This indicates that even different levels 
of the same risk factor affect accident propensity to varying degrees according to 
accident type. Nonetheless, RAIRs of all accident types fall below unity When 
temperature reaches 5'C. 
Fi. i4urc 10.7 Temperature RAIRs detailed 
RAIR Temperature - detailed 
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10.5.4 Crosswind 
The RAIR results for crosswind are shown in Figure 10.8. 
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Figure 10.8 Crosswind RAIRs 
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The general trend indicates rising accident propensity with increasing crosswind, 
which is intuitively correct. Accident propensity is especially elevated beyond 
eighteen knots, although there is no record of landing undershoots under such high 
crosswinds. The presence of a similar risk threshold was reported by Vail Es et al. 
(2001). Under eighteen knots, RAIRs are fairly similar across accident types except 
for landing overruns, which showed a distinctly high RAIR for crosswind of twelve to 
eighteen knots. When crosswind is under six knots, all RAIRs are below unity, 
suggesting that crosswind only contributes to increased accident likelihood above 
approximately six knots. 
10.5.5 Equipment class 
The predominance of small aircraft is evident in the RAIR results for equipli'lent class 
displayed in Figure 10.9. Accident propensity of small aircraft, i. e. those under 
12,500lbs, is several times higher than other aircraft types. The average RAIR for 
medium aircraft is 1.65 while heavy aircraft, large jets and large commuters all have 
RAIRs at or under unity. There are no significant disparities between the accident 
types, except for a particularly strong association between small aircraft and landing 
undershoots. 
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Figure 10.9 Equipment class RAIRs 
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10.5.6 User class 
Considering user class, accident propensity is concentrated in freight and general 
aviation operations, especially the former. Figure 10.10 also shows that all RAI Rs 
related to commercial/air taxi operations are under unity, suggesting that accidents of 
this category of operations are relatively unlikely. The largest inconsistency across 
accident types is the distinctly elevated accident propensity associated with freight 
operations and crashes after take-off. This is in line with the large number of cases 
where crashes after take-off resulted from freighters with improper loadings and 
centres of gravity observed when developing the accident database. 
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Figure 10.10 User class RAI Rs 
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10.6 Bivariate Logistic Regression 
The final stage of the bivariate analysis involved conducting individual logistic 
regressions on all risk factors. This firstly allows a formal statistical assessment of 
the significance of the risk factors' contribution towards the prediction of accident 
occurrence. Secondly, it also provides the odds ratios, and thus risk ratios, for 
assessing the impact of the presence or increase of a particular risk factor on the 
likelihood of accident occurrence. Full results are presented in Appendix J and the 
following sections in this chapter consider the results from two points of view - 
statistical significance of risk factors and their effect sizes as measured by risk ratios. 
First, however, the assumptions concerning logistic regression are discussed. 
10.6.1 Assumptions check 
Before the logistic regressions were performed, it was ensured that all assumptions for 
the statistical procedure were met. Logistic regression is relatively free from 
assumptions, especially compared to ordinary least squares regression. However, a 
number of assumptions still apply. One of these is a linear relationship between the 
independents and the log odds (logit) of the dependent. The Box-Tidwell 
transformation test was used to check whether all continuous variables rnet this 
assumption (Garson 2007). This involved adding to the model interaction terms that 
are the crossproduct of each independent times its natural logarithm [(X)ln(X)]. The 
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logit linearity assumption is violated if these terms are significant. In the current 
analysis, only the visibility variable was found to have non-linear logits. This may be 
due to the constraining of the variable at the top end (10SM). As a solution, the 
variable was first divided into five categories according to standard equal intervals 
using landing NOD and accident data. The variable was then converted into a 
categorical one with these five levels, each with a separate logit. 
10.6.2 Statistically significant risk factors 
The Wald statistic was used to assess whether a particular risk factor contributes 
towards the prediction of accident occurrence in a statistically significant way. As 
opposed to chi-square analysis and west, logistic regression not only considers the 
mean value of risk exposure but rather the entire range of exposure values. While the 
Wald statistic is known to be prone to Type II error and reject significant factors, the 
change in -2LL (-2 x Log likelihood) was also inspected to ensure that all significant 
factors were identified (Pampel 2000). For factors found to be significant predictors 
of specific accidents, their risk ratios were calculated and shown in Table 10.3. 
Regarding multi-category discrete variables, risk ratios were calculated for the 
specific categories that were identified as significant. The level used as the indicator 
or reference level is marked by "Ref". By examining the populated fields of Table 
10.3, then, the significant factors could be identified. 
The majority of factors were found to be significant predictors of accident occurrence 
for all accident types. These include aircraft and operational factors such as 
equipment class (medium & small), turboprop aircraft, user class (freight & general 
aviation) and non-hub airport. Meteorological conditions such as ceiling height, 
visibility (<2SM), fog, rain, temperature, icing conditions, frozen precipitation and 
snow were also found to be significant for all accident types. 
Two categories of multi-category discrete variables were found to be significant 
predictors for none of the accident types. They are equipment class (large 
commuters) and visibility (4-6SM). This may be due to the lack of data points 
belonging to these categories. 
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The remaining factors were identified as significant only for particular accident types. 
Visibility (24SM) and electric storm were only significant factors for predicting the 
occurrence of landing overruns and undershoots but not take-off accidents. 
Crosswind and foreign origin/destination only implicated landing and take-off 
overruns. Terrain was found to be significant only for landing undershoots, which is 
in line with expectations. The majority of these findings agree with respective West 
and chi-square analysis results. 
Tn'hli- 10 1 'Rivnriste Inprietic regrres, -, ion ri-, Ic rqtio.. -, 
Variable LDOR LDUS TOOR TOC 
Eqpt class Heavy 3.50 
Eqpt class Large jet Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Eqpt-class Large conunuter 
Eqpt class Medium 5.51 5.28 5.36 3.35 
Eqpt-class Small 28.18 52.97 30.64 22.67 
Eqpt_type Turboprop 3.77 6.79 2.84 3.55 
User class Commercial/Air Taxi Ref Ref Ref Ref 
User class Freight 5.64 5.94 4.80 13.88 
User class General Aviation 3.68 2.33 2.07 3.00 
Ceiling 180OFt Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Ceiling 120OFt 1.76 1.89 1.33 1.57 
Ceiling 60OFt 3.11 3.55 1.78 2.46 
Ceiling 20OFt 4.53 5.41 2.15 3.31 
Ceiling OR 5.46 6.67 2.37 3.85 
Visband <2 SM 19.99 23.99 5.68 10.72 
Visband 2-4 SM 3.53 5.66 
Visband 4-6 SM 
Visband 6-8 SM 2.29 
Visband 8+ SM Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Fog 12.04 12.63 4.67 6.99 
Dawn/Dusk 1.91 2.27 
Crosswind OKnts Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Crosswind 5Knts 1.45 1.51 
Crosswind 1OKnts 2.09 2.27 
Crosswind 15Knts 3.03 3.42 
Rain 3.70 3.37 2.35 2.66 
Electric storm 6.05 6.62 
1 1 
Temperature -I OOC 2.81 
1 3.31 2.29 12.51 
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Temperature -5'C 2.17 2.46 1.86 2.00 
Temperature O*C 1.68 1.82 1.51 1.59 
Temperature YC 1.29 1.35 1.23 1.26 
Temperature I OT Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Temperature 15'C 0.77 0.74 0.81 0.79 
Icing 42.57 72.62 14.45 70.32 
Frozen precipitation 25.65 21.24 23.80 94.15 
Snow 20.35 27.13 22.80 19.86 
Terrain 1.66 
Non-hub airport 4.71 4.27 3.57 1.90 
Foreign Origin/Destination 0.20 1 2.45 
- 
10.6.3 Effect size of risk factors 
A key output of the logistic regression is the odds ratio. Odds ratio is obtained by the 
exponentiation of the variable's logistic regression coefficient. The ratio indicates 
the change in odds of accident occurrence given a unit change in the predictor 
variable. In other words, the odds ratio is the number by which one multiplies the 
odds of accident occurrence for each one-unit increase in the independent variable7. 
Appendix J details the calculated odds ratios. 
Although the odds ratio is useful for interpreting the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables, it is often misinterpreted as the risk ratio, which 
is the ratio of two probabilities and more intuitively indicates relative risk (Menard 
2001). In the current study, an extra step was taken to calculate the risk ratios for all 
statistically significant predictor variables as identified by the Wald statistic (Table 
10.3). For a categorical risk factor, the risk ratio compares the relative risk of 
accident occurrence in the presence and absence of the factor. For example, a risk 
ratio of five for a categorical risk factor indicates that the risk of accident occurrence 
is five times greater in the presence of the factor than in its absence. Regarding risk 
factors measured as continuous variables, the risk ratio compares the probability of 
accident occurrence of several selected indicative levels with that of a reference level. 
For instance, a risk ratio of 0.2 for a risk factor measured as a continuous variable 
' Odds is the probability divided by one minus the probability. 
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implies that accident risk at that level is a fifth of that at the reference level. So not 
only does the risk ratio quantify the magnitude of a risk factor's effect on accident 
likelihood, it also indicates the direction of the relationship. This adds a critical 
dimension to the understanding of risk factor criticality. 
A number of risk factors consistently feature very large risk ratios for most accident 
types. Small aircraft (compared to large jets), visibility under two statute miles 
(compared to 8+ SM), fog, icing conditions, frozen precipitation and snow mostly 
have risk ratios above ten. This suggests that accident risk is ten times greater in the 
presence of these risk factors. Another set of risk factors have risk ratios between 
five to ten for landing accidents. They include medium aircraft (compared to large 
jets), freight operations, ceiling height Oft (compared to 1800ft), and electric storm. 
Several trends could be observed concerning notable risk ratio differences between 
accident types. A number of meteorological risk factors pose greater risk to landing 
accidents than take-off accidents. This confirms the findings of the previous stages 
of bivariate analysis and provides additional quantification of the phenomenon. 
Figures 10.11 to 10.15 compare the risk ratios for these factors between the accident 
types. Ceiling height, visibility, fog, rain as well as temperature tend to increase risk 
to a greater extent for landing occurrences than take-off ones. On average, fog 
increases the risk of landing accidents by 12.3 times but only 5.8 times for take-off 
accidents. The impact of fog on landing risk is hence twice that of take-off. For 
factors measured as continuous variables such as ceiling and temperature, the 
disparity in effect size on landing and take-off accidents grows as the risk factor level 
increases. 
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Fijzure 10.11 Ceiling height risk ratios 
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Figure 10.13 Fog risk ratios 
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Figure 10.14 Rain risk ratios 
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Figure 10.15 Temperature risk ratios 
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3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
0 
EI LDOR 
Z LDUS 
13 TOOR 
13 TOC 
-10 -5 05 10 15 
Temperature (degree C) 
On the other hand, icing conditions increases the risk of airborne accidents 
substantially more than overruns. Figure 10.16 compares the relevant risk ratios. 
The factor raises landing undershoot risk by more than five times that of take-off 
overruns. 
Fijzure 10.16 Iciniz conditions risk ratio 
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Certain accident types stand out to be especially vulnerable to specific risk factors. 
Landing undershoot is particularly susceptible to a number of operational features. 
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Figures 10.17 and 10.18 show that small and turboprop aircraft increase the risk of 
landing undershoots considerably more than other types of occurrences. 
Figure 10.17 Equipment class risk ratios 
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In contrast, frozen precipitation and freight operations present the greatest risk to 
crashes after take-off vis-d-vis other accident types. Figures 10.19 and 10.20 
compare the pertinent risk ratios. The increase in risk is two to four times greater for 
crashes after take-off two than other accident types. 
Risk Ratios Equipment Type (Turboprop) 
-116- 
Figure 10.19 Frozen precipitation risk ratios 
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Finally, it is interesting to note that foreign origin/destination has a contributory effect 
on take-off overrun occurrences but the opposite effect on landing overruns. This 
reflects the dominance of landing overruns by local flights in the accident database 
and the reverse for take-off overruns. 
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10.7 Summary of Findings 
This chapter has presented a series of analyses using accident data and NOD to 
characterise and quantify the criticality of individual risk factors. The bivariate 
analysis involved several stages of exploring the relationships between risk factors 
and accident occurrence. Chi-square analyses and Wests revealed significant 
differences in the mean values of risk exposure between accident and normal flights. 
For example, accidents experienced significantly lower ceiling heights, visibility and 
temperatures than their normal operations. Effect sizes were examined through 
Cramer's V statistics and r-values. Ceiling height and visibility have a large effect on 
the occurrence of landing overruns and undershoots but a lesser effect on take-off 
accidents. 
The second stage of the bivariate analysis involved calculating Relative Accident 
Involvement Ratios (RAIR), which measure the accident propensity of flights under 
various levels of risk exposure. Using RAIR, certain thresholds of risk were 
identified. For instance, accident propensity begins to rise when crosswind is over 
six knots and increases exponentially beyond eighteen knots. The relationship 
between risk factors and accident types was also characterised. It was found, for 
example, that in terms of temperature, accident propensity for landing overruns and 
undershoots concentrated around the freezing point while take-off accidents displayed 
increasing propensity with lower temperatures even beyond zero degree Celsius. 
The final stage of the bivariate analysis involved conducting a series of logistic 
regressions on individual risk factors. The Wald statistic was used to assess the 
factors' statistical significance in predicting accident occurrence. Odds ratios and 
risk ratios were also obtained to quantify the magnitude and direction of the 
relationship between risk exposure and accident likelihood. Amongst the results, 
landing undershoots were found to be especially sensitive to aircraft and engine type. 
Turboprops are 6.8 times more likely than jet aircraft to be involved in a landing 
undershoot whereas the average for the other accident types is only 3.4. How the 
presence of various weather conditions heightens the risk of accident occurrence was 
also quantified. Rain was found to increase accident risk by a factor of 2.4 to 3.7. 
By contrast, accidents are up to 27 times more likely to occur in snow. 
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Only a handful of aviation studies have previously employed the case-control 
methodology (NTSB 2005). Using the most comprehensive accident and normal 
operations databases to date, the case-control analysis presented here represent major 
advances in understanding the relationship between risk exposure and accident 
likelihood. The three stages of the bivariate analysis together offer in-depth profiles 
of the risk factors and the criticality of seventeen risk factors was quantified and 
characterised. Nonetheless, it should be noted again that the analysis is centred on 
establishing associations between risk exposure and accident occurrence without 
implying causality. Moreover, the risk ratios presented are derived from bivariate 
logistic regressions of individual risk factors and as such are not controlled for the 
joint influences of the various factors. The implications this has on accident 
frequency modelling is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 11 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS - ACCIDENT FREQUENCY 
MODELLING 
This chapter details the development of multivariate models for the prediction of 
accident occurrence. The models take into account the risk factors studied in the 
bivariate analysis. The choice of the statistical procedure, the fonn and coefficients 
of the four risk models and their respective goodness-of-fit and predictive 
performance are discussed. 
11.1 Need for Multivariate Models 
While the bivariate analysis of the previous chapter revealed many new insights on 
the properties and criticality of a range of risk factors, the bivariate logistic regression 
models are of little use in terms of accident prediction. Each bivariate model only 
considers a single risk factor, similar to Kirkland's models on runway and weight 
criticality (Kirkland et al. 2003a). As such, it is not surprising that the predictive 
power of each individual bivariate model is limited on its own. Table 11.1 shows the 
models' respective Nagelkereke W measures 8. 
Tn'kli-. III 'Rivnriate T. ofrictic Recrression Naaelkerelce R2 
Bivariate model LDOR LDUS TOOR TOC 
Equipment Class 0.093 0.141 0.077 0.071 
Equipment Type 0.027 0.056 0.014 0.022 
User Class 0.033 0.023 0.014 0.054 
Ceiling Height 0.059 0.073 0.009 0.029 
Visibility 0.083 0.092 0.016 0.039 
Fog 0.063 0.062 0.014 0.028 
Dawn/Dusk 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.004 
Crosswind 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.002 
Rain 0.020 0.016 0.006 0.009 
Electric Storm 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.000 
Temperature 0.020 0.026 0.011 0.014 
Icing Conditions 0.025 0.045 0.004 0.034 
Frozen Precipitation 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.031 
8 Nagelkerke Rý is a pseudo measure of model substantive significance similar to Rý in linear 
regression, varying between zero and one. Nagelkerke Rý of 0.3 suggests that the model explains 
roughly 30 percent of the variance in the data. 
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Snow 0.038 0.050 0.032 0.028 
Terrain 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 
Hub NH 0.039 0.033 0.022 0.006 
For OD 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.000 
Not only is it clear from the small Nagelkereke W measures that bivariate models are 
inadequate as predictive accident frequency models, their bivariate set-up also renders 
them difficult to use in conjunction with each other to obtain a total risk measure for a 
population of flights. Since independent variables are usually associated with one 
another, a series of bivariate models seldom provide an adequate analysis of the 
modcl data. In ordcr to statistically adjust for the cstimated cffccts of all risk factors, 
multivariate modelling is required (Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000). 
11.2 Choice of Logistic Regression 
A number of numerical techniques could be used to carry out the multivariate 
analysis. Logistic regression was the preferred statistical procedure for this study for 
a number of reasons. Firstly the technique is suited to models with a dichotomous 
outcome (accident and non-accidcnt) with multiple predictor variables that include a 
mixture of continuous and categorical parameters. Logistic regression is also 
especially appropriate for case-control studies because it allows the use of samples 
with different sampling fractions depending on the outcome variable without giving 
biased results. In this study, it allows the sampling fractions of accident flights and 
that of normal flights to be different. This property is not shared by most other types 
of regression analysis (Nagelkerke et al. 2005). 
Discriminant analysis as well as probit analysis were also considered for model 
building. The former was not used because it involves numerous assumptions which 
logistic regression is free from, including requirements of the independent variables to 
be normally distributed, linearly related and equal variance within each group 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 1996). Logistic regression was chosen over probit analysis 
because the latter does not give the equivalent of odds ratio so changes in probability 
are harder to quantify (Pampel 2000). 
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Consideration was equally given as to whether data-mining techniques such as 
artificial neural networks (ANN) should be used in lieu of conventional statistical 
procedures. In terms of predictive power, previous research is not conclusive as to 
whether neural networks or methods such as logistic regression offer better solutions 
(Borque et al. 2001, Freeman et al. 2002, Eftekhar et al. 2005). However, one 
marked disadvantage of ANN is its "black box" approach. Data-mining is focused 
more on predictive application than identifying the specific relationships between 
variables. Valid predictions could therefore be generated without providing much 
additional insight on the effects that predictor variables have on the model outcome. 
In contrast, the standardised coefficients and odds ratios of logistic regression offer 
far greater interpretability (Tu. 1996, Duh et al. 1998, Ohno-Machado & Rowland 
1999). This is an important advantage for its use in risk assessment and safety 
management. 
11.3 Assumptions Check 
As with bivariate logistic regression, it was ensured that all assumptions for the 
statistical technique were met. Visibility was again entered into the model as a five- 
level categorical variable in order to meet the logit linearity assumption as described 
in Chapter 10. An additional test required for multivariate logistic regression is that 
of multicollinearity. Collinearity among the predictor variables was assessed by 
conducting linear regression analyses to obtain the relevant tolerance and VIF values. 
None of the tolerance values were smaller than one and no VIF value was greater than 
ten, suggesting that collinearity among the variables is not serious (Myers 1990, 
Menard 2001). Kendall's tau was also used to assess potential correlations between 
predictor variables that are likely to be related. Three pairs of variables had 
Kendall's tau correlation coefficient between 0.5 and 0.65, indicating moderate 
correlation. They were equipment class with user class, equipment class with airport 
hub size, and icing conditions with frozen precipitation. Since none of the 
correlations were serious, all variables were kept in the multivariate model and 
caution was applied in interpreting the results. This is preferred to the alternative 
solution of removing variables, which would lead to model misspecification. 
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11.4 Logistic Regression Setup & Results 
Backward stepwise logistic regression was used to calibrate the risk models because 
of the predictive nature of the research. The selected technique is able to identify 
relationships missed by forward stepwise logistic regression (Hosmer & Lemeshow 
2000, Menard2OOl). The predictor variables were entered by blocks, each consisting 
of related factors, as shown in Table 11.2, such that the change in the model's 
substantive significance could be observed as the variables were included. Due to the 
more stringent data requirements of multivariate regression, cases with missing data 
were replaced by their respective series means. This only concerned the parameters 
of ceiling height (47 accidents), crosswind (14 accidents) and temperature (21 
accidents). The most severely affected case was ceiling height for take-off overruns, 
for which 15.4% of accidents had no data and were replaced by the series mean. 
Tnhit- II 
_9 
Block-, of varialhies 
Block Variables Entered 
Block I Equipment class, Equipment type 
Block 2 User class, Foreign origin/destination 
Block 3 Ceiling height 
Block 4 Visibility, Fog, Dawn/dusk 
Block 5 Crosswind 
Block 6 Rain, Electric storm 
Block 7 Temperature, Icing conditions, Frozen precipitation, Snow 
Block 8 Airport hub size 
Block 9 Significant terrain 
The results of the final models for each accident type are found in Appendix K, 
including the model coefficients, and adjusted risk factor odds ratios9. 
11.5 Accident Frequency Models 
With the model coefficients, the probability formula for accident occurrence could be 
obtained. 
' The adjusted odds ratios take into account potential confounders among risk factors included in the 
analysis. As such, they are closer to the risk factors' true effect on the likelihood of accident 
occurrence than the odds ratios obtained by bivariate analyses. However, the latter are relatively 
straightforward comparisons of risk exposure and are thus more directly interpretable. 
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For each accident model, 
P(AccidentOccurrence) = I+e-z 
where 
z= bo + b, (Variable, ) + b2(Variable2)+... + b,, (Variablej 
where bo is the constant and b, to b,, are the corresponding parameter coefficients. 
Due to the case-control set-up of the study, the constant (intercept) term bo of the final 
formula must be adjusted to account for the different sampling fractions between the 
cases and the controls. The following formula was used for this purpose (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow 2000): 
b *0 = In(t, /to)+ bo 
where b*O is the original intercept, tj is the sampling fraction of cases, to is the 
sampling fraction of controls and bo is the adjusted intercept. 
tj is one since all relevant accidents have been sampled. From the NOD sampling 
exercise, it was calculated that the total number of relevant normal operations from 
2000 to 2005 inclusive is 191,902,290 operations. That is 44.78 percent of the 
period's total itinerant operations excluding military operations. From the Terminal 
Area Forecasts, the total number of itinerant operations from 1982 to 2002 inclusive 
(the accident sampling period) excluding military operations was computed to be 
1,408,495,828 movements. 44.78 percent of the latter equates 630,792,133 
movements. Since the total sampled normal operation population is 242,420 flights, 
to = 242420/630792133 
= 3.843 x 10 
-4 
With t, and to, the adjusted intercepts of each of the risk model formula could be 
calculated: 
b *0 = ln(t, Ito)+ bo = in(1/3.843xlO-4) + bo = 7.864 + bo 
Table 11.3 shows the original and adjusted intercepts. 
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Table 11.3 Ori2inal & adiusted risk model equation intercei)ts 
Model Original intercept Adjusted intercept 
LDOR -8.431 -16.295 
LDUS -8.911 -16.775 
TOOR -9.281 -17.145 
TOC -9.540 -17.404 
With the adjusted intercept term, the z for the landing overrun probability fon-nula is: 
z= -16.295 + 0.486(HeavyAcft) - 1.631(L arg eCommuterAcß) + 0.893(MediumAcft) + 1.951(SmalL4cß) 
+ 1.050(TurbopropAcft) + 0.934(Freight0p) + 0.835(GAOp) - 1.565(ForeignOD) - 0.014(CeilingHeightOOfi) 
1.443(Visibility < 2SM) - 0.239(Visibility2 - 4SM) - 1.429(Visibility4 - 6SM) + 0.276(Visibility6 - 8SM) 
2.437(Fog) + 0.486(DawnDusk) + 0.089(Crosswindknts) + 2.164(kingConditions) + 1.860(Snow) 
0.588(NonhubApt) + 0.417(SignificantTerrain) 
The z for the landing undershoot probability formula is: 
z= -16.775 + 0.139(HeavyAcft) - 2.017(L arg eCommuterAcft) + 1.457(MediumAcft) + 2.932(SmalL4cft) 
+ 1.086(TurbopropAcft) + 0.894(Freight0p) + 0.610(GAOp) - 0.017(CeilingHeightooft) + 1.88 1 (Visibility < 2SM) 
0.446(Visibility2 - 4SM) - 0.234(Visibility4 - 6SM) + 0.321(Visibility6 - 8SM) + 1.738(Fog) + 0.043(Crosswindknts) 
+ 3.775(kingConditions) - 2.562(Frozen Pr ecipitation) + 2.01 I(Snow) + 0.819(SignificantTerrain) 
The z for the take-odd overruns probability fonnula is: 
, p) - 0.485(L arg eCommuterAcft) + 2.082(MediumAcft) + 3.860(SmallAcft) z= 17.145 + 1.157(HeavyAc 
0.968(ForeignOD) - 0.008(CeilingHeightOOft) + 0.320(Visibility < 2SM) - 2.077(Visibility2 - 4SM) 
- 0.470(Visibility4 - 6SM) - 0.544(Visibility6 - 8SM) + 1.847(Fog) + 0.093(Crosswindknts) 
- 0.254(Temperature) + 2.932(Snow) 
The z for the crashes after take-off probability fonnula is: 
z= -17.404 + 0.760(HeavyAcft) - 0.776(L arg eCommuterAcft) + 1.25l(MediumAcp) + 2.842(SmalL4cft) 
0.934(TurbopropAcp) + 2.049(Freight0p) + 1.316(GAOp) - 0.003(CeilingHeightOOft) + 1.307(Visibility < 2SM) 
- 0.790(Visibility2 - 4SM) - 1.104(Visibility4 - 6SM) + 0.178(Visibility6 - 8SM) + 1.753(Fog) + 0.683(DawnDusk) 
0.074(Crosswindknts) + 2.246(kingConditions) - 2.188(Frozen Pr ecipitation) + 2.561(Snow) - 0.734(NonhubApt) 
- 1.213(SignificaniTerrain) 
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It can be seen that the four formula do not contain identical parameters. The stepwise 
regression procedure has eliminated parameters that are not significant for the 
particular risk models. For example, foreign origin/destination only features in the 
formula for landing overruns and take-off overruns. Moreover, their signs are also 
different. Foreign operation is negative in the landing overrun formulae and positive 
in the take-off overrun one. This indicates that the factor contributes to accident risk 
for take-off overruns but has the opposite effect on landing overruns. This is in line 
with the findings of the bivariate analysis. The great majority of factors, however, 
bear the same sign for all accident types. The size of the factors' coefficients also 
differs between the four formula. The coefficients for fog, for instance, vary from 
1.738 (landing undershoot) to 2.437 (landing overrun). This reflects the degree to 
which the factor increases accident risk. Appendix L explains the exponential 
functional form of the models. 
11.6 Assessing Goodness-of-fit 
11.6.1 Naizelkerke R2 
The Nagelkerke Rý measures of the multivariate models are shown in Table 11.4. 
kerke W 
Model Nagelkerke Rz 
Landing Overrun 0.269 
Landing Undershoot 0.316 
Take-off Overrun 0.157 
Crash after Take-off 0.227 
The multivariate models clearly perform much better in explaining the variations in 
the data compared to bivariate models of the previous chapter (compare with Table 
11.1). The model for landing undershoot occurrence is the most potent, explaining 
twice as much data variation than the model for take-off overruns, the worse- 
performing model. Relatively low Rý values are the norm in logistic regression (Ash 
& Schwartz 1999) and they should not be compared with the Rý of linear regressions 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000). Figure 11.1 shows how Nagelkerke Rý increased as 
variables were added to the model. 
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Figure 11.1 Multivariate model accumulative Nagelkerke R2 
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11.6.2 Receiver operating characteristics curve 
In order to assess how successful the models are in classifying flights correctly as 
"accident" or "normal" and to find the appropriate cut-off points for the logistic 
regression models, Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) Curves were used. 
The cut-off point is the critical probability above which the model will class an event 
as an accident. The ROC curve plots all potential cut-off points according to their 
respective True Positive Rates (percentage of accidents correctly classed as accidents) 
and False Positive Rates (percentage of normal flights incorrectly classed as 
accidents). The best cut-off point would have a optimally high TPR and low FPR. 
Figures 11.2 to 11.5 display the four models' ROC curves. TPR is labelled 
Sensitivity and FPR I -Specificity. 
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Figure 11.2 Landinýz overrun model ROC curve 
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The ROC curve graphically presents the trade-off between TPR and FPR for all 
possible cut-off points, the best of which is likely to be the point closest to the top-left 
corner of the graph. The trade-off between TPR and FPR can be seen in Figure 11.2. 
As the TPR (sensitivity) rises, the FPR (I -specificity) also increases. Tile larger tile 
area under the curve, the better the model is at identifying accidents frorn normal 
flights. Figures 11.3 to 11.5 are interpreted in the same way. It is clear that the 
landing accident models produced better results than the take-off models. 
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Figure 11.3 Landing undershoot model ROC curve 
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Figure 11.4 Take-off overrun model ROC curve 
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Figure 11.5 Crash after take-off model ROC curve 
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11.6.3 c statistic 
The area under the ROC curve is quantified by the c statistic, which measures the 
discriminative power of the accident frequency models. The statistic varies between 
0.5 (indicating that the model's predictions are no better than chance) and I 
(indicating a perfect classification model with 100 percent TPR and 0 percent FPR). 
Table 11.5 shows the c statistics for the four models. 
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Tnhle 11.5 Model c statistics 
Model c statistic 
Landing Overrun 0.897 
Landing Undershoot 0.908 
Take-off Overrun 0.858 
Crash after Take-off 0.868 
c statistics of over 0.9 suggest excellent classification accuracy and ones above 0.8 are 
considered good (Tape 2007). Therefore, all models have at least good classification 
accuracy. As expected, the order of the c statistic findings reflects those of the 
Nagelkerke Rý in Table 11.4. The models' performance seem significantly better 
when measured by c statistics than Nagelkerke Rý because the former is not 
dependent on the frequency of the outcome, whereas Rý is smaller when the outcome 
is infrequent, which is true for accident occurrence (Ash & Schwartz 1999). 
Table 11.6 further compares the TPR and FPR of the four models at selected cut-off 
points. 
11 A Trlu-, nn4z; flui-. rqtp. Xr. fnlqi-. inn. -zit; vt-. rnti-. mmnnrirnn 
Model Cut-off point TPR FPR 
Landing Overrun 0.00000052127 0.849 0.221 
Landing Undershoot 0.00000024800 0.844 0.237 
Take-off Overrun 0.00000010955 0.846 0.330 
Crash after Take-off 0.00000009420 0.851 0.290 
For the landing overrun model, then, a cut-off point of 0.00000052127 yields 84.9 
percent of accidents being correctly classed as such and 22.1 percent of normal flights 
falsely classified as accidents. The latter could in fact be interpreted as high risk but 
incident-free operations. Depending on the objective of the risk assessment exercise, 
a relatively conservative or risk-tolerant cut-off point could be chosen. 
-132- 
11.7 Comparison with Traditional Risk Assessment Models 
The improvements achieved by this research in terms of the risk models' goodness-of- 
fit and predictive power ought to be examined. As discussed in Chapter 5, most 
traditional risk assessments for airport safety areas rely oil simple crash rates 
according to general groupings of aircraft type when considering accident frcqucncy. 
it is evident from Figure 11.1 that the final models' substantive significance as 
measured by Nagelkerke R2 are considerable improvements upon models based only 
on Block I parameters (aircraft size and type). The results also compare favourably 
with Kirkland's landing overrun model based on excess runway distance, which only 
explained II percent of risk determinants (Kirkland 200 1 a). 
Figure 11.6 shows the difference in terms of c statistics between traditional models 
and the current ones. Gains in goodness-of-fit and predictive power were observed 
for models of all accident types. 
Figure 11.6 C statistic comparisOn 
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Finally Table 11.7 contrasts the models' predictive accuracy by comparing their 
respective false positive rates at cut-off points with similar true positive rates. 
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LDOR LDUS TOOR TOC 
T, qhli- 11 -7 
Fqlqe no-.; itive rate cominarison 
Model Traditional 
Model TPR 
Current 
Model TPR 
Traditional 
Mode FPR 
Current 
Model FPR 
Landing Overrun 0.844 0.849 0.395 0.221 
Landing Undershoot 0.852 0.844 0.299 0.237 
Take-off Overrun 0.846 0.846 0.405 0.330 
Crash after Take-off 0.821 0.851 0.405 0.290 
At similar TPRs, the FPR of the current models are significantly lower than that of the 
traditional models for all accident types. For example, at a true positive rate of 84.6 
percent, the model of take-off overruns using the conventional predictor variables 
incorrectly classed 40.5 percent of normal operations as accidents. In contrast, the 
equivalent for the model developed in the present study is 33.0 percent. The models' 
increased ability in discriminating between safe and accident flights are important 
steps towards better airport risk assessment. From the various measures, then, it is 
clear that important gains have been made by the current research in improving the 
accident frequency models' fit and predictive power. 
11.8 Summary of Findings 
Although the bivariate analysis has quantified the criticality of many risk factors, a 
series of single factor models cannot be used to effectively distinguish accident flights 
from non-accident ones. Multivariate logistic regression was therefore conducted to 
calibrate frequency models for the four accident types. This was made possible by 
the availability of multidimensional normal operations data. This represents another 
major breakthrough in airport risk assessment because where normal operations data 
was used before (Enders et al. 1996, Kirkland 2001a), it was one-dimensional in 
nature, which limits modelling capability and fails to account for joint influences 
between variables. 
Multivariate modelling using the range of risk factors available vastly improved 
predictive power compared to previous methodologies, including Kirkland et al. 
(2003a), and traditional methods that only considered aircraft and engine types. 
Nagelkerke W and the c statistic were used to assess the goodness-of-fit and 
predictive ability of the models. On average, the models developed in this study 
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explained 14 percentage points more data variation than conventional models. 
Traditional techniques that only included aircraft and engine type had an average c 
statistic of 0.81 across the accident types, whereas the new models averaged 0.88. 
Significant improvements in model sensitivity and specificity were also observed. 
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CHAPTER 12 ACCIDENT LOCATION ANALYSIS 
The core contribution of this thesis concerns the first Part of the three-step airport risk 
assessment, i. e. the frequency modelling of ASA-related aircraft accidents. 
Nonetheless, advances were also made in the second component of risk assessment 
regarding accident locations. With the comprehensive accident database developed, 
a more complete understanding of accident locations could be obtained. This chapter 
describes the relevant analyses and findings. The purpose of the analysis is to 
support the demonstration application of the accident frequency models in the next 
chapter. 
12.1 Location Coordinate System 
The accidents' crash locations were recorded using a coordinate system as shown in 
Figure 12.1. 
Figure 12.1 Location coordinate system 
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The origin of the coordinate system is where the runway centreline intersects the 
runway threshold for landing accidents and the start-of-roll threshold for take-off 
accidents. Positive x is the distance from the threshold towards the end of the 
runway and negative x is the distance before the runway threshold. y measures the 
distance from the runway centreline. The measurement system is similar to those 
used by most risk assessment studies in the area, such as the British NATS and FAA's 
crash location studies (Cowell et al. 1997, David 1990). 
A number of Dutch studies such as (Ale & Piers 2000a) referenced accident locations 
to flight paths rather than the extended centreline. Although intuitively more 
accurate, the lack of relevant flight path information and hence lower statistical 
confidence as well as the tendency of landing aircraft to align with the extended 
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runway centreline at considerable distance from the threshold limit the benefits of 
referencing accident locations to flight paths (Davies & Quinn 2004b). 
12.2 Point of First Impact 
Another innovation of the current research involves recording the point of first impact 
(POFI) for landing undershoots and crashes after take-off in addition to their final 
wreckage sites. For these classes of accidents, there is often a significant distance 
between the location where an ASA was first challenged, e. g. obstacle hit before the 
runway threshold, and the final wreckage site. If only the latter was considered, the 
dimensional needs of ASAs would be substantially underestimated. When 
considering the longitudinal ASA dimensional needs for landing undershoots and 
crashes after take-off, then, the concept of the 'critical x distance' was used. The 
critical x distance is the larger of the x distances as measured from the final wreckage 
site and the POFI. This allows a better assessment of true ASA infringements and 
needs. When only POR or final wreckage location was known, it was treated as the 
critical x distance. The equivalent critical y distances were computed for landing 
undershoots and crashes after take-off correspondingly. 
12.3 Crash Scenarios 
The current analysis considered a total of six possible scenarios under which the 
longitudinal length of ASAs (x distance) could be challenged. These are explained in 
turn. 
12.3.1 Scenario I- landing overrun 
Figure 12.2 depicts accident location scenario 1. After a landing overrun, the 
aircraft's final wreckage site lies beyond the runway end. 
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Fijzure 12.2 Scenario I 
Landing direction 
Final wreckage site 
LDA Runway end of interest 
12.3.2 Scenario 2- landing undershoot 
Figure 12.3 depicts accident location scenario 2. Before reaching the runway 
threshold, the aircraft undershoots and challenged an ASA. The x distances to the 
runway threshold from the POR and final wreckage site were both measured. 
Critical x is the one with the largest negative x figure. 
Fijzure 12.3 Scenario 2 
Landing direction 
4 
POFI/Final Wreckage Site 
LDA 
\ 
Runway end of interest 
12.3.3 Scenario 3- take-off overrun 
Figure 12.4 depicts accident location scenario 3. After a take-off overrun, the 
aircraft's final wreckage site lies beyond the runway end. 
Fiaure 12.4 Scenario 3 
Take-off direction 
Final wreckage site 
TODA Runway end of interest 
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12.3.4 Scenario 4- crash after take-off 
Figure 12.5 depicts accident location scenario 4. The x distances from the start-of- 
roll threshold to the POR and final wreckage site were both measured. Critical x is 
the one with the largest x figure. 
Fijzure 12.5 Scenario 4 
Take-off direction 
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12.3.5 Scenario 5- landing undershoot (beyond runway end) 
There are some cases of landing undershoots with POFIs and/or final wreckage sites 
beyond the runway threshold. These are classed as landing undershoots because their 
POFIs are off-runway. Scenario 5 considers such cases with POFIs or final wreckage 
locations beyond the runway end (Figure 12.6). This scenario also includes cases 
which, after a POFI before the runway threshold, the aircraft continued to a final 
wreckage site beyond the runway end. 
Fizure 12.6 ScenariO 5 
POFI/Final Wreckage Site 
Landing direction 
x 
LDA Runway end of interest 
12.3.6 Scenario 6- crash after take-off (before start- f-roll threshold) 
Depicted in Figure 12.7, there are potentially cases of crashes after take-off that have 
POFIs and/or final wreckage locations with negative x distances. This is likely for 
flights that have made a sharp turn after lift-off towards the start-of-roll runway 
threshold before crashing. 
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Figure 12.7 Scenario 6 
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12.4 Complementary Cumulative Probability Distributions 
For each of the accident scenarios described above, complementary cumulative 
probability distributions (CCPD) of the relevant x and y distances were plotted'o. 
Eddowes et al. (2001) also used CCPDs to analyse overrun and undershoot distances. 
These CCPDs are essential to the application of the accident frequency models as 
demonstrated in the next chapter. Details of how each CCPD was obtained are 
described in the following sections. 
12.4.1 CCPD scenario Ix distance 
For scenario 1, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are landing overruns with 
final wreckage sites beyond the runway end. Out of 133 landing overruns with 
known wreckage locations, 71 cases involved x locations beyond the runway end. 
The x distances from the runway end to the final wreckage sites were measured. One 
case that involved an x distance of over 19000ft was considered as an outlier and was 
removed. The remaining 70 cases were used to plot the CCPD, as shown in Figure 
12.8. 
'0 It is expected that the amount of lateral deviation would bear some relationship to the x distance 
involved. However, this has not been explored in the current thesis because location modelling is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, which aims to provide a simple analysis of accident locations for the 
purpose of demonstrating the application of the frequency models developed. 
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Figure 12.8 Scenario Ix distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve overrun distances of more than 
150ft beyond the runway end. The plot also shows that 40 percent of cases Involve 
overrun distances of 500ft or more beyond the runway end. 
12.4.2 CCPD scenario 2x distance 
For scenario 2, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are landing undershoots 
with POFIs and/or final wreckage sites before the runway threshold. Out of 105 
landing undershoots with known wreckage information, 78 cases involved x locations 
beyond the runway end. The critical x distances frorn the POFI/final wreckage site to 
the runway threshold were measured. All 78 cases were used to plot the CCPD, as 
shown in Figure 12-9. 
LDOR Wreckage Location X CCPD 
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Figure 12.9 Scenario 2x distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that approximately 80 percent of cases involve undershoot 
distances of more than 100ft from the runway threshold. The plot also shows that a 
significant proportion of cases involve very large x distances. Roughly a third of 
cases involve undershoot distances of 10,000ft or more. The greater x distances 
compared to landing overruns were expected due to the airborne nature of 
undershoots. 
12.4.3 CCPD scenario 3x distance 
For scenario 3, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are take-off overruns with 
final wreckage sites beyond the runway end. Out of 37 take-off overruns with known 
wreckage locations, 21 cases involved x locations beyond the runway end. The x 
distances from the runway end to the final wreckage sites were measured and used to 
plot the corresponding CCPD (Figure 12.10). 
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Figure 12.10 Scenario 3x distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve overrun distances of more than 
245ft beyond the runway end. The greater overruns distances compared to landing 
overruns are probably due to the high energy nature of many take-off overruns. Tile 
plot also shows that roughly half of all cases involve overrun distances of 500ft or 
more. 
12.4.4 CCPD scenario 4x distance 
For scenario 4, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are crashes after take-off 
with POFIs and/or final wreckage sites beyond the runway end. Out of 57 crashes 
after take-off with known wreckage information, 26 cases involved x locations 
beyond the runway end. The critical x distances from the runway end to the 
POFI/final wreckage site were measured. Figure 12.11 shows the corresponding 
CCPD. 
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Figure 12.11 Scenario 4x distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve x distances of more than 11 80ft 
beyond the runway end. Similar to landing undershoots, the plot also shows a 
significant proportion of accidents involve very large x distances. Roughly 15.4 
percent of cases involve undershoot distances of 10,000ft or more. The greater x 
distances compared to take-off overruns were expected due to the airborne nature of 
crashes after take-off. 
12.4.5 CCPD scenario 5x distance 
For scenario 5, the cases of concern are landing undershoots with positive x distances 
beyond the runway end. Out of 105 landing undershoots with known wreckage 
information, thirteen cases fall into this category. The critical x distances from the 
POFI/final wreckage site to the runway end were measured and used to plot the 
corresponding CCPD (Figure 12.12). 
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Figure 12.12 Scenario 5x distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that approximately 80 percent of cases involve x distances of more 
than 3300ft beyond the runway end. The large x distances suggest that the majority 
of the cases involve occurrences far from the airports' immediate surroundings, where 
both POFIs and final wreckage sites are a distance away from the runway. 
12.4.6 CCPD -scenario 6x distance 
For scenario 6, the cases of concern are crashes after take-off with negative x 
distances, i. e. POF]s and/or final wreckage sites before the start-of-roll runway 
threshold. Out of 57 crashes after take-off with known wreckage Infori-nation, only 
two cases fall into this category. Their critical x distances are 3252ft and 9504ft 
respectively from the runway threshold. The large distances again suggest that the 
events were altogether removed from the immediate surroundings of the airport. The 
small number of data points prevents a CCPD to be plotted with confidence. 
12.4.7 CCPD landing overrun y distance 
The lateral deviations of all landing overruns were plotted In a single CCPD. Of the 
133 cases with known y distances, 26 were recorded as zero] 
1. These were removed 
for the purpose of plotting the CCPD- The plot, based on the remaining 107 cases, is 
shown in Figure 12.13. 
11 A disproportionate number of cases recorded zero lateral deviation due to the lack of accurate data in 
the accident files. Cases believed to involve minimal lateral deviation were entered as y=O. Where 
such an assumption could not be confidently made, y was considered unknown. 
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Figure 12.13 Landiný4 overrun v distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve lateral deviations exceeding 65ft 
from the runway centreline. For a runway 150ft wide, the plot shows that 76.6 
percent of landing overruns have final wreckage sites beyond the widths of the 
runway, i. e. y distances of over 75 ft 12. 
12.4.8 CCPD landing undershoot y distance 
The lateral deviations of all landing undershoots were plotted in a single CCPD. Of 
the 91 cases with known y distances, 22 were recorded as zero. These were removed 
for the purpose of plotting the CCPD. The critical y distances were identified and 
based on 69 cases the CCPD was obtained, as shown in Figure 12.14. 
12 Many runways, however, are legitimately less than 150ft wide. 
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Figure 12.14 Landing undershoot y distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that approximately 80 percent of cases involve lateral deviations 
exceeding 100ft from the runway centreline. For a runway 150ft wide, the plot 
shows that 85.5 percent of landing overruns have final wreckage sites beyond the 
widths of the runway. The greater lateral deviation of landing undershoots compared 
to overruns is in line with expectations. 
12.4.9 CCPD take-off overrun y distance 
The lateral deviations of all take-off overruns were plotted in a single CCPD. Of the 
37 cases with known y distances, eleven were recorded as zero. These were removed 
for the purpose of plotting the CCPD. The plot, based on the remaining 26 cases, is 
shown in Figure 12-15. 
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Fig, ure 12.15 Landing undershoot y distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that approximately 80 percent of cases involve lateral deviations 
exceeding 53ft from the runway centreline. For a runway 150ft wide, the plot shows 
that approximately 75.3 percent of landing overruns have final wreckage sites beyond 
the widths of the runway. The findings are broadly sirnilar with those of landing 
overruns, albeit based on far fewer data points. 
12.4.10 CCPD crash after take-off y distance 
The lateral deviations of all crashes after take-off were plotted in a single CCPD. Of 
the 57 cases with known y distances, five were recorded as zero. These were 
removed for the purpose of plotting the CCPD. The critical y distances were 
identified and based on 52 cases the CCPD was obtained, as shown in Figure 12.15. 
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Figure 12.15 Landing undershoot y distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that approximately 80 percent of cases involve lateral deviations 
exceeding 150ft from the runway centreline. For a runway 150ft wide, the plot 
shows that approximately 94.2 percent of landing overruns have filial wreckage sites 
beyond the widths of the runway. As such, crashes after take-off showed the largest 
lateral deviations. This is probably related to the high-energy and airborne nature of 
the accident type. Attempts to follow curved missed approach procedures may be a 
factor too. 
12.5 CCPD Equations 
The various CCPDs could be fitted into exponential functions as listed in Table 12.1. 
Their corresponding R2 values are also indicated. The functions are also plotted in 
the relevant graphs (Figures 12.8-12.15) and labelled as 'Trendline'. 
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Table 12.1 CCPD Eauations 
x/y distance Scenario Equation 
R2 
x 1 Fraction of landing overruns with an overrun distance 0.993 
beyond the runway >x = 
-0 . 000923 x 
1.107653 
e 
x 2 Fraction of landing undershoots with an undershoot 0.980 
distance from the runway threshold >x = 
-0-0 1308 x 
0.491355 
e 
x 3 Fraction of take-off overruns with an overrun distance 0.986 
beyond the runway >x = 
-0-000 132 x 
1.342743 
e 
x 4 Fraction of crashes after take-off with an x distance 0.984 
from the runway end >x = 
-0.000663 x 
0.860267 
e 
x 5 Fraction of landing undershoots with an x distance 0.944 
beyond the runway end >x = 
-0.000008 x 
1.277474 
e 
y LDOR Fraction of landing overruns with ay distance from 0.958 
the runway centreline >y = 
-0.006 y 
0.965 
e 
y LDUS Fraction of landing undershoots with ay distance from 0.975 
the runway centreline >y = 
-0.003 Y 
0.468 
e 
y TOOR Fraction of take-off overruns with ay distance from 0.984 
the runway centreline >y = 
-0.008 y 
0.840 
e 
y TOC Fraction of crashes after take-off with ay distance 0.970 
from the runway centreline >y = 
-0-008Y 
0.687 
e 
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Although the overall fit of the functions are good, all of them, except for scenario 2, 
underestimate the proportion of cases involving large deviations. It would therefore 
be more prudent to only use the fitted functions for small and moderate deviation 
estimates. 
12.6 Normalisation of accident locations 
The research also experimented with normalising accident location x distances by the 
associated runway lengths. This involves expressing x distances as a percentage of 
the runway distance available for the specific landing or take-off. The resulting 
CCPDs are presented in Appendix M and are broadly similar to those reported in this 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 13 MODEL APPLICATION & CASE STUDIES 
This chapter details how the accident frequency models could be used for practical 
airport risk assessment along with the accident location distributions. Two case 
studies were carried out based on New York LaGuardia Airport and Boca Raton 
Airport in Florida. Other than demonstrating the application of the novel risk 
assessment techniques, the exercise also revealed important findings on the need of 
ASAs at the two airports. 
13.1 Complementary Cumulative Frequency Distributions 
The previous chapter described the development of complementary cumulative 
probability distributions (CCPD) for accident locations. With CCPDs, the fraction of 
accidents involving locations exceeding a given distance from the runway end or 
threshold could be estimated. When the CCPD is multiplied by the frequency of 
accident occurrence, a complementary cumulative frequency distribution (CCFD) is 
obtained. The latter quantifies the overall frequency of accidents involving locations 
exceeding a given distance from the runway end or threshold. In other words, 
multiplying the CCPDs of Chapter 12 by the accident frequency models of Chapter II 
yields CCFDs with which ASA needs could be assessed. Eddowes et al. (2001) also 
used CCFDs to draw conclusions on Norwegian aerodrome design rules. 
13.2 Case Study Airports 
Two case studies were carried out to demonstrate the application of the overall risk 
assessment methodology developed in this thesis and to illustrate the difference in 
ASA needs at different airports and runways. New York LaGuardia Airport (LGA) 
and Boca Raton Airport in Florida (BCT) were selected for their contrasting 
characteristics. LGA is a two-runway primary commercial airport in the eastern 
region with 11,352,248 enplanements in 2001 and a FAA large hub. BCT is a non- 
hub, single-runway non-commercial service airport in the southern region mainly 
serving air taxi and general aviation services. Due to the differences in location, 
operational characteristics, traffic type and level, it is expected that the risk exposure 
of the two airports differ significantly, which should be reflected in ASA 
requirements. 
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13.3 Model Application Demonstration - ASA Length 
The length of ASA needed for each runway end was considered in turn, taking into 
account their specific accident frequency risk exposure, runway use patterns as well 
as traffic levels. The various stages involved is surninarised in Figure 13.1. 
Identify relevant crash 
scenarios for each 
runway end (Step 1) 
Collect representative 
traffic sample 
(Step 2) 
1 
For each runway end, calculate the average 
probability of accident occurrence for each crash 
scenario accordingly to specific runway end risk 
exposure using the accident frequency models 
developed (Step 3) 
Consider proportion of accidents 
that challenge ASAs 
I 
(Step 4) 
1 
Basic CCFDs I 
(Step 5) 
1 
Consider nway 
movement 
ýrrueakdown I 
(Step 6) 
1 Consider a0t 
movement br=rown 
I 
(Step 9) 
1 
Runway movement 
CCFDs 
(Step 7) 
Assess ASA 
dimensional needs 
according to TLS 
(Step 8) 
Airport movement 
CCFDs 
(Step 10) 
Consider airport traffic 
volume 
(Step 11) 
Assess time between 
accident occurrences 
(Step 12) 
1 
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The model application process is described in detail below for assessing the length of 
ASA at the end of runway 4 at LGA. 
13.3.1 Identification of relevant crash scenarios (step 1) 
In assessing the ASA needs of a specific runway end, each of the crash scenarios that 
challenge ASA length (described in section 12.3) should be taken into account. 
Table 13.1 shows the crash scenarios that should be considered for the end of runway 
4. 
TnTilp, 11 1 Ri-. Ii-. vnnt r. rq4. zb rn. minrinq tn eind nf iriitiwnv .4 
Crash Scenario No. Crash Scenario 
I Overrun of landing on runway 4 
2 Undershoot of landing on runway 22 
3 Overrun of take-off on runway 4 
4 Crash after take-off on runway 4 
5 Undershoot of landing on runway 4 with location beyond 
runway 
6 Crash after take-off on runway 22 with location behind start- 
of-roll threshold 
13.3.2 Calculation of crash scenario probabilities (Step 2-4) 
The average probability for each of these scenarios were then calculated. This 
involved applying the accident frequency models as defined in Chapter 11 to a 
representative sample of flights at the airport and runway concerned and finding the 
average probability per landing or take-off. In this case, the NOD sampled for model 
building was used, i. e. 5,758 landings and 5,796 take-offs at LGA and 160 landings 
and 191 take-offs at BCT. 
Table 13.2 shows the relevant crash scenario probabilities. The probability of each 
crash scenario is the product of two distinct probabilities. The first is the probability 
of accident occurrence (the initial event) and the second is the probability of the 
specific ASA being challenged given the initial event occurred. The latter probability 
must be considered because the location CCPDs were calculated based only on cases 
that challenged ASAs, e. g. overrun wreckage sites beyond the runway end. Certain 
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accidents would remain within the runway length, e. g. veer-offs with x distances 
smaller than the runway length. 
TnlNlt-. 11 1 rrq-, h q(-. f-. nqrin inrnhqhilitii--, fhr ARA lenoth qQQi-. Qzmplnt 
Crash Initial event Initial event Location Location Scenario 
scenario probability condition probability probability 
No. 
1 Overrun of 
landing on x beyond 
runway 4 1.188xlO'6 LDA 0.534 6.344 x 10-7 
2 Undershoot of 
landing on 
runway 22 5.904 x 10-8 Negative x 0.743 4.386 x 10-8 
3 Overrun of 
take-off on x beyond 
runway 4 1.423 x10-7 TODA 0.568 8.074 x 10-8 
4 Crash after 
take-off on x beyond 
runway 4 1.315 X10-7 TODA 0.456 5.999 x 10-' 
5 Undershoot of 
landing on x beyond 
runway 4 4.497 X10-7 LDA 0.124 5.567 x 10-3 
6 Crash after 
take-off on 
runway 22 
1 
4.283 X10-8 Negative x 
1 
0.035 
1 1.503 x 10-9 
It should be noted that the probabilities for each initial event take into account the 
particular risk exposure characteristics of the runway end concerned. For example, 
the average overrun probability of a landing on runway 4 is 1.188 x. 10 -6 whereas the 
equivalent for runway 22 is 1.291 x 10-7. Further investigation suggests that the 
difference is due to the significant disparity in exposure to adverse weather 
conditions. There are notable discrepancies in terms of exposure to visibility, ceiling 
height and fog between landings on runway 4 and those on runway 22. For instance, 
over 30 percent of landings on runway 4 take place in visibility under 2SM compared 
to 1.67 percent on runway 22. In a related measure, almost 40 percent of landings 
on runway 4 experienced fog versus under 7 percent for runway 22.39 percent of 
landings on runway 4 took place in ceiling height under 1000ft while the equivalent 
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for runway 27 is only 3.9 percent. These differences are most likely to be related to 
LGA's runway use policy. In fact, data on LGA's runway usage patterns revealed 
that landings on runway 4 are relatively rare. There are over four times more landings 
on runway 22 than on runway 4. When runway 13/31 was considered as well, it 
becomes clear that runway 4/22 is used mainly for landing on runway 22. Only 14.5 
percent of all landing operations at LGA used runway 4. It is hence reasonable to 
assume that runway 4 is used for landings only for exceptional circumstances, such as 
adverse wind conditions. This would also explain the discrepancy in risk exposure 
for landings on runway 4 and runway 22. 
The above risk exposure breakdown by runway end was made possible by Aviation 
System Performance Metrics (ASPM) data identifying the take-off and landing 
runways in hourly segments. This information was coupled to the case study's traffic 
sample to identify the runway and direction used by each flight in the sample. The 
difference in risk exposure and accident probability between landings on runway 4 
and runway 22 has highlighted the importance of differentiating risk at the runway 
end level, which has not been done in previous airport risk assessments. 
Unfortunately, ASPM only covers relatively large airports and so only average risks 
and probabilities could be calculated for BCT's runway ends. This would apply for 
any of the smaller airports not included in ASPM. 
Due to the small probability of crash scenario 6 and the lack of related location 
distribution data (only two data points are available), crash scenario 6 was not 
considered hereafter. 
13.3.3 Basic CCFD (Step 5) 
To obtain the CCFD from which the frequency of accidents involving locations 
exceeding a given distance from the end of runway 4 could be derived, the CCPDs of 
the relevant accident scenarios (given in section 12.4) were multiplied by the 
corresponding crash scenario probabilities. For crash scenario 1, then, the CCFD is 
obtained by multiplying the CCPD equation exp(-0.000923x 1.107653 ) by the crash 
scenario probability 6.344 x 10-7. Figure 13.2 plots all the CCFDs related to the end 
of runway 4 up to a distance of 1500ft beyond the runway end. 
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Figure 13.2 End of runway 4 basic CCFDs 
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The frequencies depicted in Figure 13.2 relate to individual crash scenarios. 
Therefore, it is expected that an overrun of a landing on runway 4 entering the ASA 
beyond the runway end (crash scenario 1) occurs at a frequency of 6.34 x1 ()-7 . By 
inspecting the same plot, it is also estimated that a landing overrun on runway 4 in 
excess of 500ft occurs at a frequency of 2.58 x 10-7 . The other plots and frequencies 
are interpreted similarly. The graph also shows that the frequency of crash scenario I 
is several times higher than the other crash scenarios. The greater distances of 
airborne accidents such as undershoots and crashes after take-off are therefore 
overshadowed by the greater frequency of landing overruns on runway 4 as an initial 
event. 
13.3.4 Runway movement CCFD (Step 6& 7) 
While Figure 13.2 reveals the CCFDs related to each of the crash scenarios affecting 
the end of runway 4, it does so without considering the runway use characteristics of 
runway 4/22 at LGA. Since runway 4/22 is principally used for landing on runway 
22, the high frequency of landing overruns on runway 4 may not have as large all 
impact on the risk profile of the end of runway 4 as Figure 13.2 suggests. Table 13.3 
shows the breakdown of operations on runway 4/22. 
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0 500 1000 1500 
Ft beyond runway end 
Tqhh- III Rrenktiown nf riinwiv 4/?? movernentc, 
Landing Take-off 
Runway4 12.85% 17.47% 
Runway22 56.24% 13.44% 
Total 69.08% 30.92% 
In order to take into account the above runway use characteristics, the basic CCFDs of 
Figure] 3.2 were further multiplied by the operational breakdown statistics of Table 
13.3, yielding a 'runway movement CCFD. For example, the CCFD for crash 
scenario I was multiplied by 0.1285 to reflect the fact that 12.85 percent of 
movements on runway 4/22 are landings on runway 4. The runway movement 
CCFDs are shown in Figure 13.3. A composite CCFD was also calculated by 
summing the risks of the five crash scenarios at each of the considered distances from 
the runway end. 
Figure 13.3 End of runway 4 runway movement CCFDs 
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Figure 13.3 presents the CCFDs in the context of runway movements. These plots 
arc more intuitive interpretations of the true risk posed by the crash scenarios. For 
instance, rather than noting the expected frequency of 2.58 x 10-7 for a landing 
overrun on runway 4 in excess of 500ft per landing on run", a. v 4, Figure 13.3 
provides the frequency of the same event per movement on runwav 4122, which is 
3.31 x 10-". 
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By considering all scenarios which affect the end of runway 4, the composite plot 
could be used to determine the length of the ASA according to a predefined target 
level of safety. This is discussed in section 13.5 below. 
13.4 Model Application Demonstration - ASA Width 
The application of the risk models to determine ASA width is similar to the process 
described above for ASA length. The example for runway 4 at LGA is continued 
here. 
13.4.1 Identification of relevant crash scenarios 
The crash scenarios that affect the ASA width of runway 4 are listed in Table 13.4. 
Tnhh-, lA 4 Relevnnt c-rnrb rrf-nqrinq tn ninwqv 4 width ri. -zle AQQi-qlmplnt 
Crash Scenario No. Crash Scenario 
I Overrun of landing on runway 4 
2 Overrun of landing on runway 22 
3 Undershoot of landing on runway 4 
4 Undershoot of landing on runway 22 
5 Overrun of take-off on runway 4 
6 Overrun of take-off on runway 22 
7 Crash after takc-off on runway 4 
8 Crash after take-off on runway 22 
13.4.2 Calculation of crash scenario probabilities 
The scenario probabilities are the products of the initial event probabilities and their 
corresponding location probabilities (Table 13.5). The location probabilities must be 
taken into account because the CCPDs of y distances were plotted based only on cases 
that diverged from the runway centreline, i. e. y>0. 
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T. qhle 115 Crash , cenarin nrobabilities for ASA width a-,; qe-ssment 
Crash Initial event Initial event Location Location Scenario 
scenario probability condition probability probability 
No. 
I Overrun of 
landing on 
runway 4 1.188 x 10-6 y>0 0.804511 9.561 x 10-7 
2 Overrun of 
landing on 
runway 22 1.291 x 10-7 y>0 0.804511 1.039 x 10-7 
3 Undershoot of 
landing on 
runway 4 4.497 x 10-7 y>0 0.758242 3.410 x 10-7 
4 Undershoot of 
landing on 
runway 22 5.904 x 10-8 y>0 0.758242 4.477 x 10-8 
5 Overrun of 
take-off on 
runway 4 1.423 x 10-7 y>0 0.702703 9.997 x 10-8 
6 overrun of 
take-off on 
runway 22 3.671 x 10-8 y>0 0.702703 2.579 x 10-8 
7 Crash after 
take-off on 
runway 4 1.315 x 10-7 y>0 0.912281 1.200 x 10-7 
8 Crash after 
take-off on 
runway 22 4.283 x 10-8 y>0 0.912281 1 3.907 x 10 -8 
13.4.3 Basic CCFD 
The basic CCFDs were then obtained by multiplying the y distance CCPDs in section 
12.4 with the corresponding crash scenarios above. Figure 13.4 plots all the CCFDs 
related to the width of runway 4/22 up to a distance of 1500ft from the runway 
centreline. 
-160- 
Figure 13.4 Runway 4/22 width basic CCFDs 
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As for the ASA length assessment, the basic CCFDs relate to individual crash 
scenarios and are interpreted in the same way. For example, an overrun of a landing 
on runway 4 (crash scenario 1) that veers from the centreline in excess of 100ft is 
expected to occur at a frequency of 5.84 x 10-7 . 
The frequency for the same crash 
scenario but in excess of 300ft from the runway centrellne is 2.3 1X 10-7. The graph 
also shows that the frequency of deviation from the centreline is considerably higher 
for crash scenario I up to 300ft when crash scenario 3 (undershoots of landings on 
runway 4) becomes the most likely to challenge ASA width. It should be noted that 
because y distances were recorded without discriminating between the two sides of 
the centreline, the frequencies of an event on one particular side of the centrefine 
should be half of those cited above. 
13.4.4 Runway movement CCFD 
Runway movement CCFDs were again obtained by taking into account the runway 
use characteristics of the runway. These are shown in Figure 13.5. 
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Figure 13.5 Width of runway 4/22 runway movement CCFDs 
Runway 4/22 width runway movement CCFDs 
3.50E-07 
r 
3. OOE-07 
0m 
> 2.50E-07 E 
00 ,-02. OOE-07 CL (1) 
1.50E-07 
:j (%4 
1. OOE-07 
5. OOE-08 
O. OOE+00 
Crash scenario 1 
Crash scenario 2: 
Crash scenario 3 
Crash scenario 4ý, 
Crash scenario 5 
Crash scenario 6 
Crash scenario 7 
Crash scenraio 8 
Composite 
Ft from runway centreline 
The composite plot shows that the frequency of an accident veering from the 
centreline in excess of 100ft is 1.99 x 10-7 per runway movement. This equates to 
1.00 X 10-7 per runway movement for each side of the centreline. 
13.5 Setting the Size of ASAs 
13.5.1 Target level of safety 
Before the appropriate size of ASAs could be deten-nined using the CCFDs obtained, 
a target level of safety (TLS) must be set. This is the safety level against which tile 
size of ASAs are evaluated. In the assessment of Norwegian acrodrorne design rules, 
the benchmark TLS of 10-7 per movement was used with the recommendation of 
improving upon this towards 10-' per movement where practicable (Eddowes et al. 
2001). The current study adopts the same standards. It should be stressed that tile 
selection of an appropriate TLS is beyond the scope of risk assessment and concerns a 
socio-political process. 
13.5.2 ASA lengths (Step 8) 
With the methodology described above, the relevant CCFDs for all runway ends and 
widths at LGA and BCT were computed. Tables 13.6 highlights the residual risk at 
ASA lengths of 300ft, 600ft and 1000ft, which corresponds to the FAA Runway 
Safety Area length requirements for Airplane Design Groups 11,111 and IV 
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50 100 150 200 250 
respectively. The ASA lengths necessary to achieve a TLS of 
10-7 and 10-8 are 
shown. 
Tnlili- 11 7 AIRA If-. lncrth reniiiremenfis, & residual risks 
ASA length (ft beyond runway end) Residual risk 
LGA end of runway 4 
300 9.605 x 10-" 
600 6,807 x 10-" 
1000 4.676 x 10-8 
267 1.000 x 10-7 
11690 1.000 x 10-11 
LGA end of runway 22 
300 6.640 x 10-" 
600 5.216 x 10-" 
1000 4.124 x 10-8 
N. A. 1.000 x 10-1 
16303 1.000 x 10-6 
LGA end of runway 13 
300 8.713 x 10-8 
600 6.838 x 10-13 
1000 5.174 x 10-8 
130 1.000 x 10-7 
9872 1.000 x 10-11 
LGA end of runway 31 
300 3.156 x 10-" 
600 2.509 x IWý 
1000 1.975 x 10-" 
N. A. 1.00ox 10-1 
4730 1.000 x 10-8 
BCT runway end (average) 
300 1.772 x 10-7 
600 1.311 x 10" 
1000 9.500 x 10-' 
927 1.000 x 10-1 
125302 1.000 x 10-11 
The results show the ASA needs of each runway end differ significantly. The end of 
runway 22 and runway 31 at LGA exceed the TLS of 10-7 even without ASAs beyond 
the runway end due to the low risk exposure of its operations. Figure 13.6 compares 
the average probability of accident occurrence for all accident types and runway ends. 
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The principal crash scenarios that affect risk at the ends of runway 22 and 3 1, such as 
overruns of landings on runway 22 and 31 and undershoots of landings oil runway 4 
are all relatively low. The largest source of risk for the end Of runway 31 is 
undershoots of landings on runway 13. However, this is offset by the rarity of 
landings on runway 13. Figure 13.7 shows the small proportion of landings that 
used runway 13 (0.73 percent). 
Fivure 13.6 Average accident occurrence probabilities 
Comaprison of average accident probability at 
runway ends 
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Figure 13.7 Breakdown of operations at LGA by runway 
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In contrast, the ends of runway 13 and 4 require ASA lengths of 130ft and 267ft 
respectively in order to achieve a TLS of 10-7 . Figure 13.3 showed that crash 
scenario I (overruns of landings on runway 4) contributes most to the composite risk 
at the end of runway 4. From Figure 13.6, it could be seen that the probability of 
overruns on runway 4 is the highest except accidents of landings on runway 13. The 
ASA requirement for the end of runway 4 still exceeds that of runway 13 or runway 
31 (the runway ends affected by the high overrun and undershoot probabilities of 
landings on runway 13) because there are many more landings on runway 4 than 13. 
in fact, Figure 13.7 shows that there are almost 20 times as many landings oil runway 
4 than 13 (14.5 percent vs. 0.7 percent). As a result, the high accident probabilities of 
landings on runway 13 are relatively subdued 13 . 
The smaller airport BCT has greater ASA requirement on average than any of LGA's 
runway ends. This contradicts the FAA's as well as ICAO's general policy of 
requiring larger ASAs at airports that serve large aircraft. The phenomenon can be 
traced to the traffic profile of BCT. The accident frequency models identify small 
aircraft and general aviation flights as high risk operations. Since BCT is a non- 
13 Further investigation revealed that difference in adverse weather exposure is a key factor behind the 
particularly high accident probabilities of landings on runway 13. For example, all landings on 
runway 13 experienced fog. This again is likely to be related to LGA's runway use policy. 
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Landing Take-off 
commercial service airport, 96 percent of its operations in the sample involve aircraft 
of 12,500 to 41,000lbs and 54 percent of flights are general aviation operations. As 
such, it would be expected that flights at BCT have a relatively high risk profile. The 
effect can be seen in Figure 13.6, where accident probabilities related to flights at 
BCT stand out, apart from the exceptionally high figures for landings on runway 13 
and 4 at LGA. The appropriateness of providing larger ASAs at smaller airports is 
further discussed in section 13.5.4 where the level of traffic is considered. 
The exercise has highlighted the importance of assessing the divergent risk exposure 
of flights using different airports and runways as well as the need to attune ASA sizes 
accordingly so as to achieve a risk-sensitive ASA strategy. The influence of runway 
operational patterns has also been emphasised. 
13.5.3 ASA widths 
Table 13.8 shows the results for ASA widths. The figures in the column on the left 
show the entire width of the ASA centred on the runway centreline. The middle 
column shows the associated residual risk on either side of the centreline. Since all 
runways at LGA and BCT are currently 150ft wide, the column furthest right 
indicates the additional ASA width required from the runway edge on either side of 
the runway to achieve the associated residual risk. 
Table 13.8 ASA width requirements & residual risks 
Total ASA width 
(ft) 
Residual risk 
(eithe side of the centreline) 
Width either side from edge 
of 150ft wide runway (ft) 
LGA runway 4/22 
100 1.186 x 10- N. A. 
150 1.083 x 10-7 0 
200 1.987 x 10-7 25 
197 1.000 x 10-1, 24 
6180 1.000 x 10-11 3015 
LGA runway 13/31 
100 9.306 x 10-" 
- 
N. A. 
150 8.701 x 10-F 0 
200 8.177 x 10-" 25 
52 1.000 x 10-1 N. A. 
5542 1.000 x 10-, 1 696 
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BCT runway 5/23 
100 2.632 x 10-7 N. A. 
150 2.413 x 10-7 0 
200 2.222 x 
10-7 25 
1849 1 1.000 x 10-' 1 350 
113045 11.000 x 10-" 1 6448 
As with the ASA length results, Table 13.8 shows the dissimilar risks associated with 
each of the three runways. With no ASA and just the runway width of 15 Oft, runway 
4/22 at LGA is close to meeting the TLS of 10-7 and runway 13/31 exceeds it. On the 
other hand, a simple runway of 150ft at BCT falls short of the same TLS. The key 
difference in risk between runway 4/22 and 13/31 lies chiefly in the crash location 
distributions of their associated operations. Even though runway 4/22 is the principal 
landing runway and is thus at risk from landing overruns which have the highest 
probabilities amongst accident types, the larger y distances of crashes after take-off 
dominate risks at runway 13/31, the main take-off runway, to the extent of eclipsing 
the relatively low probabilities of take-off accidents. The greater ASA width needs 
at BCT is attributed to the generally higher accident probabilities at the facility. 
Once more, the results highlight the inconsistent margin of safety currently provided. 
Eliminating this mismatch between risk and safety margin would result in BCT 
having vastly wider ASAs than LGA, which again is contradictory to ICAO and FAA 
aerodrome design principles. Section 13.5.5 examines an additional factor that is 
pertinent to the subject. 
13.5.4 ASA diagrams 
The computed ASA sizes were also visually compared with the existing ASAs. The 
dimensions of ASAs necessary to achieve a TLS of 10-7 were overlaid in red onto 
maps of LGA and BCT as available from Google Earth in February 2007. Figure 
13.8 shows the ASA requirements for LGA. It can be seen that current ASAs mostly 
exceed the TLS of 10-7 except the end of runway 4 where extra ASA length is needed, 
as shown in Figure 13.9. This would involve additional reclamation of Eastchester 
Bay. 
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Figure 13.10 shows and compares the calculated and existing ASAs at BCT. Unlike 
LGA, current ASAs at BCT fail to provide a TLS of 10-'. The required ASA would 
cover the parallel taxiway, parts of the airport apron, a building near the end of 
runway 5 as well as parts of the NW Spanish river boulevard and airport road. Figure 
13.11 offers a close-up view of the area around the end of runway 5 with noticeable 
ASA infringements circled in black. 
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(Background map source: Google Earth) 
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(Background map source: Google Earth) 
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13.5.5 Impact of traffic level (Step 9-12) 
A TLS of ()-7 translates into an accident occurrence rate of one per ten million 
movements. Given the large difference in traffic volume between LGA and BCT, the 
expected number of years between accident occurrences varies greatly too. From the 
Terminal Area Forecast, the volume of relevant traffic in 2005 was calculated to be 
398,681 movements and 11,631 movements for LGA and BCT respectively. If all 
ASAs were designed to meet the TLS of 10-7 , an accident 
involving locations beyond 
the ASAs would be expected to occur once every 25.1 years at LGA and every 859.8 
years at BCT, assuming that the annual traffic level stays unchanged. 
The current FAA and ICAO regulations do not take into account the level of traffic as 
a factor but certain land-use planning rules do, e. g. PSZ policy in the UK. The risk 
assessment methodology developed in this study can also be used to assess the impact 
of traffic level on accident frequency. 
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For airports with multiple runways such as LGA, the use pattern between runways 
would affect the overall frequency of accident occurrence at the airport since tile 1-Isk 
exposure of each runway end differs. 'Airport movement CCFDs' could be obtained 
by multiplying the basic CCFDs by the breakdown of airport movements. The 
breakdown of airport movements for LGA is given in Table 13.9. 
TnNh- I'l Q Rri-Atinwn c)f I 6A nicivemont-, 
Landing Take-off 
Runway4 7.23% 9.83No 
Runway22 31.64% 7.56% 
Runway13 0.36% 22.12% 
Runway3l 10.60% 10.65% 
Total 49.84% 50.16% 
Using the breakdown of Table 13.9 and the basic CCFDs of each runway end, the 
airport movement CCFDs for all runway ends could be obtained and summed to give 
an overall CCFD for the airport. Figure 13.12 compares the overall CCFDs for LGA 
and BCT. 
Figure 13.12 Overall airport movement CCFDs for LGA & BCT 
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Figure 13.12 indicates the frequency of accidents that exceed a certain distance 1rom 
the runway end. Given the traffic volumes of the airports, the frequency in terms of 
years between accident occurrences could be obtained, as shown in Figure 13.13. 
Figure 13.13 Frequency of accident occurrence in years 
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An accident that challenges the ASA length of any runway end at LGA is estimated to 
occur once every 12.8 years. On the other hand, ASA length is only expected to be 
challenged once every 174.6 years at BCT. For an accident in excess of 500ft of the 
runway end, the frequencies are 21.2 years and 297.8 years for LGA and BCT 
respectively. The calculations assume constant 2005 traffic levels. 
The impact of traffic levels on the frequency of accident occurrence is evident. The 
much higher accident frequency in terms of years between occurrences of busy 
airports may not be acceptable despite the low accident rates as measured by flight 
movements. By requiring larger ASAs for airports handling larger aircraft, which are 
likely to be the busier airports, the FAA and ICAO may have implicitly considered 
the effect of large traffic volumes. However, the current research allows an explicit 
quantification of the diverse influences of risk and facilitates the assessment of 
accident frequencies in terms of movements as well as years between occurrences. 
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ASA dimensional needs could therefore be adjusted with consideration for both 
criteria 14 . 
13.6 Setting the size of ASAs Using Normalised CCPDs 
The research explored the use of CCPDs of normalised location distances (detailed in 
Appendix M) to determine dimensional needs of ASAs. It was found that the results 
are broadly similar to those obtained using standard CCPDs and are presented in 
Appendix N. 
14 Additional factors also play a role in determining the acceptable TLS and ASA dimensions, such as 
fatality and injury rates, which fall under the consequence modelling of airport risk assessment. 
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CHAPTER 14 CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS 
The rules regarding the use, size and application of Airport Safety Areas do not meet 
the demands of safety management as stipulated by standards such as the ICAO's 
Safety Management System. The greatest flaw in current ASA policies lies in the 
mismatch between actual risks and the margin of safety provided. The current thesis 
set out to improve the effectiveness of Airport Safety Areas as a means of managing 
risks related to aircraft accidents near airports. This final chapter concludes the thesis 
by highlighting its key achievements, their significance and implications on the 
development of a more risk-based, flexible and effective strategy of risk mitigation by 
ASAs. The limitations of the work and avenues of further research are also 
discussed. 
14.1 Research Outcome & Significance 
The body of research is made up of several key elements. Their outcomes, 
significance and implications for future airport risk assessment and ASA policies are 
highlighted here. 
14.1.1 Accident database 
One of the principal outputs of the thesis is the comprehensive database of ASA- 
related accidents. The database is a significant achievement as its breadth and depth 
are unmatched by previous research efforts. Analysis of the database revealed 
important insights on the different types of accidents that implicate ASAs and 
demonstrated the importance of disaggregating the subsequent modelling by accident 
typc. 
The database not only contributes to the present thesis but could also be used in the 
future research of airport risk assessment, land-use planning as well as take-off, 
approach and landing operations. The unprecedented coverage and detail of the 
database would assist in areas as diverse as the development of improved flight 
procedures, airport approach procedures and pilot training. 
14.1.2 Normal overations database 
The collection of a vast database of normal flight parameters was crucial to 
quantifying and characterising accident risk factors as well as the development of 
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accident frequency models. Not only does the normal operations database developed 
by this study cover a multitude of operational and meteorological parameters, it is also 
multi-dimensional, therefore allowing multivariate analysis to be performed. This 
has not been achieved in prior attempts to use normal operations data for risk 
assessment. 
As with the accident database, the normal operations database's value is not restricted 
to the current thesis. It adds to the overall body of knowledge on flight risk exposure 
and opens significant opportunities for future research. It could be flexibly coupled 
with other landing and take-off datasets to assess the criticality of risk factors for 
events outside the scope of this work, e. g. incidents in addition to accidents. With 
ETMSC as the backbone of the database, it could easily be expanded to incorporate 
additional parameters as they become available. 
14.1.3 Quantification of risk factor criticLity 
Using the accident and normal operations databases, the criticality of a series of risk 
factors was successfully quantified. The study quantitatively defined the magnitude 
and directioii of the relationship between risk exposure and accident probability. The 
individual risk factors were characterised using different numerical procedures in 
order to provide an in-depth profile of each factor's effect on accident likelihood. A 
specific focus was placed on meteorological factors, which previous research has not 
been able to analyse. The use of a single coherent accident database for the analysis 
also allowed for sound comparisons to be made between risk factor characteristics. 
The results and techniques developed to quantify accident risk factors are important 
steps forward in identifying factors that contribute most to accident risk and 
differentiating between them when considering ASA policies. Understanding the 
effect that different conditions have on accident risk plays a key role in reducing the 
current mismatch between actual risk and the margin of safety provided through 
ASAs. The odds ratios obtained from the bivariate and multivariate analyses of this 
thesis form a sound basis from which to review the relevance of factors considered in 
current ASA policies. 
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14.1.4 Accident frequency models 
On the subject of risk assessment for third party risk near airports, Piers (1996) 
claimed that "[Accident] frequency modelling is relatively straightforward. " Indeed, 
traditional models of accident occurrence only consider a handful of risk factors, 
principally aircraft size and engine type. The resultant risk models, therefore, have 
limited ability to discriminate between accident and incident-free flights, which 
contributes to the mismatch between risk exposure and safety margins. The current 
research made significant breakthroughs in terms of including more risk factors in 
accident frequency modelling. More than a dozen risk factors were used for 
predicting accident occurrence in addition to traditional ones. These include a range 
of meteorological as well as operational parameters. Moreover, the present study 
was able to conduct multivariate modelling, allowing multiple risk factors to be 
considered in a single model that accounts for their joint influences on accident 
likelihood. Consequently, the models developed have substantially improved 
predictive power, with enhanced sensitivity and specificity. This is of significant 
value to more accurate risk assessment and risk-sensitive ASA deployment. 
The increased quantification of risks would allow better cost benefit analyses to be 
performed for a more rigorous justification of ASA-compliance costs and to evaluate 
alternative risk mitigation solutions. For example, where one runway end has 
insufficient ASA but the other has an excess of safety margin, the runway threshold 
could be shifted to provide equivalent safety margins at both ends, commensurate to 
their respective risk exposure. VA-iile the FAA has previously suggested similar 
alternatives to full Runway Safety Areas (FAA 1999a), such a robust tool for their 
justification and evaluation was not available. 
The advocated models offer a data-driven process that minimises the role of expert 
judgement and subjectivity in risk assessment. They could be adopted gradually, 
starting by differentiating the risk exposure of individual airports and runways, 
followed by considering accident locations and adjusting the ASA requirements 
accordingly. 
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14.1.5 Risk assessment & ASA-sizing 
The accident frequency models form part of the overall risk assessment methodology 
developed by the present research, which features a number of improvements 
compared to traditional approaches to airport risk assessment. 
Firstly, the dynamic interactions between diverse sources of risk are explicitly 
accounted for throughout the risk assessment process. Not only are the risks of 
individual flights assessed according to their respective risk exposure levels, but the 
usage pattern of the runway concerned is also considered. This is necessary so that 
the final ASA dimensions reflect not only the risk exposure but also the operational 
characteristics of the airport. For example, high risk landings are of less concern for 
a runway used predominantly for take-offs. These operational considerations have 
not featured in previous risk assessments but are intrinsic elements of the technique 
developed. 
Secondly, the proposed risk assessment methodology accounts for multiple 
dimensions of risk. Whereas the accident frequency models consider the frequency 
dimension of airport risk, accident locations are also incorporated through 
Complementary Cumulative Probability Distributions in the risk assessment process. 
ICAO and FAA ASA regulations may account for these separate aspects of risk 
implicitly but the current research does so explicitly and quantitatively. 
Thirdly, the methodology developed offers a framework for assessing all risks that are 
implicated by ASAs in an integrated and systematic manner. Previous approaches to 
managing accident risk near airports compartmentalised the various risks and dealt 
with each using different methodologies and solutions. The approach used in the 
current research allows all relevant risks, including crash risks within the airport 
boundary as well as off-site third party risks, to be considered simultaneously. 
Integrated solutions that target an airport's entire profile of relevant risks could 
therefore be formulated. 
The above advances together contribute to a more systematic and risk-sensitive 
approach to airport risk assessment, which is fundamental to reducing the mismatch 
between true risk levels and safety margin provision. This was demonstrated in two 
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case studies. They showed that the methodology developed can be successfully 
applied to airports to quantify risk levels at individual runway ends, which form the 
basis for determining appropriate ASA dimensions. The case studies also illustrated 
the comprehensive approach of the proposed technique, in addition to its transparency 
and independence from qualitative judgements. 
The proposed risk assessment methodology allows the length and width of ASAs to 
be tailored according to the residual risk at individual runways, such that the margin 
of safety provided meets the Target Level of Safety (TLS). This implies phasing out 
the current set of multiple ASAs under rigid and prescriptive regulations in favour of 
an integrated ASA around the runway that is sized in accordance with risk exposure. 
This would put an end to the compartmentalised and fragmented policies that govern 
the various ASAs and instil a coherent ASA that covers all risks related to aircraft 
landing and take-off accidents. In terms of ASA size, the case studies found that the 
TLS of 10-7 could be achieved and even exceeded relatively easily. However, the 
goal of attaining a TLS of 10-8 seems rather remote, especially if only on-airport 
ASAs were considered. The authorities may therefore consider a minimum level of 
safety of 10-7 for on-airport ASAs and one of 10-8 for off-site ASAs. This would also 
facilitate the transition towards an integrated ASA, given the present separation of 
responsibilities between aviation and land-use planning agencies. 
The recommended ASA-sizing methodology also points to innovative solutions such 
as displacing runway thresholds and altering runway use patterns. For instance, the 
provision of adequate safety margins may be achieved by changing the operational 
characteristics of a runway. This could take the form of modifying its landing and 
take-off balance or limiting traffic of certain aircraft or operational types. The 
resulting change in risk exposure could be quantified with the proposed methodology 
to ensure that the residual risk does not exceed the risk budget afforded by the ASA 
available. This thesis hence offers a far more dynamic and flexible approach to risk 
control and management. Authorities should find that adopting the recommended 
methods would release the development potential of certain near-airport real-estate 
and unlock its revenue potential where it is condemned under current rules, and vice 
versa. 
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14.2 Recommendations on Safety Management 
In formulating the TLS, it is suggested that consideration be given to the frequency of 
accidents in terms of the expected number of years between occurrences at a specific 
runway or airport. This is not a factor in current ASA policies but should play an 
increasing role in setting ASA dimensions, in tune with public tolerances of accident 
frequency. 
For the full benefits of the improved accident frequency models and the proposed risk 
assessment methodology to be realised, a broader overhaul of the oversight and 
management of related risks is necessary. Responsibilities across relevant authorities 
should be re-examined and clearly delineated. The role of airports should also be 
more proactive, especially concerning third party risks. Aviation agencies ought to 
be given more power to influence decisions that affect flight and airport risk exposure, 
e. g. the land-use planning of airport surroundings. 
It is also proposed that manuals such as ICAO Annex 14 be modified to reflect the 
pressures that airports face operationally, physically and financially. It should 
therefore provide guidance on appraising and prioritising alternative risk mitigation 
measures when the TLS could not be met through simple ASA provision. This 
would also stress the fact that ASAs are only one component of the risk management 
system and provide a more versatile approach to managing safety. 
Finally, there is much room for improving the collection and recording of accident 
investigation data. A more complete, consistent, accurate and objective approach to 
data collection by the accident investigation bodies would greatly enhance the risk 
assessment process. A systematic recording of data irrespective of investigators' 
subjective judgement on relevance would yield a far greater pool of data than what is 
currently available. Not only does the increase in data points enlarge the scope for 
risk analysis, modelling and assessment, it also adds statistical significance and 
confidence to the entire exercise. 
143 Research Limitations 
While the advances of the present thesis clearly contribute to improving the 
assessment and management of risks at airports, the study naturally has its limitations 
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too. The complex nature of aviation accidents means they are inherently difficult to 
predict. Although important breakthroughs have been made in improving the 
predictive power of accident frequency models, it is impossible to achieve perfect 
accuracy. The performance of the accident frequency models developed is especially 
constrained by the number of risk factors considered, which in turn is limited by the 
availability of normal operations data. The models presented in the thesis are 
therefore, at least theoretically, incapable of identifying accidents caused by factors 
completely independent from those used to calibrate the models. However, it is 
expected that cases that do not involve any of the operational and meteorological 
factors considered are relatively rare. 
The second shortcoming of this research lies in the intrinsic uncertainties of accident 
data. The NTSB is the sole source of US accident data and the quality of this 
infon-nation is not always assured. Inconsistencies within accident reports and 
dockets cast doubt on the overall accuracy of the reporting system. It is also not 
possible to verify the data in the absence of an alternative data provider. This is 
another inherent difficulty in air accident research. 
14.4 Further Research 
Collecting normal operations data for parameters not covered in this study would help 
to expand the accident frequency models to cover factors such as runway and weight 
criticality. This is likely to improve the predictive performance of the models and 
enhance the accuracy of the risk assessment, leading to further reductions in the 
mismatch between real risks and safety margin provision. Airline flight data recorder 
information is especially relevant but the cooperation of airlines and industry bodies 
are prerequisites to realising its value to risk assessment. Corresponding accident 
data must also be available and compatible. 
The accident location analysis should also be developed into a model that predicts 
accident sites based on pertinent factors. Understanding the dynamic relationship 
between longitudinal and lateral deviation, for example, may yield important results 
that would significantly affect the dimensions of ASAs. Vertical deviation should 
also be modelled such that the size and shape of three-dimensional safety zones 
around runways could be determined. Finally, accident consequences in terms of 
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fatalities, injuries and financial damage, should also be modelled to distinguish 
relatively innocuous occurrences from grave accidents. Although detailed location 
and consequence modelling are beyond the scope of the current thesis, they are 
necessary for the complete assessment of ASAs. 
Some of these concerns are currently undertaken by a research project sponsored by 
the FAA. The work covered in this thesis forms a core part of this project, which will 
potentially play a part in improving FAA regulations on Runway Safety Areas. The 
achievements and significance of this thesis are therefore recognised by the industry 
and will contribute to improvements in airport safety management. 
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GLOSSARY 
ALA Approach and Landing Accident 
ALUC Airport Land Use Commission 
ANN Artificial Neural Network 
APO FAA Aviation Policy and Plans Office 
ARC Aerodrome/Airport Reference Code 
ASA Airport Safety Area 
ASPM Aviation System Performance Metrics 
BCT Boca Raton Airport 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority 
CCFD Complementary Cumulative Frequency Distribution 
CCPD Complementary Cumulative Probability Distribution 
EMAS Engineered Material Arresting System 
ETMSC Enhanced Traffic Management System Counts 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
FPR False Positive Rate 
FSF Flight Safety Foundation 
GA General Aviation 
GAATA General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity 
GAIN Global Aviation Information Network 
IATA International Air Transport Association 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IFALPA International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IR Individual Risk 
LDA Landing Distance Available 
LDOR Landing Overrun 
LDUS Landing Undershoot 
LGA New York La Guardia Airport 
LOSA Line Operations Safety Audit 
MTOW Maximum Take-off Weight 
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NATS National Air Traffic Services (UK) 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory (The Netherlands) 
NOD Normal Operations Data 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board (US) 
PANS-OPS Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Operations 
PIREP Pilot Report 
POFI Point of First Impact 
PSZ Public Safety Zone 
RAIR Relative Accident Involvement Ratio 
RESA Runway End Safety Area 
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristics 
RPZ Runway Safety Zone 
RSA Runway Safety Area 
SAFO Safety Alert for Operators 
SMS Safety Management System 
SR Societal Risk 
STEADES Safety Trend Evaluation Analysis & Data Exchange System 
TAF Terminal Area Forecast 
TLS Target Level of Safety 
TODA Take-off Distance Available 
TOC Crash after Take-off 
TOOR Take-off Overrun 
TORA Take-off Run Available 
TPR True Positive Rate 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
-202- 
CA 
C' 
C' 
. - 
0 
E 
M. W ce 4.4 
w g. 
Eo0 
po 
.. 0 PO 
(2 
te = 
U) 3.4 
e 
P-M 
(V pcj u2 (U 
P, 0 
too 4-1 
F-0 
0 
z 
lý 
vi -tu 
C) 
., ý as 
Z, 
= Z 
. ........ .. 
ci 
0 
CU 
ce 
cJ 
*. 0 
*4 0 
1. This means that the aircraft has exited from the 'normal' areas of operation on the airfield, e. g. veering off the 
runway, hitting obstacles on landings or take-offs. 
2. The aircraft must be in the landing sequence to be qualified as a landing accidents. Aircraft that have just taken off 
and declared its desire to return to land at the airport but has yet to engage in the landing sequence are classed as 
take-off accidents. 
3. All landing overruns must strictly meet this criterion. All other landing accidents that directly challenge airport 
safety areas are classed as "Landing Undershoots". 
4. The airborne criterion is in line with the fundamental difference between the 'Crash after Take-ofr and 'Take-off 
Overrun' models - that the former deals with an airborne aircraft while the other is concerned with an entirely 
ground-based accident. This is especially relevant for the location models. 
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APPENDIX B ACCIDENT DATABASE FIELDS 
I- Basic Information 
ID Number: 20001214X43522 
Class of Accident: Takeoff and Crash 
Class of Accident (Text : Takeoff and Crash 
Type: ACC 
Date: 1983-OG-09 
City: SEATTLE 
State : WA 
Country: USA 
Time: 707Local 
Accident Being Researched By: Derek 
Basic Notes: 
Delete from Database: No 
Aircraft 
Al mraft Age: 3714 hours 
Aircraft Make: LEARJET 
Aircraft Mode 1: 35 
Aircraft Operator: 
Aircraft Operator and Owner No Same(YIN): 
Aircraft Owner: GLOBAL JET 
Aircraft Registration : N1976L 
Aircraft Serial Number: 053 
Aircraft Series : 35 
Aircraft Regulated By: FAA 
Regulation Reference: 135 
Aircraft Max Gross Weight: 18000 Ibs 
Maximum Certified Takeoff 0 lbs Weight: 
Engine Type : High Bypass Turbotan 
Engine Type Text: TF 
Number of Engines: 2 
Aircraft Notes : 
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Airport 
Airport Code. BFI 
Airport Reference Point Lat: DMS 
Airport Reference Point Long: DMS 
ARFF Inadequate . No 
Control Tower (Y / N) : Unknown I NA 
Graved Runway (Y I N) : Unknown I NA 
Runway Condition: Normal 
Runway Condition (txo : DRY 
Runway Heading (degrees): Dog Mag 
Runway Number: 13R 
Runway Slope: 0 degrees 
Runway Width : 200 ft 
Temporary Runway /Works: No 
Takeoff Start of Roll Elevation . 13 ft above MSL 
Takeoff Start of Roll Lat: DMS 
Takeoff Start of Roll Long: DMS 
Runway Takeoff Distance 10000 ft Available: 
Runway Braking Condition : Unknown I Not Applicable 
R unway Braking Condition (tx# : 
Nearest Ground Feature (X) : It 
Nearest Ground Feature (Y) : ft 
Obstacle Score (X) : It 
Obstacle Scom (Y) : ft 
Airport Notes - 
-206- 
4- Weather 
Weather General: VMC 
Weather General (txQ: VMC 
Dew Point: 9 deg C 
Temperature 18 deg C 
Gusts 0 knots 
Wind Direction (deg): 160 
Wind Shear. No 
Wind Velocity: 8 knots 
Actual Weather Different to Pilot No Expectations : 
Localized Weather Variation : No 
Runway Number: 13R 
Ceiling Height: 2900 it 
Light Leve I: DaY 
Light Level (texO : DAYL 
RVR: A ft 
Snow(Y/M: No 
Visibility: 7 statute miles 
Electric Storm CY I N) : No 
Fog (Y1 N): No 
Frozen Precipitation (Y I N) : No 
Icing Conditions (Y/N) : No 
Intensity of precipitation : None 
Weather Notes : 
5- Flight Opemtion Conditions 
Ope ration Scheduled: No 
Operation Type: Cargo (All FreIghQ 
Passenger Load Factor: -2 
Departure Country: USA 
Destination Country: USA 
Foreign Origin I Destination (Y No 
Flight was De laye d No 
Flight was Diverted (excludes No 
go-around after TI 0) : 
RunwayTakeoff Distance ft Requi re d 
Actual Weight at Time of Crash: 0 lbs 
Maximum Certified Weight foro lbs Current Operation : 
Was Actual Weight at Time of No Crash Estimale d: 
Weight Restrictions Vlolaled: UnknownINA 
ELT Fitted and Operational : No 
Fuel Load at Crash; 375 Gallons (US) 
Flight Notes : 
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Accident Details 
Al rcraft Collision Status: NA 
Did the accident Involve a No 
coll Islon with another JVC : 
Aircraft Crash Controllability: Fully ControMle 
Late Runway Change I Decision No 
(Y / N) : 
Takeoff Abort Speed :I 10 knots 
Atitempted Aborted Takeoff : Yes 
Detailed Info Notes : 
7- Wreckage 
Wreckage Location Lat: N47 32 DMS 
Wreckage Location Long : W122 18 DMS 
Wreckage Location X : 7292 ft 
Wreckage Location Y: 339 ft 
Wreckage Location Z: 3 ft 
Wreckage Site Elevation : 16 ft above MSL 
POFI X: 5104 ft 
POFI Y: 156 ft 
POFIZ: 999ft 
Angle of First Impact: 999 
Speed of First Impact: 105 knots 
Runway Exit Speed : 888 knots 
Runway Exit X Distance: 888 ft 
Wreckage Explosion: No 
Wreckage Fire: No 
Number of Obstacles Hit: 0 
Wreckage Path Slope I: 0 degrees 
Wreckage Path Surface Distance 21 GI ft 1: 
Wreckage Path Surface Type 1: Mud 
Wreckage Path Slope 2: 888 degrees 
Wreckage Path Surface Distance .. It 2. - 
Wreckage Path Surface Type 2: Unknown 
Wreckage Path Slope 3: 888 degrees 
Wreckage Path Surface Distance 888 it 3: 
Wreckage Path Surface Type 3: Unknown 
Wreckage Path Slope 4: 888 degrees 
Wreckage Path Surface Distance ... ft 4: 
Wreckage Path Surface Type 4: UnImown 
Pilot Actively Steered to Avioud No Obstacle: 
Total Wreckage Path Length: 2161 ft 
Wreckage Notes: 
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Injuries 
Events Highest Injury: NONE 
Evacuation In] urles :0 
Passenger Fatal: -2 
Passenger Fatality Rate %: .2 
Passenge rM Ino r: -2 
Passenger None : -2 
Passenger Serious : -2 
Passenger Total Injuries : -2 
Passenger Total On Board :0 
Flight Crew Fatal: 0 
Flight Crew Fatality Rate %: 0 
Flight Crew Minor: 0 
Flight Crew None: 2 
Flight Crew Se rlous :0 
Flight Cmw Total Injuries :0 
FI ight Crew Total On Board: 2 
Cabin Crew Fatal : -2 
Cabin Crew Fatality Rate %: -2 
Cabin Ciew Minor: .2 
Cabin Crew None: -2 
Cabin Crew Serious -2 
Cabin Crew Total Injuries: -2 
Cabin Ciew Total On Board: 0 
Public Fatal: 0 
Public Minor: 0 
Public Serious :0 
Public Total Injuries -0 
Tota I Fatal Injuries: 0 
Total M Inor In] urles :0 
Total No Injuries :2 
Total Serious Injuries :0 
On Ground Fatal: 0 
On Ground Minor: 0 
On Ground Serious: 0 
On Ground Total Injuries: 0 
Ground Crew Fatal: 0 
Ground Cmw Minor: 0 
Ground Crew Serious 0 
Ground Crew Total Injuries 0 
Injuries Notes - 
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Consequences 
Almraft Damage: SUBS 
Numberof Seats :2 
Total Number of Passenger 0 Seats : 
Consequence Area: 395463 Square ft 
Consequence Area Main On Airport Location: 
Ernergency Services had No Difficulty Locatl ng Wreckage: 
Change of Terrain In No 
Consequence Area: 
Consequence Area Land Use 1- 100 % Total Area: 
Consequence Area Land Use 1- On Airport Type: 
Consquence Area Land Use 2 '-2 
% Area: 
Consquence Area Land Use 2- ot Applicable Type: 
Consquence Area Land Use 3- 
%Area: ' 
Consquence Area Land Use 3- Not Applicable Type : 
Consquence Area Land Use 4 -. 2 % Area: 
Consquence Area Land Use 4- Not plicable Type: 
Consequence Notes: 
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APPENDIX E 2001 FAA HUB AIRPORTS 
Locid Airport Name City ST Region Hub Type 
2001 
Boardings 
Lehigh Valley 
ABE International Allentown PA EA S 478,367 
Albuquerque 
ABQ International Sunport Albuquerque NM SW M 3,095,899 
Atlantic City 
ACY International Atlantic City NJ EA S 386,746 
ALB Albany International Albany - NY EA S 1,463,632 
AMA Amarillo International Amarillo TX SW S 424,318 
Ted Stevens 
Anchorage 
ANC International Anchorage AK AL M 2,419,261 
The William B 
Hartsfield Atlanta 
ATL International Atlanta GA SO L 37,181,068 
Austin-Bergstrom 
AUS International Austin TX SW M 3428,202 
BDL Bradley International Windsor Locks _ CT NE M 3,416,243 
Birmingham 
BHM International Birmingham AL SO S 1,505,133 
Billings Logan 
BIL International Billings MT NM S 341,308 
BNA Nashville International Nashville TN SO M 4,209,465 
Boise Air 
BOI Terminal/Gowen Field Boise ID NM S 1,425.007 
General Edward 
Lawrence Logan 
BOS International Boston MA NE L 11,739,553 
Baton Rouge 
Metropolitan, Ryan 
BTR Field Baton Rouge LA SW S 363,419 
BTV Burlington International Burlington VT NE S 509,031 
Buffalo Niagara 
BUF International Buffalo NY EA M 2,204,087 
Burbank-Glendale- 
BUR Pasadena Burbank CA I WP M 2,250,685 
Baltimore-Washington 
BWI International Baltimore MD EA L 1,98,665 
CAE Columbia Metropolitan Columbia SC so S 537,727 
CAK Akron-Canton Regional Akron OH GL S 349,841 
Charleston 
CHS AFB/International Charleston SC so S, 786,326 
CID The Eastern Iowa Cedar Rapids IA CE S 440,797 
Cleveland-Hopkins 
CLE International Cleveland OH GL M 5,633,495 
Charlotte/Douglas 
CLT International Charlotte NC SO L 11,548,952 
Port Columbus 
CMH International Columbus OH GL M 3,296,013 
City of Colorado 
Cos Springs Municipal Colorado Springs CO NM S 1,050,344 
-220- 
CRP 
Corpus Christi 
International Corpus Christi TX SW S 404,151 
CVG 
Cincinnati/Northern 
Kentucky International Covinqt n/Cincinnati, Oh KY SO L 8,586,907 
DAL Dallas Love Field Dallas TX I SW M 3,352,083 
DAY 
James M Cox Dayton 
International Dayton OH GL S 1,070,456 
DCA 
Ronald Reagan 
Washington National Arlington VA EA M 6,267,395 
DEN Denver International Denver CO NM L 17178872 
DFW 
Dallas/Fort Worth 
International Fort Worth TX SW L 25,610,562 
DSM 
Des Moines 
International Des Moines IA CE S 789,715 
DTW 
Detroit Metropolitan 
Wayne County Detroit MI GL L 15,819,584 
ELP El Paso International El Paso TX SW S lLiýLV734 
EUG Mahlon Sweet Field Eugene OR NM S 356,108 
EWR Newark International Newark NJ EA L 15497,560 
FAI Fairbanks International Fairbanks AK AL S 384828 
FAT 
Fresno Yosemite 
International Fresno CA WP S 457,57 
FLL 
Fort 
Lauderdale/Hollywood 
International Fort Lauderdale FL SO L 8,015,055 
FSD Joe Foss Field Sioux Falls SD GL S 336,252 
GCN 
Grand Canyon National 
Park Grand Canyon AZ WP S 422,061 
GEG Spokane International Spokane WA NM S 1,423.62 
GPT 
Gulfport-Biloxi 
International Gulfport MS SO S 420,76 
GR13 
Austin Straubel 
International Green Bay W1 GL S 337.737 
GRR 
Gerald R. Ford 
International Grand Rapids MI GL S 906,76 
GSN Saipan International Saipan Island MP WP S 516,137 
GSO 
Piedmont Triad 
International Greensboro NG SO S 1,317,519 
GSP 
Greenville-Spartanburg 
International Greer SC so S 701,606 
GUM Guam International Agana GU I WP S 1,489,164 
HNL Honolulu International Honol 
, 
Ulu HI WP L 9,810,860 
HOU William P Hobby Houston TX 
" 
SW M 4,128,980 
HPN Westchester County White Plains NY EA S 456,296 
HRL Valley International Harlingen TX SW S 439,9 2 
HSV 
Huntsville International- 
Carl T Jones Field Huntsville AL SO S 473,148 
IAD 
Washington Dulles 
International Chantilly VA EA L 8484,112 
IAH 
George Bush 
Intercontinental Houston TX SW L 16,173,551 
ICT Wichita Mid-Continent Wichita KS CE S 527,062 
-221- 
IND 
Indianapolis 
International Indianapolis IN GL M 3,595,425 
ISP Long Island MacArthur Islip NY EA S 1009,919 
ITO Hilo International Hilo HI WP S 714537 
JAN Jackson International Jackson MS SO S 642,146 
JAX 
Jacksonville 
International Jacksonville FL SO M 9 
JFK 
John F Kennedy 
International New York NY EA L 14,553,815 
JNU Juneau International Juneau AK AL S 402117 
KOA 
Kona International at 
Keahole Kailua Kona HI WP S 3 
LAS Mc Carran International Las Vegas NV WP L 16,633,435 
LAX 
Los Angeles 
International Los Angeles CA WP L 6 
LBB Lubbock International Lubbock TX SW S 536,174 
LEX Blue Grass Lexington KY SO S 440,797 
LGA La Guardia New York NY EA L 11,352,248 
LIH Lihue Lihue HI WP S 
LIT Adams Field Little Rock AR SW S 1,211,753 
MAF Midland International Midland TX SW S 437,045 
MCI 
Kansas City 
International Kansas City MO CE M 5,614,347 
MCO Orlando International Orlando FL SO L 13,622,397 
MDT Harrisburg International Harrisburg PA EA S 556,672 
MDW 
Chicago Midway 
International Chicago IL GL L 7,112,784 
MEM Memphis International Memphis TN SO M 5,560,524 
MHT Manchester Manchester NH NE S 1,599,062 
MIA Miami International Miami Ft. I SO L 14,941,663 
MKE 
General Mitchell 
International Milwaukee W1 GL M 2,825,473 
MLI Quad City International Moline , IL GL S 367,688 
MOB Mobile Regional Mobile AL SO S 356,083 
MSN 
Dane County Regional- 
Truax Field Madison WI GL S 675,034 
MSP 
Minneapolis-St Paul 
International/Wold- 
Chamberlain/ Minneapolis MN GL L 15,852,433 
MSY 
New Orleans 
International/Moisant 
Field/ New Orleans LA SW M 
. 
4,767,533 
MYR 
Myrtle Beach 
International Myrtle Beach SC so S 695,502 
OAK 
Metropolitan Oakland 
International Oakland CA WP M 5,566,100 
OGG Kahului Kahului HI WP IM 2,777,692 
OKC Will Rogers World Oklahoma City OK SW IM 1,675,889 
OMA Eppley Airfield Omaha NE CE M 1,773,894 
ONT Ontario International Ontario CA WP M 3,168,975 
ORD 
Chicago O'Hare 
International Chicago IL GIL L 31,529,561 
-222- 
ORF Norfolk International Norfolk VA EA S 1478,687 
Palm Beach 
PBI International West Palm Beach FL SO M 2,954,015 
PDX Portland International Portland OR NM M 6168103 
Philadelphia 
PHL International Philadelphia PA I EA L 11,736,129 
Phoenix Sky Harbor 
PHX International Phoenix AZ WP L 17,478,622 
PIT Pittsburgh International Pittsburgh PA EA L 9939223 
PNS Pensacola Regional Pensacola FL SO S 520,953 
Palm Springs 
PSP International Palm Springs CA WP S 586,028 
Theodore Francis 
PVD Green State Providence RI NE M1 2,751,762 
Portland International 
PWM Jetport Portland ME NE S 6250591 
Raleigh-Durham 
RDU International Raleiqh/Durham NC SO M 49890,606 
RIC Richmond International Richmond VA EA S 1,187,681 
Reno/Tahoe 
RNO International Reno NV WP M 2,388,923 
Greater Rochester _ 
ROC International Rochester NY EA S 1,132,597 
Southwest Florida 
RSW International Fort Myers FL so M 2,596,005 
San Diego 
International-Lindbergh 
SAN Field San Diego CA WP L 7,506,320 
San Antonio 
SAT International San Antonio TX SW M 39313,545 
SAV Savannah International Savannah GA SO S 836,791 
Santa Barbara 
SBA Municipal Santa Barbara CA WP S 363,581 
SBN South Bend Regional South Bend IN GIL S 375,817 
Louisville International- 
SDF Standiford Field Louisville KY I SO M 1 876,499 
Seattle-Tacoma 
SEA International Seattle WA NM L 13,184,630 
SFB Orlando Sanford Orlando FL SO S, 645.944 
San Francisco 
SFO International San Francisco CA I WP L 16,475,611 
sic San Jose International San Jose CA WP M 5,981,440 
Luis Munoz Marin 
SJU International San Juan PR SO M 4,706,307 
Salt Lake City _ 
SLC International Salt Lake City LIT NM L 8,951,776 
Sacramento 
SMF International Sacramento CA WP M 4,021,102 
John Wayne Airport- 
SNA Orange County Santa Ana CA WP M 3,688,304 
Sarasota/Bradenton 
SRQ International Sarasota/Bradenton FL SO S 590391 
Lambert-St Louis 
STL International St. Louis MO CE L 13,264,7511 
-223- 
STT Cyril E King Charlotte Amalie VI SO S 516,389 
SYR 
Syracuse Hancock 
International 
- 
Syracuse NY EA S 936,450 
TLH Tallahassee Regional Tallahassee FL - TO S 424,32 
TPA Tampa International Tampa FL SO L 7,901,725 
TUL Tulsa International Tulsa OK SW S 1.627t293 
TUS Tucson International Tucson AZ WP M 1,749,560 
TYS, Mc Ghee Tyson Knoxville . TN SO S 705,607 
VIPS Eglin AFB Valparaiso FL SO S 375,196 
XNA 
Northwest Arkansas 
Regional 
- 
Fayetteville/Springdale/ AR SW S- 360,639 
-224- 
APPENDIX F AIRPORTS IN SIGNIFICANT TERRAIN 
State City 
-Airport AK ATKA ATKA AIRPORT 
AK KAKE KAKE 
AK HOMER HOMER 
AK SITKA SITKA ROCKY GUTIERREZ 
AK WALES WALES 
AK AMBLER AMBLER 
AK JUNEAU JUNEAU INTL 
AK KODIAK KODIAK 
AK NULATO NULATO 
AK PALMER PALMER MUNI 
AK VALDEZ VALDEZ PIONEER FIELD 
AK CORDOVA MERLE K (MUDHOLE) SMITH 
AK ILIAMNA ILIAMNA 
AK KLAWOCK KLAWOCK 
AK WASILLA WASILLA 
AK YAKUTAT YAKUTAT 
AK BIG LAKE BIG LAKE 
AK COLD BAY COLD BAY 
AK COLDFOOT COLDFOOT 
AK GUSTAVUS GUSTAVUS 
AK SAVOONGA SAVOONGA 
AK SHUNGNAK SHUNGNAK 
AK UNALASKA UNALASKA 
AK WRANGELL WRANGELL 
AK ALLAKAKET ALLAKAKET 
AK ANCHORAGE MERRILL FIELD 
AK FAIRBANKS FAIRBANKS INTL 
AK KETCHIKAN KETCHIKAN DIM 
AK KING COVE KING COVE AIRPORT 
AK NONDALTON NONDALTON 
AK TALKEETNA TALKEETNA 
AK PERRYVILLE PERRYVILLE AIRPORT 
AK PETERSBURG PETERSBURG JAMES A. JOHNSON 
AK SAND POINT SAND POINT 
AK ADAK ISLAND ADAK 
AK PORT HEIDEN PORT HEIDEN 
AK ANAKTUVUK PASS ANAKTUVUK PASS 
AK ARCTIC VILLAGE ARCTIC VILLAGE 
AS PAGOPAGO PAGO PAGO INTL 
AZ GLOBE SAN CARLOS APACHE 
AZ SEDONA SEDONA 
AZ TUCSON RYAN FIELD 
AZ TUCSON TUCSONINTL 
AZ TUCSON MARANA REGIONAL 
AZ KINGMAN KINGMAN 
AZ NOGALES NOGALES INTL 
AZ SAFFORD SAFFORD REGIONAL 
AZ WILLCOX COCHISE COUNTY 
AZ IPRESCOTT ERNEST A. LOVE FIELD 
-225- 
AZ FLAGSTAFF FLAGSTAFF PULLIAM 
AZ SCOTTSDALE SCOTTSDALE 
AZ BULLHEAD CITY LAUGHLIN/BULLHEAD INTL 
AZ LAKE HAVASU CITY LAKE HAVASU CITY 
AZ I FORT HUACHUCA-SIERRA VISTA SIERRA VISTA MUNI-LIBBY AAF 
CA CHICO CHICO MUNI 
CA CHINO CHINO 
CA UKIAH UKIAH MUNI 
CA BISHOP EASTERN SIERRA REGIONAL 
CA CORONA CORONA MUNI 
CA LOMPOC LOMPOC 
CA MARINA MARINA MUNI 
CA OXNARD OXNARD 
CA RAMONA RAMONA 
CA RIALTO RIALTO MUNI-MIRO FIELD 
CA UPLAND CABLE 
CA ALTURAS ALTURA S MUNI 
CA I BURBANK BOB HOPE 
CA FORTUNA ROHNERVILLE 
CA NEEDLES NEEDLES 
CA ONTARIO ONTARIO INTL 
CA REDDING REDDING MUNI 
CA SALINAS SALINAS MUNI 
CA TRUCKEE TRUCKEE-TAHOE 
CA CARLSBAD MCCLELLAN-PALOMAR 
CA EL MONTE EL MONTE 
CA INYOKERN INYOKERN 
CA LA VERNE BRACKETT FIELD 
CA LAKEPORT LAMPSON FIELD 
MARIPOSA MARIPOSA-YOSEMITE 
MONTAGUE SISKIYOU COUNTY 
CA MONTEREY MONTEREY PENINSULA 
CA PALMDALE PALMDALE REGIONALMSAF PLANT 
CA PETALUMA PETALUMA MUNI 
CA REDLANDS REDLANDS MUNICIPAL 
CA SAN JOSE BRYANT FIELD 
CA SAN JOSE NORMAN Y MINETA SAN JOSE INTL 
CA SAN JOSE REID-HILLVIEW OF SANTA CLARA CO 
CA CAMARILLO CAMARILLO 
CA FALLBROOK FALLBROOK COMMUNITY AIRPARK 
CA FULLERTON FULLERTON MUNI 
CA GROVELAND PINE MOUNTAIN LAKE 
CA LANCASTER GENERAL WM. J. FOX AIRFIELD 
CA OCEANSIDE OCEANSIDE MUNI 
CA RIVERSIDE RIVERSIDE MUNI 
CA SANTA ANA JOHN WAYNE AIRPORT-ORANGE COUNTY 
CA BECKWOURTH NERVINQ 
CA CLOVERDALE CLOVERDALE 
CA HEMET-RYAN HEMET-RYAN 
CA SAN MARTIN 
SOUTH COUNTY AIRPORT OF SANTA CLARA 
COUNTY 
CA SANTA ROSA CHARLES M. SCHULZ-SONOMA COUNTY 
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CA SANTA YNEZ SANTA YNEZ 
CA BAKERSFIELD MEADOWS FIELD 
CA BAKERSFIELD BAKERSFIELD MUNI 
CA LOS ANGELES WHITEMAN 
CA PORTERVILLE PORTERVILLE MUNI 
CA SAN ANDREAS 
CALAVERAS COUNTY-MAURY RASMUSSEN 
FIELD 
CA SANTA MARIA 
SANTA MARIA PUBLIC/CAPTAIN G. ALLAN 
HANCOCK FIELD 
CA PALM SPRINGS BERMUDA DUNES 
CA PALM SPRINGS PALM SPRINGS INTL 
CA PALM SPRINGS JACQjJELINE COCHRAN REGIONAL 
CA SANTA MONICA 
_SANTA 
MONICA MUNI 
CA ARCATA-EUREKA ARCATA 
CA BIG BEAR CITY BIG BEAR CITY 
CA CRESCENT CITY JACK MCNAMARA FIELD 
CA MAMMOTH LAKES MAMMOTH YOSEMITE 
CA MOUNTAIN VIEW MOFFETT FEDERAL AFLD 
CA SANTA BARBARA SANTA BARBARA MUNI 
CA SAN BERNARDINO SAN BERNARDINO INTL 
CA BORREGO SPRINGS BORREGO VALLEY 
CA CALIFORNIA CITY CALIFORNIA CITY MUNI 
CA SAN LUIS OBISPO SAN LUIS COUNTY REGIONAL 
CA SOUTHLAKETAHOE LAKETAHOE 
CA TWENTYNINE PALMS TWENTYNINE, PALMS 
CA MURRIETA/TEMECULA. FRENCH VALLEY 
CA SAN DIEGO(EL CAJON) GILLESPIE FIELD 
CO ERIE ERIE MUNI 
CO ASPEN ASPEN PITKIN COUNTY-SARDY FIELD 
CO 
- 
EAGLE EAGLE COUNTY REGIONAL 
Eo RIFLE GARFIELD COUNTY REGIONAL 
CO CORTEZ CORTEZ MUNI 
CO DENVER JEFFCO 
CO HAYDEN YAMPA VALLEY 
Co MEEKER MEEKER 
CO, GUNNISON GUNNISON-CRESTED BUTTE REGIONAL 
CO LONGMONT VANCEBRAND 
Co MONTROSE MONTROSE REGIONAL 
Co KREMMLING MC ELROY AIRFIELD 
Co LEADVILLE LAKECOUNTY 
CO TELLURIDE TELLURIDE REGIONAL 
CANON CITY FREMONT COUNTY 
CO BUENA VISTA CENTRAL COLORADO REGIONAL 
Co MONTE VISTA MONTE VISTA MUNI 
CO GRAND JUNCTION WALKERFIELD 
Co COLORADO SPRINGS CITY 
- 
OF COLORADO SPRINGS MUNI 
CO STEAMBOAT SPRINGS STEAMBOAT SPRINGSIBOB ADAMS FIELD 
FM KOSRAE ISLAND KOSRAE 
FM POHNPEI ISLAND POHNPEI INTL 
HI HANA HANA 
HI HILO HILO INTL 
Hi LH-fUE LIHUE 
LHI_ KAHULUI Y-AHULUI 
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HI KAMUELA WAIMEA-KOIIALA 
HI LANAI CITY LANAI 
HI 
KAILUA- 
KONA KONA INTL AT KEAIIOLE 
ID ARCO ARCO-BUITE COUNTY 
ID BOISE BOISE AIR TERMINAL(GOWEN FIELD) 
ID NAMPA NAMPA MUNI 
ID, BURLEY BURLEY MUNI 
ID DRIGGS DRIGGS-REED MEMORIAL 
ID HAILEY FRIEDMAN MEMORIAL 
ID MCCALL, MCCALL MUNI 
ID SALMON LEMHICOUNTY 
ID POCATELLO POCATELLO REGIONAL 
ID SANDPOINT SANDPOINT 
ID GRANGEVILLE IDAHO COUNTY 
ID COEUR D'ALENE COEUR D'ALENE AIR TERMINAL 
ID MOUNTAIN HOME MOUNTAIN HOME MUNI 
MT BUTTE BERT MOONEY 
MT LIBBY LIBBY 
MT DILLON DILLON 
MT HELENA HELENA REGIONAL 
MT POLSON POLSON 
MT BOZEMAN GALLATIN FIELD 
MT HAMILTON RAVALLI CO 
MT MISSOULA MISSOULA INTL 
MT KALISPELL GLACIER PARK INTL 
MT LIVINGSTON MISSION FIELD 
MT STEVENSVILLE STEVENSVILLE 
NC ANDREWS ANDREWS-MURPHY 
NC ASHEVILLE ASHEVILLE REGIONAL 
NIH WHITEFIELD MOUNT WASHINGTON REGIONAL 
NM TAOS TAOS REGIONAL 
NM BELEN ALEXANDER MUNI 
NM GRANTS GRANTS-MILAN MUNI 
NM SOCORRO SOCORRO MUNI 
NM SANTA FE SANTA FE MUNI 
NM ALAMOGORDO ALAMOGORDO-WHITE SANDS REGIONAL 
NM ANGEL FIRE ANGEL FIRE 
NM LAS CRUCES LAS CRUCES INTL 
NM LOSALAMOS LOSALAMOS 
NM ALBUQUERQUE DOUBLE EAGLE 11 
NM ALBUQUERQUE ALBUQUERQUE INTL SUNPORT 
NM SILVER CITY GRANT COUNTY 
NV ELY ELY AIRPORT-YELLAND FIELD 
NV ELKO ELKO REGIONAL 
NV RENO RENO/STEAD 
NV RENO RENO/TATJOE RTM 
NV MINDEN MINDEN-TAHOE 
NV LASVEGAS MCCARRAN INTL 
NV LASVEGAS NORTH LAS VEGAS 
NV LASVEGAS HENDERSON EXECUTIVE 
NV WINNEMUCCA V; RTNEMUCCA MUNI 
-228- 
NV BATTLE MOUNTAIN BATTLE MOUNTAIN 
NY LAKE PLACID LAKE PLACID 
OR EUGENE MAHLON SWEET FIELD 
OR MEDFORD ROGUE VALLEY INTL-MEDFORD 
OR JOHN DAY GRANT CO REGIONAIJOGTLVIE FIELD 
OR LAKEVIEW LAKECOUNTY 
OR 1 PORTLAND PORTLAND INTL 
00 R PORTLAND PORTLAND-TROUTDALE 
00 R SUNRIVER SUNRIVER 
OR LA GRANDE LA GRANDEWNION COUNTY 
OR BAKER CITY BAKER CITY MUNI 
OR THE DALLES 
COLUMBIA GORGE REGIONAL/TIIE DALLES 
MUNI 
OR GRANTS PASS GRANTSPASS 
OR KLAMATH FAT LS KLAMATH FALLS 
PR PONCE MERCEDITA 
UT I DELTA DELTA MUNI 
UT LOGAN LOGAN-CACHE 
UT OGDEN OGDEN-HINCKLEY 
UT PRICE CARBON COUNTY 
UT PROVO PROVO MUNI 
UT I TO ELE BOLINDER FIELD-TOOELE VALLEY 
UT MILFORD MILFORD MUNI/BEN AND JUDY BRISCOE FIELD 
UT VVENDOVER WENDOVER 
UT RICHFIELD RICHFIELD MUNI 
UT CEDAR CITY CEDAR CITY REGIONAL 
UT HEBER CITY HEBER CITY MUNI-RUSS MCDONALD FIELD 
UT HUNTINGTON HUNTINGTON MUNI 
UT ST. GEORGE SAINT GEORGE MUNI 
UT BRIGHAM CITY BRIGHAM CITY 
UT SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE CITY INTL 
UT SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE CITY MI WT 
VT BENNINGTON WILLIAM H MORSE STATE 
WA OMAK OMAK 
WA YAKIMA YAKIMA AIR TERMINAL/MCALLISTER FIELD 
WA SPOKANE FELTS FIELD 
WA PUYALLUP PIERCE COUNTY-THUN FIELD 
WA ARLINGTON ARLINGTON MUNI 
WA BREMERTON BREMERTON NATIONAL 
WA WENATCHEE PANGBORN MEMORIAL 
WA ELLENSBURG BOWERS FIELD 
WA WALLA WALLA WALLA WALLA REGIONAL 
WA PORT ANGELES PORT ANGELES CGAS 
WA PORT ANGELES WILLIAM R. FAIRCHILD INTL 
WA BURLINGTON/MOUNT VERNON SKAGIT REGIONAL 
wv PETERSBURG GRANT COUNTY 
wy CODY YELLOWSTONE REGIONAL 
VVY AFTON AFTON MUNI 
VN CASPER NATRONA COUNTY INTL 
VVY BUFFALO JOHNSON COUNTY 
ACKSON j E JACKSON HOLE W 
GY L LL 
E 
GI EjýYBI SOUTH BIG HORN COUNTY 
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VVY PINEDALE RALPH WENZ FIELD 
WY SARATOGA _ SHIVELY FIELD 
ArY SHERIDAN SHERIDAN COUNTY 
WY COWLEY-LOVELL-BYRON NORTH BIG HORN COUNTY 
Source: FAA Aviation System Standard 
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APPENDIX G STRATIFIED SAMPLING STRATA & WEIGHTS 
TAF Relevant Stratum share of 
Traffic (2000- total TAF relevant 
Stratum 2005 incl. ) traffic 
HAALF 1,250,158 0.65% 
HAALT 929,768 0.48% 
HACEF 4,932,783 2.57% 
HAEAF 21,567,290 11.24% 
HAGLF 20,049,157 10.45% 
HANEF 4,731,238 2.47% 
HANNIF 6,089,146 3.17% 
HANNIT 4,279,446 2.23% 
HASOF 29,120,284 15.17% 
HASWF 14,202,438 7.40% 
HASWT 753,505 0.39% 
HAWPF 14,584,951 7.60% 
HAWPT 8,857,981 4.62% 
NAALF 4,118,123 2.15% 
NAALT 1,093,992 0.57% 
NACEF 2,423,410 1.26% 
NAEAF 7,420,230 3.87% 
NAEAT 24,256 0.01% 
NAGLF 15,294,362 7.97% 
NANEF 3,306,238 1.72% 
NANET 1,722 0.00% 
NANMF 4,398,816 2.29% 
NANMT 2,545,756 1.33% 
NASOF 8,657,697 4.51% 
NASOT 133,284 0.07% 
NASWF 5,104,589 2.66% 
NASWT 232,655 0.12% 
NAWPF 2,890,900 1.51% 
NAWPT 2,908,415 1.52% 
TOTAL 191,902,590 100.00% 
Stratum share 
of total 
Sampled sampled 
flights flights Weight 
0 0.00% N. A. 
1243 0.51% 0.94 
5322 2.20% 1.17 
26028 10.74% 1.05 
50604 20.87% 0.50 
0 0.00% N. A. 
11403 4.70% 0.67 
20483 8.45% 0.26 
43886 18.10% 0.84 
3899 1.61% 4.60 
0 0.00% N. A. 
47943 19.78% 0.38 
16271 6.71% 0.69 
427 0.18% 12.18 
0 0.00% N. A. 
965 0.40% 3.17 
4513 1.86% 2.08 
0 0.00% N. A. 
1098 0.45% 17.60 
1034 0.43% 4.04 
0 0.00% N. A. 
1637 0.68% 3.39 
1589 0.66% 2.02 
573 0.24% 19.09 
750 0.31% 0.22 
1134 0.47% 5.69 
0 0.00% N. A. 
248 0.10% 14.73 
1370 0.57% 2.68 
242420 100.00% 
Stratum Key: 
First letter: 
H= Hub 
N= Non-hub 
2nd , 3rd, 4 
th letters: 
AAL = Alaska Region 
ACE = Central Region 
AEA = Eastern Region 
AGL = Great Lakes Region 
ANE = New England Region 
ANM = Northwest Mountain Region 
ASO Southern Region 
ASW Southwest Region 
AWP Western Pacific Region 
Final letter: 
T Significant Terrain 
F Non-significant Terrain 
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APPENDIX H SAMPLED AIRPORTS 
Airport Code 
ADS 
ADW 
ASS 
ASG 
ASH 
ATL 
AUS 
AVL 
BCT 
BET 
BFI 
BFL 
BGR 
BKL 
BLI 
BOI 
CGF 
CHD 
CKB 
CLE 
CMH 
CWF 
DTW 
EGE 
EMT 
ENA 
EUG 
EWR 
FAI 
FAT 
FLG 
FYV 
GCN 
GLH 
GSP 
GYR 
HEF 
IND 
ISO 
JNU 
LAW 
LAX 
LGA 
LVK 
LWB 
MCI 
MCO 
MDT 
MSP 
MYR 
Sampling Stratum 
NASWF 
NAEAF 
NANNIT 
NASWF 
NANEF 
HASOF 
HASWF 
NASOT 
NASOF 
NAALF 
NANMF 
NAWPT 
NANEF 
NAGLF 
NANMF 
HANNIT 
NAGLF 
NAWPF 
NAEAF 
HAGLF 
HAGLF 
NASWF 
HAGLF 
NANMT 
NAWPT 
NAALF 
HANMT 
HAEAF 
HAALT 
HAWPF 
NAWPT 
NASWF 
HAWPF 
NASOF 
HASOF 
NAWPF 
NAEAF 
HAGLF 
NASOF 
HAALT 
NASWF 
HAWPF 
HAEAF 
NAWPF 
NAEAF 
HACEF 
HASOF 
HAEAF 
HAGLF 
HASOF 
Runway Layout 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
Single 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
Single 
Single 
2 Parallel 
2 Parallel 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
Single 
Single 
Single 
2 Parallel 
2 Parallel 
2 Parallel 
Single 
Single 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
Single 
Single 
2 Parallel 
Single 
Single 
Single 
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Runway Operative 
Configuration 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
NOA NASOF Single 
oic NACEF Single 
ONT HAWPT 2 Parallel 
oxc NANEF Single 
OXR NAWPT Single 
PDX HANIVIT 
PHX HAWPF 
PSP HAWPT 2 Parallel 
RNT NANMF Single 
SAW NAGLF Single 
SCK NAWPF 2 Parallel 
SEA HANMF 
SFF NANMT 2 Parallel 
SFO HAWPF 
sic HAWPT 
SLC HANMT 
smo NAWPT Single 
SNA HAWPT 
SOL NAWPF Single 
SUN NANIVIT Single 
sus NACEF 2 Parallel 
TEB NAEAF 
TlW NANMF Single 
TTD NANMT Single 
TUP NASOF Single 
TUS HAWPT 
TYS HASOF 2 Parallel 
TZR NAGLF Single 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Single 
Parallel 
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APPENDIX I CALCULATION OF RELEVANT TERMINAL AREA 
FORECAST TRAFFIC 
Identifying the relevant traffic from Terminal Area Forecasts (TAFs) is important for 
deriving the weights to be applied to each stratum after stratified sampling because 
TAF's coverage goes beyond that of the population of flights of interest as defined by 
the accident database filtering criteria. TAF breaks down traffic into Air Carrier, Air 
Taxi & Commuter, General Aviation (GA) and Military flights. Whereas itinerant 
Air Carrier and Air Taxi & Commuter traffic is clearly relevant and Military 
operations not, only a portion of GA traffic is pertinent to the current study. The 
accident database only includes GA flights that involve aircraft of over 12,500lbs. 
The 2002 FAA General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity (GAATA) survey was used to 
identify the portion of itinerant GA flights that is within the scope of the present 
research. The GAATA survey breaks down GA traffic by aircraft type. The 
relevant aircraft types were first identified. These are 2 Engine Turboprops, "Othee, 
Turboprops, 2 engine Turbojets and "Othce'Turbojets. Other aircraft types, such as 
single engine turboprops and turboicts and rotorcmft, were considered irrelevant. 
For each aircraft type, the GAATA survey gives a breakdown of the fleet according to 
primary use (but not by FAA region). Four uses were considered relevant to the 
study. These are Business, Corporate, Air Tours and Sightseeing. Other uses such 
as Aerial Observation and External Load were deemed irrelevant. Air Taxi 
operations were not considered relevant because they are already explicitly identified 
and included in TAF. The following table shows the statistics for the relevant aircraft 
types and their primary use breakdown. 
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Aircraft Type Air Sight Fleet Size Business Corporate Tours See 
TBP 2 Engine 5,703 1,241 2,386 0 0 
% of fleet 21.76% 41.84% 0.00% 0.00% 
Turboprop Other 30 0 0 0 0 
% of fleet 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Turbojet 2 Engine 7,655 948 5,368 0 0 
% of fleet 12.38% 70.12% 0.00% 0.00% 
Turbojet: Other 701 170 323 0 0 
% of fleet 24.25% 46.08% 0.00% 0.00% 
Proportion of 
fleet in relevant 
use 
63.60% 
0.00% 
82.51% 
70.33% 
The share of each fleet in relevant use was then applied correspondingly to the 
number of landings performed by each aircraft type per FAA region 15 . This yielded 
an approximate number of relevant GA landings in each FAA region, as shown 
below. 
Alaskan 1.75% 
Central 8.73% 
Eastern 9.29% 
Great Lakes 17.82% 
New England 5.64% 
Northwest 4.38% 
Southern 6.92% 
South Western 5.20% 
Westem-Pacific 3.93% 
Overall 7.92% 
Because the regional landings data is only broken down by aircraft type and region 
but not by primary use, the calculation assumes that the proportion of fleet in relevant 
use computed for each aircraft type (identified by their primary use) approximates the 
proportion of relevant landings of the respective aircraft types. Additionally, it was 
assumed that figures on the proportion of fleet in relevant use vary little from region 
to region. 
The regional rates above were then applied to the TAF itinerant GA traffic statistics 
accordingly to deduce the number of relevant GA operations in each region and thus 
the total normal GA traffic that is relevant to the current study. 
15 The GAATA landing statistics includes air taxi aircraft but excludes commuter aircraft. 
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APPENDIX J BIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
Landing Overruns 
Lower95CI Upper 95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) for Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
EqpLclass (Ref: C) 274.187 P<. 0001 
Eqpt-class AB 0.526 2.054 0.152 1.691 0.824 3.471 
Eqpt-class D -0.497 1.835 0.176 0.609 0.297 1.249 
Eqpt-class E 1.709 54.755 P<. 0001 5.523 3.512 8.685 
Eqpt-class F 3.355 178.445 P<. 0001 28.632 17.503 46.839 
User class (Ref: C/T) 103.581 P<. 0001 
User 
- class 
F 1.735 63.407 P<. 0001 5.669 3.699 8.689 
User class G 1.305 71.555 p<. 0001 3.686 2.724 4.987 
Eqpt: type T 1.329 86.841 P<. 0001 3.778 2.857 4.997 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.095 200.843 p<. 0001 0.91 0.898 0.922 
Visband (Ref: 8+) 343.673 P<. 0001 
Visband <2 3.014 334.226 P<. 0001 20.375 14.749 28.148 
Visband 2-4 1.264 22.738 P<. 0001 3.54 2.105 2.952 
Visband 4-6 0.307 0.693 0.405 1.36 0.659 2.805 
Visband 6-8 0.828 11.616 0.001 2.288 1.422 3.683 
Fog 2.502 271.191 P<. 0001 12.208 9.064 16.442 
Dawn/Dusk 0.65 9.53 0.002 1.916 1.268 2.895 
Xwind 0.074 20.747 P<0001 1.077 1.043 1.112 
Rain 1.312 72.481 P<0001 3.712 2.744 5.02 
storm Elec 1.808 27.818 P<0001 6.099 3.115 11.941 
Templ 0 - -0.518 56.785 P<0001 0.596 0.521 0.682 
Icing 3.821 165.905 P<0001 45.666 25.531 81.683 
FrozPrep 3.287 60.216 P<. 0001 26.75 11.663 61.352 
Snow 3.043 210.279 P<0001 20.967 13.897 31.634 
Terrain -0.069 0.098 0.754 0.933 0.604 1.441 
Hub NH 1.553 101.802 P<. 0001 4.724 3.494 6.387 
For OD -1.618 5.18 0.023 0.198 0.049 0.799 
Landina Undershoots 
Lower95CI Upper95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) for Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
EqpLclass (Ref: C) 284.458 P<0001 
Eqpt-class AB 0.165 0.081 0.776 1.179 0.38 3.656 
Eqpt 
- class 
D -0.858 2.207 0.137 0.424 0.137 1.315 
Eqpt 
- class 
E 1.666 26.961 P<. 0001 5.293 2.822 9.929 
Eqpt 
- class 
F 3.986 153.794 p<. 0001 53.823 28-668 101.05 
Uw_class (Ref: C/T) 54.085 p<. 0001 
class F User 1.786 49.269 p<. 0001 5.964 3.622 9.82 
class G - User 0.848 16.023 p<. 0001 2.335 1.541 3.536 
Eqpt_type T - 1.919 107.826 p<. 0001 6.817 4.745 9.793 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.106 153.154 p<. 0001 0.899 0.884 0.915 
Visband (Ref: B+) 239.331 p<. 0001 
Visband <2 3.19 228.448 p<. 0001 24.287 16-059 36.73 
Visband 2-4 1.736 34.514 P<. 0001 5.673 3.179 10.123 
Visband 4-6 0.771 3.634 0.057 2.161 0.979 4.773 
Visband 6-8 0.577 2.531 0.112 1.781 0.875 3.627 
Fog 2.545 175.132 p<. 0001 12.739 8.739 18.569 
Dawn/Disk 0.13 0.154 0.695 1.138 0.596 2.175 
Xwind 0.007 0.079 0.778 1.007 0.957 1.061 
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Rain 1.217 36.903 P<. 0001 3.378 2.281 5.003 
Elec 
- storm 
1.896 20.376 P<. 0001 6.659 2.923 15.169 
TemplO -0.6 48.487 P<. 0001 0.549 0.464 0.65 
Icing 4.356 206.635 P<. 0001 77.926 43.029 141.126 
FrozPrep 3.077 27.107 P<. 0001 21.692 6.812 69.079 
Snow 3.324 188.217 P<. 0001 27.771 17.273 44.651 
Terrain 0.506 4.77 0.029 1.658 1.053 2.611 
Hub NH 1.454 56.784 P<. 0001 4.281 2.933 6.248 
For OD -0.708 1.467 0.226 0.493 0.157 1.549 
Take-off Overrun 
Lower 95CI for Upper 95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
Eqpt_class (Ref: C) 71.617 p<. 0001 
Eqpt 
- class 
AB 1.254 3.931 0.047 3.505 1.014 12.108 
Eqpt 
- class 
D -0.38 0.27 0.603 0.684 0.163 2.863 
Eqpt 
- class 
E 1.68 11.672 0.001 5.364 2.046 14.059 
Eqpt 
- class 
F 3.426 43.978 P<. 0001 30.765 11.175 84.695 
User_class (Ref: CIT) 16.011 p<. 0001 
User 
- class 
F 1.569 14.037 P<. 0001 4.801 2.113 10.909 
User 
- class 
G 0.728 5.111 0.024 2.071 1.102 3.894 
EqpLtype T 1.046 13.884 p<. 0001 2.847 1.642 4.936 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.048 8.988 0.003 0.953 0.924 0.983 
Visband (Ref: 8+) 21.019 p<. 0001 
Visband <2 1.739 19.65 p<. 0001 5.69 2.638 12.274 
Visband 2-4 -0.74 0.532 0.466 0.477 0.065 3.484 
Visband 4-6 0.4 0.574 0.449 1.492 0.53 4.198 
Visband 6-8 0.059 0.012 0.911 1.061 0.377 2.985 
Fog 1.543 17.686 p<. 0001 4.677 2.279 9.599 
Dawn/Disk 0.445 0.894 0.344 1.56 0.62 3.924 
Xwind 0.082 7.153 0.007 1.086 1.022 1.154 
Rain 0.855 6.745 0.009 2.352 1.233 4.484 
Elec 
- storm -13.442 
0 0.991 0 0 NA 
TemplO -0.415 10.168 0.001 0.661 0.512 0.852 
Icing 2.676 6.98 0.008 14.522 1.995 105.698 
FrozPrep 3.179 9.816 0.002 24.024 3.288 175.529 
Snow 3.135 59.11 p<. 0001 22.994 10.34 51.137 
Terrain -0.114 0.069 0.792 0.892 0.381 2.089 
Hub NH 1.274 18.558 p<. 0001 3.574 2.002 6.381 
For OD 0.898 4.273 0.039 2.545 1.048 5.747 
Crashes aflcr Take-off 
Lower95CI Upper95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) for Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
Eqpt_class (Ref: C) 96.717 P<. 0001 
Eqpt 
- class 
AB 0.849 2.591 0.107 2.336 0.831 6.565 
Eqpt 
- class 
D -0.457 0.67 0.413 0.633 0.212 1.89 
Eqpt 
- class 
E 1.21 9.874 0.002 3.352 1.576 7.129 
Eqpt 
- class 
F 3.126 60.556 p<. 0001 22.789 10.37 50.084 
User_class (Ref: CfT) 79.486 p<. 0001 
User class F 2.634 79.437 p<. 0001 13.93 7.805 24.861 
User 
- class 
G 1.1 13.886 p<. 0001 3.005 1.685 5.36 
Eqpt_type T 1.267 26.802 P<. 0001 3.549 2.194 5.734 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.075 37.069 p<. 0001 0.928 0.906 0.95 
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Visband (Ref: 8+) 65.249 P<. 0001 
Visband <2 2.376 62.882 P<. 0001 10.765 5.983 19.368 
Visband 2-4 0.814 2.917 0.088 2.257 0.887 5.745 
Visband 4-6 -0.349 0.231 0.631 0.706 0.17 2.928 
Visband 6-8 0.563 1.865 0.172 1.756 0.783 3.94 
Fog 1.947 46.078 P<. 0001 7.011 3.995 12.301 
Dawn/Disk 0.822 5.263 0.022 2.276 1.127 4.595 
Xwind 0.048 2.237 0.135 1.049 0.985 1.116 
Rain 0.98 12.178 P<. 0001 2.665 1.537 4.622 
Elec storm 0.567 0.316 0.574 1.762 0.244 12.71 
Templ 0 -0.461 16.348 P<. 0001 0.631 0.504 0.789 
Icing 4.288 97.256 P<. 0001 72.848 31.065 170.827 
FrozPrep 4.593 93.312 P<. 0001 98.81 38.91 250.924 
Snow 2.998 62.776 P<. 0001 20.043 9.548 42.077 
Terrain -0.834 2.618 0.106 0.434 0.158 1.193 
Hub NH 0.641 6.87 0.009 1.899 1.176 3.067 
For OD -0.126 0.045 0.831 0.882 0.277 2.808 
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APPENDIX K MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
Landing Overruns 
Lower95CI Upper95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) for Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
Eqpt_class (Ref. C) 96.658 P<. 0001 
EqpLclass AB 0.486 1.614 0.204 1.626 0.768 3.442 
Eqpt_class D -1.631 14.651 p<. 0001 0.196 0.085 0.451 
EqpLclass E 0.893 7.047 0.008 2.443 1.263 4.724 
Eqpt_class F 1.951 25.734 P<. 0001 7.036 3.311 14.951 
Eqpt_type T 1.050 20.578 P<. 0001 2.859 1.816 4.501 
User class (Ref: C/T) 23.441 P<. 0001 
User 
- class 
F 0.934 14.651 P<. 0001 2.544 1.577 4.104 
User 
- class 
G 0.835 13.743 p<. 0001 2.305 1.482 3.584 
For OD -1.565 4.360 0.037 0.209 0.048 0.909 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.014 1.596 0.206 0.986 0.965 1.008 
Visband (Ref: 8+) 63.022 P<. 0001 
Visband <2 1.443 20.639 P<. 0001 4.232 2.271 7.885 
Visband 2-4 -0.239 0.476 0.490 0.787 0.399 1.552 
Visband 4-6 -1.429 7.842 0.005 0.239 0.088 0.651 
Visband 6-8 0.276 1.136 0.287 1.318 0.793 2.191 
Fog 2.437 96.815 P<. 0001 11.444 7.042 18.596 
Dawn/Dusk 0.486 4.535 0.033 1.626 1.040 2.545 
Xwind 0.089 31.157 P<. 0001 1.094 1.060 1.128 
Icing conditions 2.164 30.307 p<. 0001 8.705 4.029 18.809 
Snow 1.860 47.762 p<. 0001 6.426 3.791 10.891 
Hub NH 0.588 6.937 0.008 1.801 1.162 2.791 
Terrain 0.417 2.928 0.087 1.517 0.941 2.446 
Constant -8.431 447.335 P<. 0001 0.000 
Landinp, Undershoots 
Lower95CI Upper95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) for Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
EqpLclass (Ref: C) 89.131 p<. 0001 
Eqpt_class AB 0.139 0.056 0.814 1.149 0.362 3.651 
EqpLclass D -2.017 9.936 0.002 0.133 0.038 0.466 
EqpLclass E 1.457 12.084 0.001 4.293 1.888 9.760 
EqpLclass F 2.932 38.560 p<. 0001 18.766 7.438 47.347 
EqpLtype T 1.086 11.750 0.001 2.963 1.592 5.513 
User 
- class 
(Ref: C/T) 11.363 0.003 
User 
- class 
F 0.894 9.210 0.002 2.445 1.373 4.356 
User 
- class 
G 0.610 4.011 0.045 1.841 1.013 3.346 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.017 1.787 0.181 0.983 0.958 1.008 
Visband (Ref: 8+) 37.140 P<. 0001 
Visband <2 1.881 24.735 P<. 0001 6.560 3.126 13.767 
Visband 2-4 0.446 1.297 0.255 1.562 0.725 3.367 
Visband 4-6 -0.234 0.213 0.644 0.791 0.293 2.139 
Visband 6-8 0.321 0.739 0.390 1.379 0.663 2.870 
Fog 1.738 35.348 P<. 0001 5.687 3.206 10.086 
Xwind 0.043 2.382 0.123 1.044 0.988 1.103 
Icing conditions 3.775 54.710 P<. 0001 43.609 16.037 118.588 
Frozen precipitation -2.562 7.346 0.007 0.077 0.012 0.492 
Snow 2.011 33.332 p<. 0001 7.469 3.774 14.782 
Terrain 0.819 9.151 0.002 2.268 1.334 3.855 
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Constant -8.911 296.667 p<. 0001 0.000 
Take-off Overrun 
Lower95CI Upper 95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) for Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
EqpLclass (Ref: C) 83.924 p<. 0001 
Eqpt 
- class 
AB 1.157 3.226 0.072 3.182 0.900 11.250 
Eqpt 
- class 
D -0.485 0.437 0.509 0.616 0.146 2.592 
Eqpt class E - 
2.082 17.124 p<. 0001 8.018 2.991 21.489 
Eqpi class F 3.860 53.108 P<. 0001 47.455 16.805 134.003 
Foreign O/D 0.968 4.427 0.035 2.633 1.069 6.487 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.008 0.099 0.753 0.992 0.944 1.020 
Visband (Ref: 8+) 6.351 0.174 
Visband <2 0.320 0.187 0.666 1.377 0.323 5.869 
Visband 2-4 -2.077 3.470 0.062 0.125 0.014 1.114 
Visband 4-6 -0.470 0.560 0.454 0.625 0.183 2.141 
Visband 6-8 -0.544 0.957 0.328 0.581 0.195 1.726 
Fog 1.847 11.073 0.001 6.342 2.136 18.823 
Xwind 0.093 9.453 0.002 1.098 1.034 1.165 
Temperature -0.254 2.961 0.085 0.776 0.581 1.036 
Snow 2.932 31.268 P<. 0001 18.760 6.714 52.423 
Constant -9.281 113.325 P<. 0001 0.000 
Crashes afler Take-off 
Lower95CI Upper95CI 
Variable B Wald Sig. Exp(B) for Exp(B) for Exp(B) 
EqpLclass (Ref. C) 42.533 p<. 0001 
Eqpt class AB - 
0.760 1.784 0.182 2.138 0.701 6.519 
Eqpi class D -0.776 1.408 0.235 0.460 0.128 1.658 
Eqpt 
- class 
E 1.251 4.431 0.035 3.496 1.090 11.210 
Eqpt 
- class 
F 2.842 19.569 P<0001 17.149 4.868 60.404 
EqpUype T 0.934 4.660 0.031 2.545 1.090 5.943 
User_class (Ref: C/T) 37.327 P<0001 
User 
- class 
F 2.049 35.528 P<. 0001 7.764 3.957 15.232 
User class G 1.316 7.820 0.005 3.730 1.483 9.386 
Ceiling 10OFt -0.003 0.019 0.890 0.997 0.960 1.036 
Visband (Ref: 8+) 17.213 0.002 
Visband <2 1.307 5.304 0.021 3.694 1.215 11.231 
Visband 2-4 -0.790 1.464 0.226 0.454 0.126 1.632 
Visband 4-6 -1.104 2.000 0.157 0.331 0.072 1.532 
Visband 6-8 0.178 0.168 0.682 1.195 0.509 2.810 
Fog 1.753 14.926 p<. 0001 5.771 2.372 14.044 
Dawn/Dusk 0.683 3.336 0.068 1.980 0.951 4.120 
Xwind 0.074 5.967 0.015 1.076 1.015 1.142 
Icing conditions 2.246 9.040 0.003 9.449 2.185 40.851 
Frozen precipitation 2.188 6.332 0.012 8.915 1.622 48.991 
Snow 2.561 28.741 P<0001 12.945 5.076 33.013 
Hub NH -0.734 5.190 0.023 0.480 0.255 0.903 
Terrain -1.213 4.718 0.030 0.297 0.100 0.888 
Constant -9.540 186.050 P<. 0001 0.000 
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APPENDIX L MODEL FUNCTIONAL FORM JUSTIFICATION 
The functional form of the accident model seems to suggest that the probability of 
accident occurrence varies exponentially with the independent variables. While such 
a relationship between the dependent and independent variables appears to be an 
implied assumption, it is in fact related to the nature of a dichotomous regression 
problem and how logistic regression deals with that (Pampel 2000). 
Models of a dichotomous response (e. g. accident and non-accident) have a 'boundary 
problem', which must be taken into account when regression analysis is performed. 
The 'boundary problem' stems from the fact that probabilities have maximum and 
minimum values of one and zero whereas a normal linear regression line can extend 
towards both positive and negative infinity giving predicted values of the dependent 
variable above one and below zero. The one and zero limit creates a floor and a 
ceiling to the dependent variable. As such, it is likely that the effect of a unit change 
in the independent variable on the predicted probability would be smaller near the 
floor or ceiling than near the middle. The general principle is that the same 
additional input has less impact on the outcome near the ceiling or floor and that 
increasingly large inputs are needed to have the same impact on the outcome near the 
ceiling or floor. A linear relationship would understate the actual relationship in the 
middle and overstate the relationship at the extremes. 
The dependent variable's ceiling and floor also pose issues of additivity. Regression 
usually assumes additivity - that the effect of changes in one variable on the 
dependent variable stays the same regardless of the levels of the other independent 
variables' 6. Models can include selected product terms to account for non-additivity 
but a dichotomous dependent variable is likely to violate the additivity assumption for 
all combinations of the independent variables. If the value of one independent 
variable reaches a sufficiently high level to push the probability of the dependent 
variable to near the ceiling or the floor, then the effects of other variables cannot have 
much influence. The ceiling and floor make the influence of all independent 
variables inherently non-additive and interactive. 
16 This is not to be confused with the impact of slightly collinear X variables in a multiple regression. 
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The assumptions of normality and hornoscedasticity are also violated as a result of 
only having two observed values for the dependent variable. Logistic regression 
overcomes these difficulties by transforming probabilities into logits. This 
transformation could be viewed as linearising the inherent non-linear relationship 
between X and the probability of Y. The floor and ceiling are eliminated as the logit 
expands or stretches the probabilities of Y at extreme values relative to the values 
near the midpoint, such that the same change in X comes to have similar effects 
throughout the range of the logit transformation of the probability of Y. In other 
words, the logit can relate linearly to changes in X. The logit transformation has 
straightened out the non-linear relationship between X and the original probabilities. 
The exponentiation of the model function results from transforming the model to 
express probability, rather than the logit, as a function of X. 
In short, the dichotomous nature of the model creates a 'boundary problem' of having 
a ceiling and a floor to the dependent variable. Logistic regression overcomes the 
'boundary problem', along with the violations of regression assumptions that it 
brings, by estimating the linear determinants of the logged odds or logit rather than 
the non-linear determinants of probabilities. As a result of this logit transformation, 
the probability model takes up an exponential form. Therefore, the exponential 
nature of the model reflects the inherent non-linear behaviour of probabilities in a 
regression model rather than that specifically related to accident occurrence. 
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APPENDIX M NORMALISED ACCIDENT LOCATION CCPDS 
The current study explored the normalisation of the accident location x distances by 
the respective available runway lengths. As a result, x. distances are expressed as 
percentages of LDA or TODA. This may provide a better comparison between the 
accident cases and accounts for the lengths of the runways involved, especially for 
overruns and crashes after take-off 
Due to the relatively unifonn width of runways, the effect of varying runway widths 
was not expected to be great and so normalisation by runway width available was not 
carried out. 
The effect of using normalised CCPDs for risk assessment is detailed in Appendix N. 
CCPD scenario Ix distance 
For scenario 1, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are those with final 
wreckage sites beyond the runway end. Out of 133 landing overruns with known 
wreckage locations, 71 cases involved x locations beyond the runway end. The x 
distances from the runway end to the final wreckage sites were measured and 
normaliscd as a percentage of LDA. Two cases with x distances of over 100 percent 
LDA were considered outliers and were removed. The remaining 69 cases were used 
to plot the CCPD, as shown in Figure M. 1. 
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Figure M. 1 Scenario Ix distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve overrun distances more tilall 2. () 
percent of LIDA beyond the runway end. For a runway of 5000ft, this transkoc" into 
an overrun distance of 130ft beyond the runway end. Tile plot also shows that 30.2 
percent of cases involve overrun distances of 10 percent of LDA or more bevond tile 
runway end. For the same 5000ft runway, this entails overrun diMances of 5OOtt or 
more 
CCPD scenario 2x distance 
For scenario 2, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are those with 1)()Fls 
and/or final wreckage sites before the runway threshold. Out of 105 landing 
undershoots with known wreckage information, 78 cases involved x locations beyond 
the runway end. The critical x distances from tile POFI/final wreckage site to tile 
runway threshold were measured and normallsed as a percentaie of L-DA. Tile LDAs 
for two cases were not known and were therefore removed. The remaining 76 cases 
were used to plot the CCPD, as shown in Figure M. 2. 
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Figure M. 2 Scenario 2x distance CCPD 
LDUS Normalised Critical Wreckage Location X CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve undershoot distances ofillol-c thill, 
2.3 percent of LIDA from the rUnxvay threshold. For a runway of 5000fi, this 
translates into an overrun distance of 11 5ft beyond the runway end. The plot also 
shows that a significant proportion of occurrences involve very large x distances. 
Roughly 22.5 percent of cases involve undershoot distances of 200 percent of I-DA or 
more from the runway threshold. For the same 5000ft runway, this entails 
undershoots distances of 10,000ft or more. The greater x distances comparcd to 
landing overruns were expected due to the airborne nature of undershoots. 
CCPD_scenario 3x distance 
For scenario 3, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are those xvith final 
wreckage sites beyond the runway end. Out of 37 take-off overruns xvith known 
wreckage locations, 21 cases involved x locations beyond tile runway end. 'File x 
distances from the runway end to the final wreckage sites were Measured and 
normallsed as a percentage of TODA. Figure M. 3 shows the corresponding CCPD. 
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Figure M. 3 Scenario 3x distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve overrun distances ofniore than 4.2 
percent of LDA beyond the rUnway end. For a runway of 5000ft, this translatcs into 
an overrun distance of 21 Oft beyond the runway end. The greater overruns distances 
compared to landing overruns are probably due to the high energy nature of many 
take-off overruns. The plot also shows that 33 percent of cases involve overrun 
distances of 10 percent of TODA or more beyond the runx\! ay end. I-or tile saille 
5000ft runway, this entails overrun distances of 500ft or more. 
CCPD scenario 4x distance 
For scenario 4, the cases that challenge longitudinal ASAs are those v"Ith P01: 1s 
and/or final wreckage sites beyond the runway end. Out of 57 crashes after take-off 
with known wreckage information, 26 cases involved x locations beyond the runway 
end. The critical x distances from the runway end to the POFI/final wreckage site 
were measured and normalised as a percentage of TODA. The LDAs tor two cases 
were not known and were therefore removed. Figure MA shows tile corresponding 
CCPD. 
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Figure MA Scenario 4x distance CCPD 
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The CCPD shows that 80 percent of cases involve x distances of njorc Iliall 11.3 
percent of TODA from the runway threshold. For a runway of 5000ft, this translates 
into an x distance of 565ft beyond the runway end. Similar to landing undershoots, 
the plot also shows a significant proportion of cases involve very large x distances. 
Roughly 15.4 percent of cases involve undershoot distances of 200 percent of EDA or 
more from the runway threshold. For the same 5000ft runway, tills entalls 
undershoots distances of 10,000ft or more. The greater x distances compared to take- 
off overruns were expected due to the airborne nature of crashes after take-oft'. 
CCPD scenario 5x distance 
For scenario 5, the cases of concerti are landing undershoots with positive x distances 
beyond the LDA. Out of 105 landing undershoots with known wreckage 
information, thirteen cases fall into this category. The critical x distances from the 
POFI/final wreckage site to the runway end were measured and normallsed as a 
percentage of LDA. Figure M. 5 shows the corresponding CCPD. 
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Fig, ure M. 5 Scenario 5x distance CCPD 
LDUS Normalised Wreckage Location Critical X (beyond 
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The CCPD shows that approximately 80 percent of cases involve x distanccs bcvond 
the runway end exceeding 61.4 percent of LDA from the runway dircsilold. For a 
runway of 5000ft, this translates into an overrun distance of 307211 bevond flic 
runway end. The large x distances suggest that the imllority of tile cases Involved 
accidents far from the airports' immediate surroundings, where both l"OlAs and final 
wreckage sites are a distance away from the runway ends. The accident database 
indicates the same. 
CCPD scenario 6x distance 
For scenario 6, the cases of concern are crashes after take-off with negative x 
distances, i. e. POFIs and/or final wreckage sites before tile start-of-roll runway 
threshold. Out of 57 crashes after take-off with known wreckage Information, only 
two cases fall into this category. Only one case had tile correspondino TODA 
inforination. Its critical x distance is 135.77 percent Tile large distance sug 1 , gests that 
the event was altogether removed from the immediate surroundings of tile aIrport. 
The y distance confirms this. The lack of data prevents the CCPD and its trend 
equation to be computed. 
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CCPD Equations 
The various CCPDs could be fitted into exponential functions as listed in the 
following table. Their corresponding R2 values are also indicated. The functions arc 
also plotted in the relevant graphs in this appendix and labelled as 'Trendline'. 
Scenario Equation R' 
1 Fraction of landing overruns with an overrun distance beyond 0.993 
-15.261 X1.156 the runway >x = 
e 
2 Fraction of landing undershoots with an undershoot distance 0.984 
-1.07x 
0.497 from the runway threshold >x = 
e 
3 Fraction of take-off overruns with an overrun distance beyond 0.964 
the runway >x 00x 1.465 -24 . e 
4 Fraction of crashes after take-off with an x distance from the 0.982 
runway end >x = -1.25Ix 
0.734 
e 
5 Fraction of landing undershoots with an x distance beyond the 0.946 
runway end >x -0.512x 
1.704 
e 
Although the overall fit of the functions are good, all of them, except for scenario 2, 
underestimate the proportion of cases involving large deviations. It would therefore 
be more prudent to only use the fitted functions for small and moderate deviation 
estimates. 
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APPENDIX N USING NORMALISED CCPDS FOR ASA zkS", ESSNIFNT 
The research explored the impact of using norniahscd Cul)Ds Of landing overruns, 
take-off overruns and crashes after take-off for risk asscssnient. Nonnallsed CCPI)s 
were not used for landing undershoots (crasli scenario 2 aiid 5) because it is not 
expected that the runway length has Much influence on landing undcrshoot locations. 
The following graphs display the runway movement CCFDs calculated using 
normalised CCPDs for the end of runway 4 at LGA and the average runway end at 
BCT. 
Normalised runway movement CCFDs for end of runway 4 at LGA 
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End of runway 4 runway movement CCFD 
using normalised CCPDs 
Normalised rUnway movement CCFDs for the average runway end at BUT 
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The table below compares the residual risk at ASA lengths of 300ft, 000ft and 1()()()I't 
of ()-7 'S and the ASA lengths required to achieve a TLS and 10" betwcen ('('I--I)s 
calculated using standard CCPDs and ones using nornialiscd CCPDs. The results 
using normallsed CCPDs are in brackets. 
Comparing ASA length requirements & residual risks of CCFDs bascd on standard 
and normalised CCPDs 
ASA length (ft beyond runway end) Residual risk 
LGA end of runway 4 
300 9.605 x 10-8 (1.020 x 10-7) 
600 s 6.807 x 10' (7.447 x 10-'-) 
1000 4.676 x 10-8 (5.111 x 10-8) 
267(-319) 1. ooo. v 10-1 
11690(12254) 1.000 x 10-1 
- - 
BCT average runway end 
300 1.772 x 10-7 (1.793 x 10-') 
600 1.311 x 10-7 (1.312 x 10-') 
1000 9.500 x 16ý7 ý9.289 x 10-5- 
927(903) 1.000 x 10-' 
25302 (2607-3) I-Ooox 10-8 
The results using the two methods are broadly similar. For the end of rUnway 4 at 
LGA, residual risks and ASA requirements are all higher if calculated with 
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Average BCT runway end runway movement CCFD 
using normalised CCPDs 
normalised CCPDs than standard ones. For BCT, residual risk figures are higher if 
calculated using normalised CCPDs until approximately 600ft, when they become 
lower than the standard results. At very high distances though, the normalised results 
again exceed their standard counterparts. 
These findings most likely reflect the way normalisation penalises relatively long 
runways and estimates lower risks for shorter runways at certain distances from the 
runway end. The relatively high probability and small x distances of landing 
overruns (absolute or normalised) are expected to interact with the smaller 
probabilities but greater distances of the other accident types such as crashes take- 
offs. For firmer conclusions, a more in-depth analysis with more airports of different 
runway lengths is necessary but is outside the scope of the current thesis. 
-252- 
